اسناد لانه جاسوسی

شماره ۳۸

((پاریس پناهگاه جاسوسان آمریکا))

دانشجویان مسلمان پیرو خط امام

In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

S E C R E T 0403102 AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 488731.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT

REF: PARIS 11231

1. BAKHTIAR WAS IN WITTING CONTACT WITH EV RA TATION
OFFICERS DURING THE EARLY 1960 [redacted]. FOR OBVIOUS REASONS WE WOU
LIKE TO EXPLORE RE-ESTABLISHING THAT CONTACT AT PARIS. T ONE
OR ANOTHER OF BAKHTIAR'S EARLIER CASE OFFICERS MIGHT BE AVAILABL
TO TDY PARIS. WOULD WELCOME STATION'S COMMENT ON HOW THIS MIGHT
BEST BE BROUGHT ABOUT.

2. HAVE INFORMED STATE OF OUR INTEREST IN CONTACTING
BAKHTIAR AND OBTAINED THEIR CONCURRENCE. ACCORDINGLY, AMBASSADOR
MAY BE BRIEFED IF AND AS STATION DEEMS DESIRABLE.

3. FILE: 201-0083101. PVW 03 AUG 99 DRV DOC ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#8828

[redacted]

3 AUG 79 [illegible] 2 55Z

[redacted]LS, LONDON, STOCKHOLM.

[redacted]IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER SHAHPUR [redacted]S CONFERENCE GIVEN WIDE FRENCH [redacted]ERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE [redacted]FOLLOW KEY EXCERPTS OF [redacted]BLISHED IN 1 AUGUST ISSUE OF

PRESEN[redacted]AT LEGITIMATE CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT AND LEADER IN OPPOSI[redacted] THE ISLAMIC REGIME. ACCUSED RELIGIOUS LEADERS OF PLU[redacted]ING COUNTRY INTO CHAOS AND SAID MULLAHS SHOULD GO BACK TO THEIR MOSQUES. HE SAID HE IN TOUCH WITH SUPPORTERS IN TEHRAN AND WITH HIS OWN INFLUENTIAL BAKHTIAR TRIBE. CLAIMED HAS SUPPORT IN IRAN BECAUSE OF GROWING FRUSTRATION OVER POLITICAL INCOMPETENCE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS BUT HAS NO INTENTION TRYING REGAIN POWER BY LEADING UNDERGROUND STRUGGLE, PARTY OR GOVERNMENT IN EXILE. SAID WOULD NOT PRESENT CANDIDATES IN COUNTRY'S FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS. PRESENT "RELIGIOUS DICTATORSHIP" CHANGING IDEAS EVERY FEW WEEKS, BANKRUPTING COUNTRY AND UNDERMINING GOVERNMENTAL CENTRAL AUTHORITY IN FACE OF MINORITY REVOLTS. KHOMEINI HAS NO IDEA WHAT TO DO WITH POWER AND IN ONE YEAR IRAN HAD NOW SQUANDERED AS MUCH AS IN 25 YEARS UNDER THE SHAH. ATTACKED IRANIAN POLICIES OF SOVIET UNION WHICH WANTED TO SEE AN IRAN UNDER MOSCOW'S INFLUENCE OR ELSE TOTALLY CORRUPT. SUPPORTED DECISION OFF IRANIAN CUT OFF OF NATURAL GAS SALES TO SOVIET UNION. KURDS SHOULD BE GIVEN LOCAL AUTONOMY BUT WITHIN NATIONAL UNITY. REPEATEDLY CRITICIZED FORMER ALLIES INCLUDING KARIM SANJABI OF NATIONAL FRONT FOR THEIR ALLIANCE WITH ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. IRAN EXISTED BEFORE ISLAM.

[redacted]

[redacted]ATE FRENCH AND IRANIAN [redacted]SDSLIPPERY/1, SDULTIMATE/1, [redacted]ADING/INFORMATION [redacted]. ADDEES WILL RECALL THAT [redacted]MIR, WHO CLAIMED CLOSE [redacted]TH BAKHTIAR WHILE HE STILL [redacted]24 DTD 30 JAN 79). IF ALAMIR [redacted]S HE CLAIMED IN PAST AND HAS [redacted]BERAL NON DOCTRINAIRE REVOLU- [redacted]ED SOME MONTHS AGO, WOULD SEEM [redacted]ILL EXPLORE WITH UNSOBER/1 [redacted]UST.

[redacted]TENTION TO FACT THAT FRENCH [redacted]AND UNKEY) ARE OBVIOUSLY [redacted]SURFACING IN WHAT APPEARS TO BE [redacted]N (WITH ASSUMED APPROVAL OF [redacted] INCLUDING PRESIDENT), PROVIDING [redacted] PUBLICLY WITH ATTENDANT EXTENSIVE MEDIA COVERAGE AS KHOMEINI ENJOYED DURING HIS DAYS AT NEAUPHLE-LE-CHATEAU.

4. NO FILE. RVW 2 AUG 99 DRV D9C1.

S E C R E T
BT
#1231

28 SEP

CC O N F I D E N T I A L 271750Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE LONDON 19198

TO: WASHINGTON INFO TEHRAN.

FOR: NE/IRAN INFO E R/BC

SUBJECT: WNINTEL AJ JA IRANIAN EXILES

1. WISH TO CALL TO YOUR ATTENTION STATE TELEGRAM NO. 249714, DATED 22 SEPTEMBER 1979, SUBJECT CONTACT WITH IRANIAN EXILES, WHICH STATES INTER ALIA THAT "IT IS CRUCIAL THAT NO IMPRESSION BE LEFT THAT THE USG HAS ANY INTENTION OF INTERFERING IN INTERNAL IRANIAN AFFAIRS OR OF SUPPORTING GROUPS PLOTTING AGAINST THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT." PLEASE MAKE THIS EXPLICITLY CLEAR TO CALLERS.

2. NO FILE. RVW 27 SEP 99 DRV D9D.5.

S E R E T

B

#8198

4

190CT79 04 33Z

S E C R E T 190214Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 535504.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN

SUBJECT: WNINTEL RYBAT - RUN-DOWN ON SDRAP/SDPEPPER OPERATIONS

REF: TEHRAN 54496

1. IN ORDER TO GIVE THE STATION A BETTER FEEL FOR THE SDPEPPER/1 (P/1) AND SDRAP/1 (R/1) OPERATIONS WE ARE PROVIDING THE FOLLOWING RUN-DOWN.

2. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, P/1 ARRANGED CONTACT WITH RTACTION INDIRECTLY VIA U.S. MILITARY CONTACTS. P/1 WAS MET BY -- AND IS HANDLED BY GUMMISKY. P/1 IS ONE OF THE UNFORTUNATES FROM THE PREVIOUS REGIME (HIGH RANKING MILITARY OFFICER, IMPORTANT EMBASSY JOB, ETC.) WHO APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN BASICALLY HONEST AND AS A RESULT FACED FINANCIAL DISASTER WHEN THE SHAH'S REGIME COLLAPSED. P/1 NOT ONLY LOST HIS JOB BUT ALSO HIS RETIREMENT INCOME. HE NOW LIVES IN A MODEST APARTMENT IN THE WASHINGTON AREA AND LIVES OFF HIS SMALL SAVINGS. HE HAD MAINTAINED LIMITED CONTACT WITH OTHER IRANIANS UNTIL BAKHTIAR SURFACED IN PARIS. ACCORDING TO P/1 HE WAS CONTACTED BY BAKHTIAR WHO WANTED HIM TO ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN BAKHTIAR AND EITHER HIGH RANKING USG OFFICIALS OR RTACTION. P/1 CLAIMS BAKHTIAR HAS COMPLETE TRUST IN HIM BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT ONLY LONG TIME FRIENDS BUT ALSO CLOSE RELATIVES BY MARRIAGE. AFTER P/1 APPROACHED US WE ADVISED HIM TO TELL BAKHTIAR THAT HE WAS FREE TO DO AS HE WISHED, BUT THAT WE RECOMMENDED THAT HE USE P/1 AS A CHANNEL TO FORWARD WHATEVER VIEWS HE WISHED CONVEY TO RTACTION. WE MADE CLEAR TO P/1 THAT HE SHOULD TELL BAKHTIAR THAT WE WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO FUND, ASSIST, OR GUIDE HIS MOVEMENT, BUT WERE PROVIDING THE CHANNEL AS A MEANS BY WHICH HE COULD PROVIDE US WITH INFORMATION ON HIS INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES. THIS WAS THE MESSAGE THAT P/1 CARRIED TO PARIS WHEN HE TRAVELLED TO SEE BAKHTIAR AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER. BAKHTIAR'S RESPONSE WAS THAT HE APPRECIATED THE

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CHANNEL AND WOULD KEEP US INFORMED. A SUMMARY OF P/1'S MEETING WITH BAKHTIAR WAS DISSEMED IN MEMO FORM AND IS BEING FORWARDED TO TEHRAN. WE CONSIDERED BAKHTIAR'S MESSAGE TO US TO BE VERY CANDID. HE IS AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES HE MUST OVERCOME WITH VERY LIMITED RESOURCES. HE FREELY ADMITS HE HAS NO REAL MOVEMENT AND IS ONLY IN THE EARLY PLANNING STAGES. HOWEVER, HE HAS HOPES.

3. P/1'S OWN MOTIVATION IS A COMBINATION OF VENGEANCY AGAINST THE PRESENT REGIME, A DESIRE TO HELP HIS FRIEND BAKHTIAR, THE HOPE THAT A FRIENDLY REGIME WOULD REINSTATE HIS PENSION, AND A DESIRE TO REMAIN IN WASHINGTON AS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN. HE APPEARS TO BE BASICALLY A DECENT FELLOW AND NOT ONLY CHANNELS MESSAGES BUT ALSO FREQUENTLY ACTS AS A UNILATERAL ASSET, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT FORMALLY RECRUITED HIM. WE ASSISTED HIM WITH A PORTION OF HIS TRAVEL EXPENSES AND MAY EVENTUALLY GIVE HIM A MONTHLY RETAINER.

4. R/1 WAS CONTACTED BY GLEGOROFF AND COMMISKY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN LATE AUGUST 1979. THE ORIGINAL CONTACT WAS TO DETERMINE IF REPORTS OF R/1 BEING INVOLVED WITH THE KURDS WERE TRUE. AT THE TIME WE WERE UNSURE OF R/1'S WHEREABOUTS AND HIS WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH REACTION OFFICERS. SDENORMOUS/1 WAS USED TO BROKER THE INTRODUCTION AND HAS REMAINED IN THE CASE AS A GENERAL SUPPORT AGENT, INDIRECT CHANNEL BETWEEN R/1 AND HIS CASE OFFICERS, AND AS A USEFUL SOURCE OF FEEDBACK FROM R/1 ON THE RESULTS OF OUR MEETINGS WITH HIM. AT OUR FIRST SESSIONS WITH R/1 HE HAD BEEN CONSIDERING COOPERATING WITH BAKHTIAR, BUT MORE RECENTLY HAS BECOME INTERESTED IN RUNNING HIS OWN MOVEMENT. HIS BASIC BELIEF IS THAT THE ONLY MEANS TO RECTIFY THE SITUATION IN IRAN IS THROUGH SOME FORM OF MILITARY ACTIVITY LED BY OR AT LEAST ORCHESTRATED BY HIMSELF. ONCE THE CHANGE IS EFFECTED AND CONSOLIDATED THE RUNNING OF THE COUNTRY COULD BE TURNED OVER TO A POLITICIAN SUCH AS BAKHTIAR. R/1 PLANS TO TRAVEL TO EUROPE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO TEST SUPPORT FOR HIMSELF AMONG THE EXILES. AGAIN, WE HAVE EMPHASIZED TO R/1 THAT WE ARE IN CONTACT WITH HIM TO GAIN INFORMATION ON THE IRANIAN SITUATION, AND THAT THE CONTACT SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS AN INDICATION OF SUPPORT ON OUR PART. R/1 MAY NOT TOTALLY BELIEVE THIS.

5. UNTIL RECENTLY R/1 WAS IN DIRE FINANCIAL STRAIGHTS AND

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PR. TING OFFICE: 1973—537—438

LIVED IN A VERY MODEST HOME IN A SMALL TOWN IN NEW JERSEY. RECENTLY HE HAS MOVED TO BETTER QUARTERS AND IS ABLE TO MAKE ENDS MEET. HE IS NOW BEING ASSISTED FINANCIALLY, IN A LIMITED WAY, BY WELL-TO-DO IRANIANS IN THE U.S. WHO PROBABLY SEE THE SMALL INVESTMENT AS AN INSURANCE POLICY. WE SEE R/1'S MOTIVATION CONSISTING OF A MIX OF PATRIOTISM, SELF-INTEREST, VENGEANCE, DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR, AND RETIREMENT IN THE U.S.

6. WE DO NOT YET KNOW IF AN EXILE MOVEMENT, LED BY BAKHTIAR, R/1, A COMBINATION OF THE TWO, OR OTHERS WILL EVER GET OFF THE GROUND. THE PURPOSE OF MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH R/1 IS BASICALLY TO BE IN BETTER POSITION TO MAKE THAT DETERMINATION. A POSITIVE SIGN IS THAT BOTH FIGURES APPEAR TO BE REALISTIC IN VIEWING THE DIFFICULTY OF THEIR TASK. IT HAS NOT YET BEEN SHOWN THAT THEY CAN COOPERATE TOWARD A COMMON GOAL, AND ALREADY THERE ARE SIGNS OF THEM DIVIDING THEIR EFFORTS BY OPPOSING ONE ANOTHER. REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME, BOS SEES IN THE EXILE OPPOSITION AN OPPORTUNITY TO GATHER USEFUL INTELLIGENCE ON IRAN. BOTH BAKHTIAR AND R/1 ARE AWARE OF THE NEED TO GATHER INFORMATION FROM INSIDE THE COUNTRY, AND BOTH ARE IN THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING LINKS INTO THE TRIBAL, MILITARY, RELIGIOUS, AND POLITICAL SEGMENTS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY. WE SEE IN THIS THE CHANCE OF PIGGYBACKING ON THEIR EFFORTS.

7. FILE: 201-962615; 201-106171. RVW 18 OCT 99
DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#9457

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05SEP79 ? ? Z

E C R E T 0423562 SEP 79 STAFF

ITE DIRECTOR 507357.

O: TEHRAN.

NINTEL INTEL

REF: DIRECTOR 504036

1. FOLLOWING OBTAINED BY CUMMISKY AND GLAROFF IN REF MEETING 29 AUGUST AND DISSEMINATED TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS SAUNDERS ONLY AS FIRDB-312/02101-79 31 AUGUST.

WITH REGARD TO HIS OWN PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN OPPOSITION PLANNING VIS-A-VIS REF (SUBJECT) SAID THAT HE ONLY RECENTLY HAD RESUMED AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN IRANIAN POLITICS HE HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF FORMER PRIME MINISTER SEAHPOUR BAKHTIAR AND INVITED TO PARIS FOR MEETINGS. SUBJECT CLAIM ALSO TO HAVE RECEIVED AN INVITATION FROM THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO TRAVEL TO FRANCE FOR TALKS WITH THAT GOVERNMENT. SUBJECT HAS BEEN IN PERIODIC CONTACT WITH ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE U.S. FROM WHOM HE DID NOT IDENTIFY, SINCE HIS ARRIVAL HERE AND HAS BEEN TOLD TO EXPECT CONTACT FROM AN ISRAELI OFFICIAL ARRIVING IN THE U.S. FROM LONDON ON 1 SEPTEMBER. SUBJECT IMPLIED THAT THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AS WELL ALONG LINES OF CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR THE ISRAELIS FOR IRAN. HE HAS CONSIDERABLE MILITARY CONTACTS STEMMING FROM HIS DEALINGS WITH THEM AND ANY CONTACTS MANNER IN IRAN. SUBJECT DENIES THAT HE HAD ANY CONTACTS DEPARTURE OR CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SHAH SINCE SUBJECT'S TELEPHONE CALL FROM FROM IRAN, ALTHOUGH HE DID ONCE RECEIVE PHONE CALL FROM EMPRESS FARAH DIBA.

ADDED FOLLOWING COMMENT FROM SDENOFFS/1: SUBJECT WAS HURT THAT THE SHAH NEVER ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT HIM IN THE U.S. AND AS A RESULT HAS BECOME BITTER TOWARD HIM. ACCORDING TO TENORMOUS/1, SUBJECT HAS NOT RECEIVED ANY FUNDS FROM THE SHAH OR THE SHAH'S FAMILY. END DISSEM.

ALL DIRECTOR 507557 S E C R E T

FIL: 201-106171 HVW 04 99 DRV9 -1.ALLSECRET.

E T



20 SEP 79

S E C R E T 2003197 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 517075.

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN, ROUTINE
GENEVA.

WINTEL AJAJA FORRES

REF: TDFIDA-315/15000-79 (DIRECTOR 512112, NOT SENT)

1. SDPEPPER/1 (P/1) (IDEN A) IN LATE AUGUST AND
US MILITARY CONTACTS THAT HE DESIRED MEET WITH RTACTION
FAMILIAR WITH IRANIAN MATTERS. ON 31 AUGUST HQS OFFICE
P/1. P/1'S MESSAGE WAS THAT HE WANTED TO TRAVEL TO PARIS
BAKHTIAR AND WISHED TO BE CERTAIN HE COULD TRAVEL WITHOUT
JEOPARDIZING HIS IMMIGRATION STATUS HERE. THIS LED TO HIS
THAT BAKHTIAR HAD REQUESTED HIM TO TRAVEL TO PARIS SO THAT
TALK TO HIM ABOUT ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH RTACTION OR THE
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. P/1 EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS
TERM FRIEND AND CONFIDANT OF BAKHTIAR AND HAD A SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP BY VIRTUE OF IDEN B.

2. TWO ADDITIONAL MEETINGS WITH P/1 HAVE BEEN HELD, ONE
WHICH RESULTED IN REF DISSEM. WE HAVE AGREED TO ASSIST P/1 WIT
IMMIGRATION PROBLEM SO THAT HE CAN TRAEL, AND HAVE ADVISED HIM
THAT IF BAKHTIAR WISHES CONVEY MESSAGE OR INFO TO U.S. GOVERNMEN
MAY DO THIS THROUGH P/1. HE HAS BEEN MADE AWARE OF TED
SECRECY REQUIRED TO SAFEGUARD SUCH COMMUNICATIONS AND WILL IMPRESS
THE SAME UPON BAKHTIAR. P/1 HAS AGREED TO ACCEPT REQUIREMENTS
AND WILL BE GIVEN THE FOLLOWING PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE: STATUS OF
BAKHTIAR'S FINANCES; INFO ON HIS CONTACTS INSIDE IRAN; RELATIONSHIP
WITH GEN JAM; MEMBERS AND DETAILS HIS IMMEDIATE CIRCLE, INCLUDING
AWAD ALAMIR; BAKHTIAR'S VIEWS ON ASSORTED INTERNAL MATTERS.

3. P/1 PLANS TO TRAVEL PARIS LATE THIS WEEK OR EARLY NEXT
WILL STAY THERE APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK. IF PARIS OR TEHRAN
ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR P/1, PLEASE PROVIDE PRIORITY.

4. FILE: 201-952515. RV: 19SEP99 DRV DOC.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET



20 SEP 79

S E C R E T 2001072 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 517145.

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN, ROUTINE
GENEVA.

INTEL AJAJA FORRES

DIRECTOR 517075

1. IDEN A: GEN MOSTATEB RAFII, FORMER CHI
EMBASSY SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON.
IDEN B: HIS SON WHO IS MARRIED TO BAKHTI

FILE: 201-952515. RV: 19SEP99 DRV DOC.1 ALL

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

S E C R E T 201344Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 542 60

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY PARIS.

WNINTEL AJAJA

REF: DIRECTOR 517075

1. PARA TWO REF REQUIREMENTS COVER OUR INTERESTS. [illegible]
IN IRAN, WOULD SUGGEST SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON TRIBAL CONTACTS
THOSE WITH ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY.

2. NO FILE. RVW 20SEP99 DRV DOC. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 180020Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 534442.

TO: PARIS INFO LONDON, GENEVA, TEHRAN, FR/WASHINGTON.

WNINTEL AJAJA

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 521262 (NOT SENT/NEEDED TEHRAN, FR/WASH)
B. PARIS 12594 (NOT SENT/NEEDED LONDON, GENEVA)

1. SDPEPPER/1 WAS MET AND DEBRIEFED ON 5 OCT AFTER HIS RETURN FROM EUROPE. HE HAD VISITED BAKHTIAR IN PARIS 25-28 SEPT AND GENERAL JAM IN LONDON 29 SEPT-1 OCT. IN SUM, HE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION, WHICH BEING DISSEMED WASHINGTON IN PART IN MEMO FORMAT.

BAKHTIAR ACCEPTED P/1'S ROLE AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN HIMSELF AND RTACTION. BAKHTIAR'S MESSAGE TO US WAS THAT HE RUNS A SHOESTRING OPERATION WHICH IS NOT GOING TO GO ANYWHERE UNLESS HE RECEIVES FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE FROM THE U.S. HE IS STILL IN THE PLANNING STAGE BUT EXPECTS TO HAVE ALL DETAILS READY IN ABOUT FIVE MONTES, AT WHICH TIME HE WISHES TO COME TO WASHINGTON FOR DIRECT DISCUSSIONS ON THE FUTURE OF HIS MOVEMENT AND HIS COUNTRY WITH USG OFFICIALS. (HE CONFIDED TO P/1 THAT IF HE DOES NOT OBTAIN U.S. ASSISTANCE, HE WILL PROBABLY TURN TO THE GULF ARAB STATES FOR AID.)

BAKHTIAR'S OFFICE IN PARIS CONSISTS OF HIMSELF, DR. FNU ETTEBAR, DR. ABDOR RAHMAN BOROUMAND, AND THE DAUGHTER OF FORMER SAVAK CHIEF PAKRAVAN ACTING AS A SECRETARY. IN LONDON HE WAS GEN JAM WORKING ON MILITARY AFFAIRS ASSISTED BY GEN MOHSEN MOBASSER, A FORMER COMMANDER OF POLICE, AND AMIR HOSEIN AMIR-PARVIZ, NOW A LONDON BUSINESSMAN. BAKHTIAR HAS HAD CONTACT WITH NUMEROUS OTHERS, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MOJAHEDDIN, BUT THE KEY INDIVIDUALS ARE THOSE NAMED ABOVE. BAKHTIAR SAID MANY SPEAK IN HIS NAME BUT WITHOUT HIS AUTHORITY. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE HAS NO PEOPLE ON THE GROUND

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PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 534442 S E C R E T
IN IRAN, BUT IS WORKING ON IT.

WHILE IN LONDON, IN ADDITION TO SEEING GEN JAM P/1 CALLED ON GEN MOTAZED, FORMER DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF. MOTAZED IS A VIRTUAL RECLUSE LIVING UNDER POOR CONDITIONS AND DESCRIBED BY P/1 AS A SHADOW OF HIS FORMER SELF.

2. PER REF B, P/1 SAID THAT BAKHTIAR HAD BROKEN CONTACT WITH JAVAD ALAMIR SEVERAL WEEKS BEFORE BECAUSE ALAMIR WAS "A BAD PERSON". P/1 WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY GEN TARIRI-ALI. HE SAID THAT IN THE TIME HE SPENT WITH BAKHTIAR, WHICH WAS AT LEAST A TOTAL OF 36 HOURS, NOBODY MENTIONED ORGANIZATION CALLED NATIONAL UNION.

2. FILE 201-982615. RVW 160CT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#6382

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

24 SEP 79

F T 2219ZZ SEP 79 STAFF

(...) DIRECTOR 517620)

TO: ... INFO GENEVA

WA...TEL ... AJAJA

REF: TEHRAN 54242 (NOT NEEDED GENEVA)

1. IDENTITIES REQUESTED ARE GENEVA STATION CHIEF MR. JOSEPH I. SALTSMAN (S) AND AIDE TO BAKHTIAR ... BOURGMAND (...).

2. RELAYING GENEVA 48721 TO YOU FOR INFO AND INCLUDING TEXT OF DIRECTOR 522244 BELOW. THESE ARE THE PERTINENT MESSAGES ON THIS TOPIC. ALTHOUGH IN BEGINNING THERE WAS PROBABLY REASON TO SPARE YOU THE EXCHANGES THAT WENT ON TO BRING ABOUT THIS CONTACT, WE ARE REMISS IN NOT HAVING BROUGHT YOU INFO IT SOONER. WILL DO OUR BEST TO SEE IT DOESN'T HAPPEN AGAIN.

3. FOLLOWING TEXT DIRECTOR 522244, 23 AUG 79, FYI:

"1. HQS WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE WITH GENEVA AND PARIS STATIONS FEE POSSIBILITY OF USING GENEVA OFFICER (S) TO PENETRATE THE ENTOURAGE OF SHAPOUR BAKHTIAR. (S) IS PARTICULARLY SUITED TO THIS ASSIGNMENT AS HE IS ... ACQUAINTED WITH MANY OF BAKHTIAR'S SUPPORTERS.

2. FOR EXAMPLE, (S) IS IN PARIS FUNCTIONING AS ONE OF BAKHTIAR'S PRINCIPAL LIEUTENANTS. (S) WAS ... GEN (S) WAS ... IRANIAN. HE WOULD BE PRIME ... CONTACT BY (S).

3. HQS SUGGESTS THAT THROUGH CLOSE COORDINATION ... PARIS STATION, (S) SHOULD BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY ... MEMBERS OF BAKHTIAR'S ENTOURAGE. IF (S) ABLE TO ESTABLISH DIRECT CONTACT WITH BAKHTIAR, SO MUCH THE BETTER. (S) FOR ... GUIDANCE LAST SENTENCE WAS RESCINDED PRIOR (S) VISITING PARIS).



PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 317622 S E C R E T

4. RYU: INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO [illegible] DIRECTE[illegible]
VARIOUS IRANIANS ARY ORGANIZING SUPPORT FOR AL[illegible]TIA[illegible]
HAVE LITTLE HARD INFORMATION ON THESE [illegible]VIL[illegible]. [illegible]
INTEL (S) ABLE TO DEVELOP WOULD BE WARMLY [illegible]

5. PARIS: HOS ASSUMES PARIS [illegible]WOULD BE AB[illegible]
SOME ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING WERE BAKHTIAR'S [illegible]
TAKING IN PARIS.

6. INVITE ADDRESSEES' COMMENTS ON TIMELY BAS[illegible]

[illegible]: 821-2[illegible]21AS. RVW-20 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 A[illegible]



[illegible] 18 SEP [illegible] 32

E C [illegible] T 1113537Z SEP 79 ST FF

TE GLENA A721. SECTION 1 OF 2.

FM DIRECTOR INFO PARIS, TEHRAN

NINTEL RYBAT NJAJA SDSTAY.

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 502044
B. PARIS 11937 (322493)

1. GUNION MET SDSTAY IN PARIS ON 6 AND 7 SEPTEMBER. INITIAL CONTACT MADE ON 5 SEPTEMBER BY [illegible] (HOUSE) PE[illegible]E AT PARIS SHERATON WHERE HE STAYING. THERE WAS NO OTHER PE[illegible]E CONTACT AT FIRST FACE-TO-FACE MEETING. HE SAID HAD TOLD [illegible] O OF MEETING, NOT EVEN BAKHTIAR. HE WAS FULLY AVAILABLE FOR [illegible] ON 6 SEPT BUT ON 7 SEPT THERE WAS SESSION WAS HELD IN H[illegible]. GUNION'S ORIGINAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SDSTAY WAS IN FARSI, BUT TES[illegible] CONVERSATIONS WERE IN FRENCH. SDSTAY FLUENT. HE IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED GUNION NAME AND WAS DELIGHTED TO [illegible] CONTACTED.

2. SDSTAY SAID THAT DURING BAKHTIAR PREMIERSHIP HE WAS LIAISON WITH KHOMENI AND WAS FORCED TO LEAVE WHEN BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT FELL. HE SAID THAT BAKHTIAR NOW HAS FRENCH [illegible] PROTECTION BUT HE, SDSTAY, DOES NOT. HAD BEARS ASSASSI[illegible] ATTEMPT. HE HAS BEEN IN FRANCE SINCE FEBRUARY 79 WIT[illegible] AND YOUNG SON WHO LEFT IRAN WITH TWO ELDER DAU[illegible] WERE ALREADY IN UNIVERSITY IN PARIS AND SON IN UNIVE[illegible]TOR LAUSANNE. HE HAS VILLA AT CANNES AND HAS LIVED THER[illegible] FEBRUARY.

3. SDSTAY WAS TOLD THAT GUNION CONTACT WAS OFFICIAL NOT PERSONAL, BUT CONTACT IS NO EQUIVALENT TO SUPPORT. SE[illegible] TOLD THAT USG IRANIAN POLICY WAS RECEIVING HIGH LE[illegible] AND THAT INFORMATION WAS WANTED ON VIEWS AND ACTIVI[illegible] POLITICAL GROUPS, HENCE THIS APPROACH TO HIM.

4. SDSTAY, WHO DESCRIBES HIMSELF AS BAKHTIAR PERSONAL AND POLITICAL STRATEGIST, SAID THAT HE AND BAKHTIAR HAVE ANALYZED IRANIAN SITUATION IN TERMS OF ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL



...PO... OR BAKHTIAR. THOSE WHO WOULD OPPO... BAKHTIAR REGIME

RE:

A. RELIGIOUS LEADERS (E.G. KHOMENI) WHO WANT TO INTEGRATE ... INTO THEIR OWN ...LL POWER, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND RELIGIOUS. THEIR VISION IS SIMPLY TO ...ANDS.

B. RELIGIOUS FANATICS SUCH AS KHALKHALI;

C. THE TUDEH;

D. FEDAYIN-KHALQ WHO ARE CONTROLLED BY MOSCOW, AND;

E. MUJAHIDIN-KHALQ WHO ARE NOT DIRECTLY CONTROLLED BY MOSCOW BUT ARE MARXIST.

5. ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL SUPPORTERS OF BAKHTIAR INCLUDE:

A. ALL NATIONAL FRONT LEADERSHIP EXCEPT SANJABI AND 4 OR 5 OF HIS CLOSE FRIENDS. SANJABI'S REFUSAL OF SUPPORT STEMS ON JEALOUSY STEMMING FROM FACT BAKHTIAR RATHER THAN HE WAS NAMED AS PRIME MINISTER;

B. FORMER MILITARY LEADERS WHO SUPPORTED SHAH. THEY HOPED FOR A RESTORATION OF MONARCHY BUT NOW REALIZE THIS IMPOSSIBLE AND SEE BAKHTIAR AS THE BEST POSSIBILITY FOR RESTORING ORDER IN IRAN;

C. RELIGIOUS MINORITIES SUCH AS JEWS, ASSYRIANS AND ARMENIANS;

D. ALL OF THE WEALTHY LANDOWNER CLASS, THE TRIBAL FAMILIES;

E. THE SMALL MERCHANTS, THE BAZARIS;

F. MANY RELIGIOUS LEADERS SUCH AS SHARIAT-MADARI (TABRIZ) AND NAJAFI (JEOMI AND SHIRAZI FROM MESHED AND RAHALATI (SHIRAZ) AND NAJAFI (KARACHI (JOM). THESE INFLUENTIAL MULLAHS BELIEVE THEIR ROLE IS IN THE MOSQUE AND NOT IN POLITICS.



...MOST KURDS EXCEPT THOSE UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE;

...THE KHUZISTAN ARABS DON'T ESPECIALLY LIKE BAKHTIAR ...T WOULD WORK WITH ANYONE AGAINST KHOMENI;

I. A MAJORITY OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS ARE UNDER COMMUNIST ...R KHOMENI INFLUENCE BUT WORKERS IN KHUZISTAN AND ISFAHAN ...SUPPORT BAKHTIAR;

J. ALL TECHNOCRATS;

K. TRIBES - THE ONLY TWO WITH SUFFICIENT FORCE TO BE IMPORTANT ARE BAKHTIARI AND QASHQAL. THEY ARE NOT RELIGIOUS ...ENGE DO NOT SUPPORT KHOMENI. BAKHTIARI IN SUPPORT OF HIS ...RIBE AND QASHQAL ARE AWAITING APPEARANCE OF SOMEONE WHO LOOKS LIKE A WINNER BEFORE TAKING SIDES;

L. SDSTAY DISCOUNTS FARMERS AND PEASANS AND CRAFTSMEN (BAZAR WORKERS) AS A POLTICAL FORCE.

6. BASIC PREMIS OF ABOVE ANALYSIS IS THAT IRAN, AS A DIVERSE MIXTURE OF CULTURES, RELIGIONS AND CLASSES, CANNOT ...GOVERNED AS AN INTEGRATED DICTATORSHIP IN THE MANNER OF THE SHAH OR KHOMENI. THE ONLY SUCCESSFUL GOVERNMENT WILL BE A ...LIBERAL, DEMOCRATIC, SECULAR REPUBLIC ALLOWING FREEDOM AND DIVERSITY FOR ALL SEGMENTS OF POPULATION. THIS IS WHAT BAKHTIAR OFFERS AND TO THIS END HE HAS RAISED HIS STANDARD AND IS NOW WAITING TO SEE WHO WILL RALLY TO HIS SIDE. BAKHTIAR COMPLETELY REJECTS POSSIBILITY OR DESIRABILITY OF RESTORATION OF MONARCHY.

7. AT THE MOMENT THERE IS NO BAKHTIAR ORGANIZATION ... HE HAS ANNOUNCED HIS WILLINGNESS TO GOVERN AND, WITH HELP OF COLLEAGUES SUCH AS SDSTAY, IS TRYING TO DEVELOP SUPPORT AMONG INFLUENTIAL IRANIANS. AMIR PAVAR IS WORKING FOR BAKHTIAR IN LONDON. SDSTAY SAYS THEY ARE IN CONSTANT PHONE CONTACT WITH IRAN IN EFFORT GATHER SUPPORT. THEY ARE SOLICITING FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM ALL CONTACTS, BUT TO DATE MOST CONTRIBUTIONS HAVE BEEN SMALL AND THEIR FINANCIAL CONDITION IS POOR. BAKHTIAR DOES NOT HAVE ANY PERSONAL FORTUNE. BAKHTIAR HAS NO POLITICAL ...

BT

#7606

TH THEIR GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING FRENCH; HE IS DEALING WITH
NO PLACE HERE HIS PHYSICAL SECURITY BUT NOTHING MORE. THE
TIONAL FRONT NO LONGER EXISTS AS AN ORGANIZATION AND BAKHTIAR
NOT ATTEMPTING TO RESURRECT IT AS VEHICLE TO POWER. HE SEES
ED FOR MUCH BROADER POWER BASE THAN PROVIDED BY FORMER
TIONAL FRONT.

B. BAKHTIAR SEES NO POSSIBILITY OF WORKING WITH PRESENT
GIME. BAZARGAN IS HIS FRIEND BUT BAKHTIAR SEES HIM AS WEAK,
DECISIVE TOOL OF KHOMENI INCAPABLE OF DEFENDING THE INTERESTS
IRAN. MAJOR INTELLECTUAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM IS THAT
AZARGAN IS DEEPLY RELIGIOUS AND THUS BELIEVES IN CONCEPT OF
SLAMIC REPUBLIC WHILE BAKHTIAR FEELS IRAN MUST HAVE A SECULAR
EPUBLIC. BAKHTIAR WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN FORTHCOMING
ONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM OR SUBSEQUENT MAJLIS ELECTIONS ON
SSUMPTION VOTE WILL NOT BE FREE. SDSTAY WAS NOT AWARE OF
FFORTS OF AMBASSADOR ENTEZAM TO INDUCE IRANIANS TO RETURN TO
IRAN AND DOUBTS THAT ANYONE HAVING IMPORTANT ROLE IN PRE-
REVOLUTION IRAN WOULD NOW RETURN.

C. BAKHTIAR BELIEVES, FOR REASONS ALREADY STATED, THAT
KHOMENI REGIME CANNOT LAST. AS IT WEAKENS SOMEONE WILL PROVIDE
A "COUP DE FORCE" TO TOPPLE REGIME; THIS WILL BE EITHER THE
SOVIETS OR THE WEST AND SUBSEQUENT REGIME WILL BE MODELED
GOVERNMENTS SPONSORING THE COUP. BAKHTIAR BELIEVES THAT T
USA, FRG, UK, FRENCH AND JAPANESE HAVE COMMON INTERESTS IN IRA
AND SHOULD DEVISE A JOINT PLAN TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS THERE
USA SHOULD LEAD IN FORMULATION OF OBJECTIVES AND GOAL OF PLAN BE
BRITISH (WHO UNDERSTAND IRAN MUCH BETTER THAN THE USA) SHOULD
EXECUTE THE PLAN. ACCORDING TO SDSTAY THE QASHQAI ARE THE BES
TOOL TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY COUP DE FORCE. NASSER QASHQAI
IS NOW IS USA SEEKING SIGNAL THAT USG WOULD SUPPORT A QASHQAI
UPRISING. SDSTAY WAS RECENTLY IN USA WHERE HE SOUGHT USG SUPPOR
FOR BAKHTIAR VIA BILL MILLER (SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
STAFF). SDSTAY BELIEVES USG SHOULD WEAKEN IRANIAN REGIME BY
WITHHOLDING FOOD, MILITARY SUPPLIES AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
AND BY MOUNTING MAJOR CAMPAIGN TO PUBLICIZE SHORTCOMINGS OF
REGIME IN AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS. SDSTAY OF OPINION USG COULD DO
MUCH TO IMPROVE AND CHANGE SITUATION BY ASKING FRIENDLY
BUSINESS, TRIBES, ETC., TO SUPPORT BAKHTIAR.

11. ABOVE REFLECTS PERSISTENT IRANIAN VIEW, DESPITE KHOMENI
EXAMPLE, THAT FOREIGN POWERS CONTROL IRAN AND CHANGE CAN COME
ONLY BY WORKING WITH THESE POWERS. SDSTAY ASKED WITH CONCERN
IF PRESS REPORTS OF VIRTUAL DESTRUCTION OF RTA ORGANIZATION WERE TRUE
AND WAS REASSURED TO HEAR A CONTRARY VIEW. HE FEELS THAT ONLY
TACTICAL PERSONNEL UNDERSTAND IRAN AND THAT IT IS THE ONLY
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION WORTH CONTACTING. SDSTAY WAS GREATLY
IMPRESSED WITH RTA ACTION OMNISCIENCE AS DEMONSTRATED BY FACT
WE HAD LOCATED HIM. HE HAD NO IDEA HOW WE HAD DETERMINED HIS
WHEREABOUTS.

12. COMMENT: SDSTAY WAS CHEERED AND ENCOURAGED TO BE
CONTACTED AFTER LONG HIATUS AND FELT MERE FACT OF CONTACT
SIGNALED CHANGE OF POLICY. HOWEVER, HIS BASIC MOOD WAS SOMEW
DISCOURAGED AND DESPONDENT AND DOUBT HE REALLY BELIEVES BAKHTIAR
WILL RETURN TO POWER. AN EXAMPLE WILL SHOW LACK OF COORDINATION
AMONG IRANIAN OPPOSITION LEADERS WITH SIMILAR VIEWS. PARIS
STAFFMAN SHOWED GUNION A FRENCH LANGUAGE NEWSLETTER, IRAN LIB
OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN. GUNION READ THIS BEFORE SEEING SDSTAY A
SDSTAY'S PERSPECTIVE SEEMED COINCIDE ALMOST EXACTLY WITH VIEWS
IN THIS NEWSLETTER. AT CONCLUSION OF SDSTAY-GUNION MEET, HE WAS
SHOWN NEWSLETTER AND ASKED IF IT WAS HIS WORK. HE HAD NEVER
HEARD OF IT AND HAD NO IDEA WHO WAS BEHIND IT. HE PHONED
BAKHTIAR TO ASK IF HE KNEW AND BAKHTIAR GUESSED, BUT DID NOT
KNOW, THAT ITS ORIGINATOR MIGHT BE SAHABJAM NAHAVANDI, FORMER
DIRECTOR OF TEHRAN UNIVERSITY AND ADVISER TO SHABANOU.

13. POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE CONTACT WAS DISCUSSED WITH
SDSTAY. HIS ACTIVITIES AND LOCATION DURING NEXT TWO OR THREE
MONTHS WILL DEPEND ON VIABILITY OF BAKHTIAR MOVEMENT. IF
GAIN ADHERENTS AND SUPPORT, HE WILL BE WITH BAKHTIAR IN PAR
MOST OF THE TIME. IF BAKHTIAR INITIATIVE FOLDS, HE WILL BE
HOME IN CANNES. SDSTAY WAS GIVEN GUNION HOME TELEPHONE
PROVIDED HIS TELEPHONE IN CANNES, [illegible]-18-13 REPEAT 90-[illegible]13
AND THE NUMBER OF BAKHTIAR'S RESIDENCE IN PARIS, 548-[illegible]62
REPEAT 548-92-62 WHERE HE CAN BE REACHED IF IN PARIS. SDSTAY
SHOULD PROBABLY BE RECONTACTED IN A FEW WEEKS TO DETERMINE
BAKHTIAR HAS SUCCEEDED IN LAUNCHING A CREDIBLE MOVEMENT.



PAGE 2 GENEVA 14721 S E C R E T
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CRS COMMENT: RELAYED INFO TEHRAN PER [illegible]
S E C R E T

15 Sep 79 2 of 2

S E C R E T 141612Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 12390 SECTION 1 OF 2.

TO: DIRECTOR INFO GENEVA, TEHRAN

WNI TEL RYBAT AJAJA SDUPBEAT

REF: PARIS 10928

1. RECENTLY, CRAMBES RECEIVED THROUGH THE MAIL A COPY OF A PUBLICATION CALLED, "IRAN LIBRE", WRITTEN IN FRENCH (COPY BEING POUCHED UNDER TM 562894 AND 562895). ENVELOPE HAD RETURN ADDRESS, ONLY SDUPBEAT'S NAME. THINKING THAT SDUPBEAT MAY BE IN CONTACT WITH BAKHTIAR (IN FACT WE AT FIRST THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE BAKHTIAR'S PUBLICATION), STATION DECIDED TO RECONTACT SDUPBEAT. THIS WAS DONE BY CRAMBES AND AN HOUR-AND-A-HALF MEETING WAS HELD ON 12 SEPTEMBER.

2. FIRST, SDUPBEAT'S PERSONAL SITUATION: HE HAS OFFICIALLY BROKEN AWAY FROM PRESENT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT, REFUSED TO RETURN TO IRAN WHEN DIRECTLY ORDERED BY THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF. AS A RESULT, IRANIAN AMBASSADOR LOCKED HIM OUT OF HIS OFFICE AND ORDERED HIM TO VACATE HIS APARTMENT AND RETURN CAR, BOTH PROPERTY OF EMBASSY. SDUPBEAT, TO DATE, HAS REFUSED TO MOVE AND TOLD CRAMBES HE INTENDS HIRE LAWYER AND PROCEDURE MAY WELL TAKE YEAR OR MORE TO SETTLE. HE INTENDS RETURN CAR. EVEN THOUGH STRIPPED OF HIS DIPLOMATIC STATUS, SDUPBEAT MAKES IT A POINT TO ATTEND MANY MILITARY DIPLOMATIC FUNCTIONS TO WHICH HE STILL RECEIVES OFFICIAL INVITATIONS SENT TO HIS HOME. FOR EXAMPLE, ON 12 SEPTEMBER HE AND HIS WIFE ATTENDED PARTY GIVEN FOR NEW YUGOSLAV MILITARY ATTACHE. CRAMBES NOTICED THAT SDUPBEAT WAS GIVEN A VERY COOL RECEPTION BY THE CHIEF OF THE MILITARY PROTOCOL OFFICE, BUT OTHER DIPLOMATS SEEMED TO ENJOY TALKING TO HIM. HE ADMITTED THAT FINANCES ARE A GROWING PROBLEM. EVEN IF HE DOES NOT MOVE OUT OF APARTMENT, HE WILL HAVE TO PAY RENT, MUST BUY NEW CAR, AND AS HE PUT IT HIS FRIENDS WHO HAVE BEEN HELPING HIM FOR PAST SIX MONTHS MAY BE GETTING TIRED OF LOANING HIM MONEY. HIS

TWO CHILDREN CONTINUE ATTEND FRENCH PRIVATE SCHOOL, BUT FOR PRESENT DO NOT HAVE TO PAY ANY FEES.

3. SDUPBEAT TOLD GRAMBES THAT HE IS HEAVILY INVOLVED WITH AN IRANIAN EMIGRE GROUP WHICH WHILE NOT YET IN TOUCH WITH BAKHTIAR, MAY EVENTUALLY CONTACT HIM. THIS GROUP RECEIVED SOME FINANCIAL BACKING, ENOUGH TO PUBLISH FIRST ISSUE OF "IRAN LIBRE" IN FRENCH (EIGHT-PAGE PUBLICATION PRINTED ON GOOD PAPER, BUT CARRIES NO NAME OR ADDRESS AND ALL ARTICLES ARE UNSIGNED), AND ENOUGH TO PUBLISH SECOND ISSUE SOON WHICH, ACCORDING TO SDUPBEAT, WILL BE PUBLISHED IN FRENCH, ENGLISH AND FARSI. THIS ISSUE WILL INCLUDE AN EDITORIAL WRITTEN BY SDUPBEAT AND ADDRESSED TO THE IRANIAN MILITARY REMINDING THEM OF THEIR OATH MADE TO IRAN AND NOT TO KHOMEINI. ALSO, CASETTES WILL BE SENT TO SELECTED IRANIANS IN IRAN. THIS GROUP ALSO DEMONSTRATED IN FRONT OF IRANIAN CONSULATE ON 10 SEPTEMBER IN SUPPORT OF THE KURDS.

4. SDUPBEAT ALSO SAID THAT HIS GROUP WAS ACTIVE AND WAS ORGANIZING ITSELF EVEN BEFORE BAKHTIAR'S FIRST PRESS CONFERENCE SOME MONTHS AGO. IT ALSO HAS GOOD CONTACTS INSIDE IRAN AND IS IN DAILY CONTACT WITH SELECTED IRANIANS IN IRAN, INCLUDING SOME KURDS. SDUPBEAT FELT THAT BAKHTIAR DOES NOT HAVE MUCH SUPPORT IN IRAN AND THE SUPPORT, SUCH AS IT IS, COMES ONLY FROM SEGMENTS OF MIDDLE AND UPPER CLASS WHICH LOST THE MOST WHEN THE SHAH FELL, BUT HAS LITTLE SUPPORT EITHER AMONG THE WORKING CLASSES AND EQUALLY LITTLE AMONG IRANIAN MILITARY. IT WAS THE OPINION OF SDUPBEAT AND HIS GROUP, AND IN THIS THEY AGREE WITH BAKHTIAR, THAT KHOMEINI'S REGIME CANNOT LAST. IN ORDER NOT TO BE SUCCEEDED BY A LEFTIST COALITION, TWO THINGS MUST TAKE PLACE. THE ARMY MUST SUPPORT A WESTERN-SUPPORTED MOVEMENT (SDUPBEAT WAS FUZZY ON WHO WOULD LEAD THE MOVEMENT, BUT IN HIS USUAL "MODESTY" ADDED THAT HE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO BECOME PRIME MINISTER). USG'S SUPPORT OF SUCH A MOVEMENT IS ESSENTIAL, NOT ONLY MATERIALLY, BUT ALSO BY REDUCING RELATIONS WITH PRESENT IRANIAN REGIME. SDUPBEAT SAID THAT HIS GROUP DOES NOT ENVISION THE RETURN OF THE SHAH, BUT DOES NOT RULE OUT RETURN OF MONARCHY BY ONE OF

THE SHAH'S SONS. THE GROUP HAS COMMUNICATED WITH THE SHAH, BUT SO FAR HAS NOT RECEIVED A DIRECT RESPONSE. HOWEVER, SDUPBEAT AND OTHERS MET WITH FORMER AMBASSADOR ZAHEDI ON 14 JULY, WHO GAVE THE GROUP HIS TACIT APPROVAL.

5. WHEN CRAMBES RAISED QUESTION OF WHETHER SDUPBEAT OR HIS GROUP HAVE ANY CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIETS, SDUPBEAT REPLIED THAT HE AND HIS GROUP ARE TOTALLY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF SOLICITING SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION. SDUPBEAT ADDED THAT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, HE WAS ASKED TO DINNER BY THE SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHE (GENERAL KAPALKIN), BUT NEVER ACCEPTED. HOWEVER, FOLLOWING THIS TURN-DOWN OF KAPALKIN'S, HE HAS BEEN INVITED, AND HAD DINNER, WITH THE CZECH MILITARY ATTACHE (COLONEL VALEHRACH) AND THE POLISH MILITARY ATTACHE (LTC DUNAJ). BOTH GENTLEMEN WANTED TO TALK ABOUT THE SITUATION IN IRAN, BUT DID NOT (IF ONE CAN BELIEVE SDUPBEAT) PRESS FOR ANY COLLABORATION.

6. THROUGHOUT THE MEETING, CRAMBES STRESSED THAT HIS CONTACT WITH SDUPBEAT WAS IN NO WAY TO BE TAKEN AS SUPPORT BY USG, THAT CRAMBES WAS IN TOUCH WITH HIM AS AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WHOSE JOB WAS ONLY TO COLLECT INFORMATION FOR PASSAGE TO HIGHER LEVELS. CRAMBES AGAIN (AS WE HAVE DONE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN THE PAST) SAID THAT IN ORDER FOR USG TO BE WELL INFORMED, IT NEEDED SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON WHO, WHAT, WHERE AND WHEN, AND ANYTHING LESS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. FURTHERMORE, IF SDUPBEAT WERE UNWILLING TO, FIRST OF ALL, PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION, AND SECONDLY, TO HOLD OUR CONTACTS CONFIDENTIAL, THERE WOULD BE NO SENSE IN MEETING AGAIN. CRAMBES SAID THAT IF WE WERE TO CONTINUE, SDUPBEAT WOULD HAVE TO COME UP WITH NAMES, POSITIONS, ORGANIZATION, ETC. ALSO, NAMES OF THOSE IRANIANS WITH WHOM THEY ARE IN CONTACT INSIDE (UNDERSTANDABLY SDUPBEAT BALKED AT THIS ONE RIGHT AWAY), AND OTHER INFORMATION OF VALUE.

7. NOW, WHAT WOULD WE HAVE TO DO IN RETURN? SDUPBEAT ADMITTED THAT HE IS IN SOMEWHAT TIGHT FINANCIAL STRAITS (SEE PARA 2). CRAMBES REPLIED THAT WHILE HE COULD NOT COMMIT HIMSELF WITHOUT HIS HQS APPROVAL TO ANY FINANCIAL

PAGE 4 PARIS 12390 S E C R E T
SUPPORT, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO COME TO SOME UNDERSTANDING.
IN A TYPICAL MANNER, SDUPBEAT AT FIRST SAID THAT HE
CANNOT BE BOUGHT (HE ADDED THAT HE HAD REFUSED HELP OFFE
BY CRAMBES BEFORE), BUT IT SEEMED OBVIOUS TO CRAMBES
THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT SOME PAYMENT IF OFFERED. THE ONLY
PROBLEM WE ENVISAGE IS THAT SDUPBEAT, WITH HIS VISION OF
GRANDEUR, MAY NOT COME CHEAP. CERTAINLY IF HE FEELS THA
WE WOULD SUPPORT HIS PRESENT LIVING STANDARD, HE WILL BE
DISAPPOINTED WITH WHATEVER WE CAN OFFER.

8. FOLLOWING IS STATION'S RECOMMENDATION AND REQUE
FOR VIEWS AND EVENTUAL APPROVAL. IF THERE IS AN INTEREST
IN CONTINUING CONTACT WITH THE EMIGRE GROUPS AND SPECIFIC
WITH THE ONE THAT SDUPBEAT IS ASSOCIATED WITH, WE PLAN TO
OFFER SDUPBEAT 2,500 FRANCS (CIRCA $600) A MONTH FOR A
TRIAL PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, TO BE RENEGOTIATED AT THE END
OF THAT PERIOD. IF SDUPBEAT FEELS THIS IS TOO LITTLE, WE
WILL THANK HIM FOR HIS TIME AND LEAVE. PLEASE REPLY BY
COB 25 SEPTEMBER.

9. FILE: 201-959108. RVW 13 SEP 99, DRV 09C1, CL
BY 0[illegible]7277, ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
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#2390

21 SEP 79

S E C R E T 20[illegible]Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 5[illegible]

TO: PARIS INFO GENEVA, TEHRAN.

[illegible]INTEL AJAJA SDUPBEAT

REF: PARIS 12390

1. BELIEVE ADEQUATE COVERAGE OF IRANIAN EXILE OPPOSITIO
TIVITIES IN EUROPE IS DEVELOPING AND SDUPBEAT/ (U/I) WAS NO
ED IN OPS PLANNING THUS FAR. THEREFORE WE RE DISINTERES
CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT WITH U/I CENTERED ON THIS TARGET.
APPRECIATIVE CRAMBES EFFORTS AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE PERIODIC
MAINTAINED THAT WOULD PERMIT U/I TO PASS U WHATEVER IN
SETS.

2. FYI: OVEISI HAS INFORMED EOS OFFICERS THAT HE PLANS TO
SDROOE/1 AND U/1 DURING A PLANNED TRIP TO PARIS IN
SEVERAL WEEKS.

3. FILE: 201-959108. RVW 19SEP99 DRV DOC.1 ALL SECRET.

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CITE DIRECTOR 493033.

TO: PRIORITY LONDON INFO TEHRAN, PARIS, DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

ANNINTEL AJAJA GNSIGHT GNGRAPH

1. DCD SOURCE HAS PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT IRANIAN GEN. (RET) HASSAN TOUFANIAN, FORMER TOP LIEUTENANT OF SHAH AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIES, CURRENTLY IN LONDON WHERE HE HOLDING MEETING OF IRANIAN MILITARY LEADERS PLOTTING OVERTHROW OF CURRENT GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. STATION WILL RECALL THAT SD-PRETEXT/1 HAD INFORMED ADLESICK OF 9 AUGUST MEETING SCHEDULED IN LONDON OF IRANIAN EXILES FROM EUROPE. IMPLICATION WAS THAT REAPPEARANCE OF EX-PRIME MINISTER SHAHPOUR BAKHTIAR IN PARIS HAD STIMULATED EUROPEAN-BASED ORGANIZING ACTIVITIES.

2. A SEPARATE SOURCE, SDBEETLE/1, TRAVELED TO LONDON ON 8 AUGUST FOR WHAT IS PROBABLY THE SAME MEETING. SDBEETLE/1 SAID THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH VARIOUS EUROPEAN EXILES IN AN ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE THE IRANIAN COMMUNITY AGAINST KHOMEINI AND THAT AMONG SEVERAL PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE FORMER PM ALI AMINI AND IIAF BRIG GEN MEHDI MIR-HOSSEINI. THIS GROUP WAS PLANNING TO ATTEMPT TO MEET WITH BAKHTIAR CIRCA 10-12 AUGUST 1979.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE QUERY GNGRAPH FOR FURTHER INFO ON ALLEGED MEETING OF IRANIAN EXILES AND FOR CONFIRMATION OF TOUFANIAN'S PRESENCE UK.

4. NO FILE. RVW 10AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

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BT
#2260

S E C R E T 3116112 AUG 79 STAFF

TE LONDON 17282

DIRECTOR INFO PARIS, TEHRAN.

TEL AJAJA SDFACE INTEL

LONDON 17051

1. ON 31 AUGUST, SDFACE/1 REP[illegible] THAT HE HAD IDENTIFIED
OF BAKHTIAR ORGANIZATION IN LO[illegible] IS TWO-STAR
AL NASIR DJAHANBANY. SDFACE/1 [illegible] WAS SELECTED
LEADER BY WHAT SDFACE/1 CALLS T[illegible] GROUP", DESCRIBED
F.

2. ACCORDING TO THESE SAME SO[illegible] HTIAR ORGANIZATIONS
EING ESTABLISHED IN SWEDEN, GE[illegible] SWITZERLAND, AS
AS IN THE U.K. AND FRANCE. BIG [illegible] T PRESENT TIME IS
A BANK ACCOUNT HAS BEEN OPENE[illegible] AND AN APPEAL HAS
MADE TO WEALTHY IRANIANS TO CO[illegible] SDFACE/1 WAS TOLD
HOTEL SOURCES THAT FORMER W[illegible] AMBASSADOR ZAHEDI
O SHAH AND ASKED HIM TO CONTRI[illegible] SHAH REPORTEDLY
D TO MAKE ANY CONTRIBUTION WHA[illegible]

3. AS RESULT OF MONEY PROBLEM[illegible] S ANNOUNCEMENT
ABLE TO BACK UP ANNOUNCEMENT WI[illegible] RESOURCES ARE
PROPAGANDA. FOR SAME REASON, LO[illegible] TE PUBLICITY
BEEN POSTPONED. THERE WILL [illegible] REPORTED IN RET
, HOWEVER. (DJAHANBANY ATTEN[illegible] DE PAR SUNDAY
1 HAS ALSO HEARD RUMOR THAT (U[illegible] S ON 2 AUGUST.)
RENT IRANIAN REGIME ARE TALKING [illegible] OPPONENTS OF
EMBASSY HERE. THIS TALK SOUND[illegible] TACKING THE
EOPLE NEWLY CAUGHT UP IN ORGANI[illegible] GICAL DEVELOPMENT
TIVITIES.

4. DESPITE THE MONEY PROBLEM, T[illegible] ATION HERE HAS
A SMALL-SCALE CHARITY PROGRAM. [illegible] HIMSELF WAS
ONE OF THE HOTEL GROUP IF HE [illegible] IRANIAN, SEPARATELY
OF MONEY. CONTACT SAYS THAT G[illegible] PROVIDE

31 Oct 79 07 14z

S E C R E T 302247Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 542726.

TO: PRIORITY LONDON INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDFACE GNSIGHT

REFS: A. LONDON 18960
B. LONDON 19113

1. IN VIEW OF CONTINUED NEED TO MONITOR EXPATRIATE ACTIVITIES, CONCUR STATION SUGGESTION TO RETAIN SDFACE/1 ON PAYROLL AT 150 POUNDS STERLING PER MONTH THROUGH END OF JANUARY 1980.

2. IN ABSENCE OF RECORD, SINCE OPERATION INITIALLY ONLY REQUIRED HAND HOLDING, KILTIGER BELIEVES COM PROBABLY NOT INFORMED. LEAVE IT TO STATION DISCRETION WHETHER COM SEOULD BE BRIEFED NOW.

3. FILE 201-077924. RVW 30OCT99 DRV DOC.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#3019

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977-225 323

6 Sep 79 [illegible] 932

S E C R E T 051515Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE LONDON 17289

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDPRETEXT INTEL

1. ON 4 SEPTEMBER, ADLESICK ASKED SDPRETEXT/1 ABOUT WHAT HE HAD LEARNED ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION OF A PRO-BAKHTIAR MOVEMENT. SDPRETEXT/1 SAID THAT WHAT ORGANIZATION HAD BEEN DONE HAD BEEN DONE BY MOINZADEH AND A FEW OTHERS. THEY HAD BEEN DEVOTING ALL OF THEIR TIME TO ORGANIZING THE YOUNGER IRANIANS IN GREAT BRITAIN. SDPRETEXT/1 SAID THAT THEY ARE PAMPERED BY THE LACK OF FUNDS. HE SAID THAT TO DATE NO BIG GUNS HAD COME FORTH TO DECLARE FOR, OR OPENLY SUPPORT, BAKHTIAR.

2. SDPRETEXT/1 SAID THAT TO DATE ALL THE ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF BAKHTIAR WERE PROPAGANDISTIC IN NATURE AND NOT PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE OR WIDESPREAD. HE THOUGHT THAT IF THE WHEREWITHAL WERE AVAILABLE, BAKHTIAR WOULD BE ABLE TO ORGANIZE SOMETHING BECAUSE HE HAS A REPUTATION FOR BEING A GOOD ORGANIZER. SDPRETEXT/1 WAS UNABLE TO STATE WHETHER THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE ORGANIZING ACTIVITIES IN ENGLAND WAS BECAUSE OF A LACK OF FUNDS, OR INDIFFERENCE ON THE PART OF THE IRANIAN COMMUNITY.

3. WITH REGARD TO THE MILITARY, SDPRETEXT/1 SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE IRANIAN MILITARY WAS TOO MUCH UNDER THE THUMB OF THE MULLAHS TO ORGANIZE A COUP AGAINST BAZERGAN. HE HAS HEARD THAT MADANI IS GOING TO BE MOVED BACK TO TEHRAN FROM KHUZISTAN, BECAUSE BEING BOTH THE GOVERNOR AND MILITARY LEADER GIVES HIM AN EFFECTIVE BASE TO MOVE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IF HE SO CHOOSES. SDPRETEXT/1 DID NOT THINK MADANI WAS DOING ANYTHING, IT WAS JUST A QUESTION OF THE GOVERNMENT ACTING WITH CAUTION.

4. SDPRETEXT/1 SAID THAT HE SEES A LOT OF PEOPLE AND MERELY LISTENS. HE IS DEFINITELY STAYING ON THE SIDELINES WITH REGARD TO THE BAKHTIAR BOOMLET. HE SAID THAT, FROM HIS OBSERVATIONS, IF BAKHTIAR ACCEPTS SUPPORT FROM FORMER ASSOCIATES OF THE SHAH, ETC., IT WILL BE A TACTICAL MISTAKE BECAUSE SHAH IS STILL ROUNDLY DESPISED BY MOST IRANIANS AND FOR BAKHTIAR TO ACCEPT SUPPORT FROM THIS QUARTER WOULD BE A MISTAKE.

PAGE 2 LONDON 17389 S E C R E T

5. ON 2 SEPT, ADLESICK AND KILTIGER WENT TO HYDE PARK TO SEE THE PRO-PAKISTANI DEMONSTRATIONS. ACCORDING TO SDPRETEXT/1 THERE WERE ABOUT 3,000 AT THE DEMONSTRATIONS. ADLESICK AND KILTIGER ESTIMATED THAT CROWD MAY HAVE NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND. MOST OF CROWD APPEARED TO BE INDIFFERENT. THE HIGH POINT OF THE AFTERNOON CAME WHEN A YOUNG WOMAN WAS RAISED TO SPEAKERS BOX AND BEGAN CALLING KHOMEINI ALL KINDS OF NAMES. A WOMAN IN THE CROWD SHOUTED THAT KHOMEIN WAS ALSO AN AMERICAN SPY. (FROM ADLESICK AND KILTIGER'S OBSERVATIONS OF THE CROWD. SDPRETEXT/1'S COMMENTS MADE ABOVE WERE SUBSTANTIATED.)

6. FILE: 201- 215177. RVW 05 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1.

S E C R E T
BT
#7389

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979-721-333

12 SEP 79 7214

S E C R E T 1912582 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE BERN 39543

TO: DIRECTOR INFO GENEVA, ZURICH, TEHRAN, PARIS.

WINTEL AJAJA INGOT INK

1. FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF INGOT REPORT 79594, 13 SEP 79 SOURCED IRANIAN TRAVELER IN EUROPE WITE DOI AUG/SEP 79; WHICH MAY BE OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST TO HQS.

"AT THE END OF AUGUST DIFFERENT IRANIANS, WHO HAD OCCUPIED IMPORTANT POSTS UNDER THE SHAH, TRAVELLED SINGLY TO EUROPE TO VISIT FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES. AMONG THE TRAVELERS WERE THE FORMER RECTOR OF TEHRAN POLYTECHNIC SCHOO AND THE MINISTER OF WATER AND ENERGY OFFICE OF AHWAZ. DURING THEIR EUROPEAN STOPOVER THEY HAD PERSONAL CONTACTS WITH FORMER MINISTER-RESIDENT BAKHTIAR. IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE FORMER RECTOR OF THE POLYTECHNIC SCHOO FLEW BACK TO IRAN."

2. FILE: DEFER. RVW 19 SEP 09, DRV D9B.1.
S COMMENT: RELAYED INFO TEHRAN, PARIS DIRECTOR 5186942
E C R E T
BT
33

E C [illegible] T 1555Z SEP 79 STAFF

ITE PARIS 12539

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, BONN.

NINTEL AJAJA GUGRENADE

REFS: A. TEHRAN 53379 (NOT NEEDED BONN)
B. TEHRAN 53355 (NOT NEEDED BONN)

1. ON 12 SEPTEMBER SDJANUS/39 SAID HE JUST RETURNED FROM TURKEY WHERE HE HELPED EXFILTRATE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF SAVAK FOR TEHRAN, GENERAL P A R N I A N F A R. SDJANUS/39 SAID THERE ARE STILL A FEW SAVAK OFFICERS IN HIDING IN TEHRAN BUT THE RAT LINE USING KURDS IS STILL WORKING WELL. HE PLANS ANOTHER TRIP TO TURKEY IN SEVERAL WEEKS.

2. SDJANUS/39 HAS NOT YET CONTACTED HIS COLLEAGUES CONNECTED WITH BAKHTIAR GROUP BUT SAW FNU T A B A T A B A I, WHO BROTHER OF BAKHTIAR'S LAWYER. TABATABAI LEFT SDJANUS/39 WITH IMPRESSION BAKHTIAR GROUP ON DEAD CENTER AND THEY "HOPING" FOR SUBSTANTIAL AID FROM USG TO OVERTHROW KHOMEINI. OTHERWISE WITHOUT US SUPPORT, BAKHTIAR MOVEMENT DEAD.

3. STATUS SDJANUS/39'S HOUSE REVIEWED AGAIN AND HE STILL WANTS SETTLE MATTER ASAP. SAID HE PERHAPS RESPONSIBLE FOR PRESENT SITUATION BY ASKING US TO STOP PAYMENT. HAD HOPED, OF COURSE, THAT WE WOULD PAY HIM DIRECTLY, WITHOUT COMPLICATIONS, IN PARIS. PFEIFFERBAU EXPLAINED WE DO NOT WISH TO ENDANGER HIS WITH ANOTHER U.S. AGENCY AND WE DO NOT WISH TO ENDANGER HIS SECURITY. SDJANUS/39 THANKFUL AND AGREED RECEIVE CHECK FOR TOTAL AMOUNT STILL OWED HIM PER REF. PLEASE OBTAIN CHECK AND POUCH TO PARIS. IF THERE ANY WAY WE CAN GIVE HIM DOLLARS, HE WOULD PREFER IT TO RIALS.

4. COULD TEHRAN PLEASE OBTAIN NAME OF MAAG ADMIN OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR MATTER SO THAT SDJANUS/39 CAN ADVISE HIS MOTHER-IN-LAW WHO TO CONTACT. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO WRITE SHORT LETTER TO THE ADMIN OFFICER AS THIS FOR A FINAL DETAILED ACCOUNTING. CAN STATION HAS THIS LETTER (WHICH WE WOULD POUCH TO YOU) TO THE ADMIN OFFICER? PLEASE ADVISE.

[illegible]

2 SEP 79

SECRET 2214Z27 SEP 79 STAFF

SITE PARIS 12539

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, BONN.

WINTEL AJAJA SDJANUS

REFS: A. TEHRAN 53379 (NOT NEEDED BONN)
B. TEHRAN 53355 (NOT NEEDED BONN)

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4. COULD TEHRAN PLEASE OBTAIN NAME OF MAAG ADMIN OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR MATTER SO THAT SDJANUS/39 CAN ADVISE HIS MOTHER-IN-LAW WHO TO CONTACT. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO WRITE SHORT LETTER TO THE ADMIN OFFICER AS THIS FOR A FINAL DETAILED ACCOUNTING. CAN STATION HAS THIS LETTER (WHICH WE WOULD POUCH TO YOU) TO THE ADMIN OFFICER? PLEASE ADVISE.



27 SEP 79 1172

S E C R E T 261959Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 521399.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN, BONN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDJANUS

REF: PARIS 12539

1. ACCORDING TO HQS DOCUMENT NITA 26541, DATED 24 APR 73, WHICH WAS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE TITLED "SAVAK PERSONNEL CHANGES", A BRIG GEN GHASEM P A R V I A N F A R (PURNIYANFAR) DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF DEPT 3, SAVAK, WAS TO BECOME CHIEF SAVAK TEHRAN. SUBJECT WAS ASSIGNED TO SAVAK IN 1968 AS A COLONEL. HIS FIRST ASSIGNMENT WAS DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF DEPT 3. SUBJECT WAS LATER PROMOTED TO BRIG GEN AND BECAME A REGULAR SAVAK EMPLOYEE WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE GRADE OF 9. A RELIABLE SOURCE FURTHER MENTIONED SUBJECT WAS AN ACTIVE, ACCURATE AND HARD WORKING EMPLOYEE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME HE WAS AN AILING MAN, HOT TEMPERED, NERVOUS, HAD OLD FASHIONED IDEAS AND VIEWS AND HAD LIMITED AND SUPERFICIAL KNOWLEDGE.

2. HQS DESK CARDS INDICATE SUBJECT WAS CHIEF OF TEHRAN SAVAK OFFICE IN APR 75 AND HAD BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED IN ANTI-TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. SUBJECT WAS SELECTED AS AN ASSASSINATION TARGET BY QAZVIN TERRORIST. NO FURTHER HQS INFO AVAILABLE.

3. FILE: 201-960187. RVW 25SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#9861

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977 - 225-323

11 Aug 79

S E C R E T 110536Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 493295.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDROOF

REF: PARIS 11450

1. CHAHLLA KIA ASSIGNED 201-962245. ONLY TRACES SOURCED TO PAST PARIS CABLES. DPOB: CIRCA 1943, TEHRAN, SECOND SECRETARY IRANIAN EMBASSY, PARIS. WORKS IN CONSULAR SECTION ON IRANIAN STUDENT AFFAIRS. (PARIS 37080, 23 MAR 78). IRANIAN EMBASSY PRESS OFFICER KNOWS SEVERAL AMERICAN DIPLOMATS (PARIS 96756, 5 MAR 79).

2. CONCUR STATION PLANNING OUTLINED REF

3. FILE: 201-962245. RVW 10AUG99 DRV 9C.1 ALL SECRET

S E C R E T

11 Aug 79

S E C R E T 110537Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 493297.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDROOF

REF: PARIS 11418

1. WHILE DEFER TO TEHRAN RE REF LEAD, BELIEVE WE NEED BETTER ASSESSMENT SDROOF/I'S (RE BROTHER'S ACCESS TO PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE BEFORE SETTING UP CONTACT IN TEHRAN. BELIEVE BEST COURSE OF ACTION FOR PARIS AT THIS TIME IS TO ATTEMPT SEE R/I'S BROTHER WHEN HE RETURNS PARIS IN NOVEMBER WITH PURPOSE OF ATTEMPTING DETERMINE ACCESS AND IF HE HAS ACCESS TO NEEDED INFORMATION, BEGIN DEVELOPMENT/VETTING PROCESS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO OUR TURNING OVER TO TEHRAN STATION FULLY RECRUITED AND TESTED ASSET.

2. THERE ARE NO HQS OR TEHRAN TRACES REF IDEN.

3. WE CONTINUE APPRECIATE PARIS' EFFORTS AGAINST IRANIAN TARGET AND ARE GRATEFUL FOR AGGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENTIAL PROGRAM BEING PURSUED.

4. FILE: 201-008145. RVW 10AUG 9 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET

S E C R E T



21 SEP 79

S E C R E T 2014027 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 12540

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDROOF

REF: A. DIR 520403

1. ON 18 SEP SDROOF/1 CONTACTED PRETERAD AND REQUEST
MEETING. DURING 19 SEP SESSION, SDROOF/ SAID
TEAT HIS CLOSE FRIEND AND RELATIVE, LT. GENERAL SIAVOUCH
B E H Z A D I, IS NOW IN PARIS. BEHZADI ESCAPED FROM IRAN
ABOUT 2 MONTHS AGO AND WORKED HIS WAY THROUGH TURKEY.
HE IS NOW HIDDEN AWAY AND WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO REACTION
SDROOF/1 INQUIRED IF WE INTERESTED IN TALKING TO HIM. FYI,
GENERAL BEHZADI IS RELATED TO SDROOF/1 THROUGH MATERNAL
SIDE OF FAMILY.

2. IN ADDITION, SDROOF/1 SAID TEAT HIS NIECE CHALLA
K I A DEPARTED PARIS ON 16 SEP FOR TEHRA

3. REQUEST HQS AND TEHRAN STATION TRACES ON GENERAL
BEHZADI AS WELL AS EXPRESSION OF OPS INTEREST. ACCORDING
TO SDROOF/1 GENERAL BEHZADE SPEAKS ENGLI AND SOME FRENCH
TO PARIS STATION TRACES BEHZADI.

4. FILES 201-0085145. RVW 20 S 99 DRV D9C.1.

S E C R E T
BT
#2540

140

S E C R E T 2518302 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 520403.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDROOF

REF: PARIS 12540

1. ONLY TRACES WE HAVE ON SUBJECT REF IS PROBABLE IDEN SIAVOSH B E H Z A D I, DESCRIBED IN 1959 AS LIAISON OFFICER (PROBABLY BETWEEN ARMY AND SAVAK) TO WHOM SAVAK IDENTITY CARD ISSUED AT REQUEST OF ARMY JUDICIAL SECTION.

2. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN DEBRIEF OF BEHZADI WITH GOAL OF SECURING SUFFICIENT BIOGRAPHIC DATA, WORK HISTORY, LEVEL OF ACCESS TO TARGETS OF INTEREST AND WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE TO ALLOW US TO LEVY MORE SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL AND FI REQUIREMENTS.

3. FILE: DEFER. RVW 24 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
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#7987

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978 - 201-526



6 Oct 79

S E C R E T 052218Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUC

BRUSSELS 7344

WASHINGTON INFO TEHRAN.

NE/IRAN INFO E/EML/B

SUBJECT: UNINTL INTEL AJAJA SDPRAWN

SDPRAWN/1 PROVIDED FOLLOWING INFORMATION AT 3 OCTOBER MEETING:

A. P/1'S FORMER BRUSSELS COLLEAGUE AMIN KARDAN WHO ASSIGNED PARIS HAS BEEN RECALLED TO TEHRAN. P/1 SPOKE DIRECTLY WITH KARDAN AND SAID RECALL WAS SOMEWHAT UNEXPECTED, BUT SAID HE THOUGHT HE WOULD EVENTUALLY BE REASSIGNED OVERSEAS. HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN ARE STILL IN EUROPE BECAUSE CHILDREN ARE ATTENDING SCHOOL. PER P/1, KARDAN PLANS TO LEAVE FAMILY IN EUROPE UNTIL HE REASSIGNED.

B. P/1 SAID HE LEARNED FROM FRIENDS THAT IRANIAN GOVT IS SENDING SECURITY TYPES TO EMBASSIES TO MONITOR DIPLOMATS' ACTIVITIES. P/1 SAID THEY EASILY RECOGNIZABLE BECAUSE THEY USUALLY DRESSED AND APPEAR OUT OF PLACE AT EMBASSY. P/1 COULD NOT CONFIRM SECURITY TYPE HAS ARRIVED BRUSSELS. DOES HQS HAVE ANY INDICATION IRANIAN GOVT HAS SENT SUCH INDIVIDUALS TO WESTEUR?

C. SHAPUR BAKHTIAR HAS ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT IRANIAN LIVING IN BELGIUM (THOUGH NOT P/1) FOR SUPPORT. P/1 EXPLAINED BAKHTIAR NOT LOOKING FOR MONEY AS HE RECEIVING FUNDS FROM SHAH'S BROTHER, BUT WANTS MORAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT. P/1 UNAWARE WHAT BAKHTIARS FUTURE PLANS ARE.

D. MEHDI CHAMRAN, NEW DEFENSE MINISTER, HAS LONG-TIME TIES WITH PLO. PER P/1, CHAMRAN SPENT TEN YEARS BEFORE REVOLUTION TRAINING IN PLO MILITARY CAMPS IN MIDDLE EAST BEFORE RETURNING IRAN AFTER SHAH DEPOSED. P/1 LABELLED HIM LEFTIST, BUT COULD DESCRIBE HIS POWER BASE OR RELATIONSHIP WITH KHOMEINI. P/1 DID KNOW CHAMRAN'S BROTHER, MOSTAFA.



11 SEP 79

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E/1 A 1012Z SEP 79 STAFF

ARIS 12536

IRECTO INFO TEHRAN

EL RYBA AJAJA

PARIS 7827

1. MOHAMMAD AMIN KARDAN (201-957081) COUNSELOR STER O IRANIAN EMBASSY IN PARIS, DEPARTED PCS FOR RAN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979. SINCE MAY, CRAMBES HAD ERAL SHORT CONTACTS WITH HIM, BUT KARDAN WAS UNWILLING ENTER INTO ANY SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATIONS AND REFUSED TO E ANY LONG MEETINGS. HE DID CALL CRAMBES PRIOR TO S DEPARTURE TO SAY GOODBYE. HE SAID THAT HIS FAMILY ULD NOT RETURN AND WILL REMAIN IN BRUSSELS FOR THE ME BEING. CRAMBES ASKED THAT KARDAN LET CRAMBES KNOW HE SHOULD RETURN TO PARIS OR ANOTHER WESTERN CAPITAL.

2. FILE: 201-957081. RVW 11 SEP 99, DRV D9C1, C

CRET.

S E C R E T

EXILED OPPOSITION

TEHRAN STATION.

IN SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER, SDROTTER/4 SAID THAT BAKHTIAR WAS SOLICITING HIS SUPPORT. R/4 SAID HE HAD RECEIVED MESSAGES (NUMBER NOT SPECIFIED), DELIVERED BOTH IN WRITING AND ORALLY. R/4 DID NOT IDENTIFY THE PERSON OR PERSONS WHO DELIVERED THE MESSAGES. HE SAID THAT BAKHTIAR OFFERED IMMEDIATE, UNLIMITED FINANCIAL SUPPORT. R/4 SAID HE HAD NOT REPLIED TO BAKHTIAR'S MESSAGES. WE SAID WE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE BAKHTIAR MOVEMENT MIGHT BE BROKE AND ABOUT TO COLLAPSE, AND R/4 SAID HE ALSO DOUBTED THAT BAKHTIAR HAD THE RESOURCES HE CLAIMED.

HQS AND OTHER STATIONS.

1) THERE WAS DIRECT CONTACT WITH GENERAL JAM IN LONDON, PROBABLY IN SEPTEMBER. THE IMPRESSION WAS GIVEN THAT THIS WAS A ONE-TIME INTERVIEW, WITHOUT ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE FOR FUTURE CONTACTS, BUT THIS IS NOT RECALLED WITH CERTAINTY. DETAILS OF JAM'S REMARKS ARE ALSO NOT RECALLED, BUT IT IS BELIEVED THAT HE SAID HE WAS AVOIDING, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, ANY COMMITMENT TO BAKHTIAR. IT IS POSSIBLE, BUT NOT CERTAIN, THAT HE SPOKE OF HIMSELF AS A POSSIBLE OPPOSITION LEADER IN HIS OWN RIGHT.

2) SDPEPPER/1 IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE BEEN REPORTING ON THE BAKHTIAR GROUP WITHOUT BAKHTIAR'S KNOWLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED THAT P/1 PROVIDED THE REPORTING ACCORDING TO WHICH BAKHTIAR WAS ALMOST BROKE AND HIS MOVEMENT ABOUT TO COLLAPSE. NO OTHER INFORMATION ON P/1 IS RECALLED BEYOND THAT CONTAINED IN THE TELEPOUCH SEEN IN EARLY MARCH.

3) SDSLIPPERY/1, THE LEBANESE BUSINESSMAN IN PARIS, REPORTED IN AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER THAT AN OPPOSITION ORGANIZATION WAS BEING CREATED IN PARIS BY REPRESENTATIVES

OF THE NATIONAL FRONT, MUJAHEDIN, FEDAYAN, AND TUDEH. THE REPRESENTATIVES WERE NOT IDENTIFIED BAKHTIAR WAS TO BE THE CHIEF OF THE NEW COMMITTEE, THOUGH EACH CONSTITUENT ORGANIZATION WAS TO PURSUE ITS OWN PROGRAM (NOT FURTHER DESCRIBED). (SOME OF THIS INFORMATION SEEMED IMPLAUSIBLE.)

15 Sep 79

S E C R E T 1317282 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 12373

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, ATHENS.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA INTEL SDSLIPPERY

REF: PARIS 12374 (OFA-4713)

1. REF WAS OBTAINED BY TIMKEN FROM JAWAD AL-A M I R, SPOKESMAN FOR SHAHPOUR B A K H T I A R. OVER LIGHT LUNCH SERVED BY SDSLIPPERY/1 IN HIS OFFICE ON 8 SEPTEMBER 1979, SDSLIPPERY/1 INVITED AL-AMIR TO MEET SYMPATHETIC SENIOR OFFICIAL WITH MIDDLE EAST BACKGROUND WHO COORDINATES MATTERS INVOLVING UNITED NATIONS AND NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT FOR PARIS EMBASSY.

2. DURING LUNCH, SDSLIPPERY/1 MADE CLEAR THAT HE S EXI COOPERATION BETWEEN HIS OWN SHI'ITE SUPPORTERS IN BEIRUT AND SUBURBS AND COORDINATI G GR UP CITED REF, ON THE GROUND PAT PALESTINIANS (ARAFAT) WITH YRIAN BACKING NOW HAVE THE MOST D INFLUENCE OVER THE LARGE MA S OF UNEMPLOYED AND UNDEREMPLOYE SHI'A IN BEIRUT AND SUBURBS TO DETRIMENT OF LEBANESE UNITY A NATIONALISM. SDSLIPPERY/1 ND AL-AMIR BELIEVE IRANIAN SECUR OFFICIAL MUSTAFA S H A M R A N, WHO IS PALESTINIAN, TO BE AN INSTRUMENT OF ARAFAT. SHAMRAN HAS BEEN KEY MAN IN ORGANIZING TRAINING AND DIRECTING AYATOLLAH K H O M E I N I'S SECURITY APPARATUS. THEREFORE, SDSLIPPERY/1 CONCLUDES THAT ALL TH SHI'AS SHOULD WORK TOGETHER AGAINST THIS KHOMEINI/PLO AXI ON AS WIDE A FRONT AS POSSIBLE.

3. AL-AMIR TOLD TIMKEN THAT BAKHTIAR WAS NOT IN FRA CE, BUT WAS EXPECTED WEEK OF 10 EPTEMBER FOR MEETING WITH HEDAYATOLLAH M A T I N-D A F T A R I OF NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT. SEPARATELY, AL-AMIR TOLD SDSLIPPERY/1 THAT MEETING WOULD BE ARRANGED AT WHICH SDSLIPPERY/1 COULD DISCUSS LEBANESE SHI'A COOPERATION WITH BAKHTIAR. AL-AMIR TOLD TIMKEN THAT BAKHTIAR TRAVELS ON HIS IRANIAN PASSPORT WHICH WILL NOT EXPIRE UNTIL FEBRUARY 1980.

PAGE 2 PARIS 12373 S E C R E T

4. SDSLIPPERY/1 OBSERVED PRIVATELY TO TIMKEN THAT, SINCE BAKHTIAR'S SON IS A FRENCH SECURITY OFFICIAL, THE SON COULD EASILY ARRANGE TO KEEP BAKHTIAR HIDDEN IN FRANCE AT TIME WHEN HE OSTENSIBLY OUT OF COUNTRY. (COMMENT: SDSLIPPERY/1 COULD N BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT BAKHTIAR'S SON'S POSITION, BUT AS REPOR IN PARIS-11765, SDJANUS/38 SAID THE SON IS A POLICE OFFICER IN PARIS, AND "L'EXPRESS" OF 11 AUGUST 1979 CITED HIM AS AN INSPECTEUR OF POLICE IN THE 13TH ARRONDISSEMENT. ALSO, PER PARA 4 PARIS-12105, UNVIS/1 REPORTED SON WORKS AT UNDERRID. THUS, SON IS SOMEWHERE I POLICE ESTABLISHMENT, BUT WE ARE UNABLE CONFIRM WHERE EXA TLY.)

5. FILE: 221-0962 27. INDEX AL-AMIR. RVW 13SEP99 DRV

D9C.1.
S E C R E T
BT
#2373

20 SEP 79

C R E T 201340Z SEP 79 STATE

E ATHENS 60808

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY PARIS, TEHRAN.

INTEL AJAJA INTEL

REFS: A. ATHENS 60480 (NOTAL SECTY NEEDED PARIS)
B. ATHENS 60480 (NOTAL SECTY TEHRAN)

1. FOR TEHRAN: REF A ADVISED THAT SHOLROLLAH H A L A T A B A R I (SUBJECT OF A) HAS AGREED TO INFORM EMBASSY STATION OF EVENTS HE HEARS CONCERNING BAKHTIAR'S PARIS BASED ANTI-KHOMEINI ACTIVITIES. IT ALSO ADVISED THAT JAWAD A L A M I R, AN IRANIAN JOURNALIST WORKING IN PARIS FOR LE MONDE IS A CLOSE FRIEND OF SUBJECT AND BAKHTIAR AND THAT ALAMIR IS IN POSITION TO KEEP SUBJECT ADVISED OF BAKHTIAR'S ACTIVITIES.

2. ON 19 SEPTEMBER [redacted], SUBJECT PROVIDED FOLLOWING TWO ITEMS OF INFORMATION. THE FIRST (ITEM A) HE SOURCED TO JAWAD ALAMIR WITH WHOM HE TALKED BY TELEPHONE MORNING OF 19 SEP. SUBJECT CALLED ALAMIR. SUBJECT REFUSED TO IDENTIFY SOURCE OF SECOND BIT OF INFORMATION (ITEM B). HE SAID THAT INFORMATION CAME FROM FRIEND IN IRAN WHO IS MEMBER OF IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY. FRIEND WAS ON RECENT TRIP TO HOLY CITY OF QOM AS ESCORT FOR VISITING SUDANESE DIGNITARY. SUBJECT'S FRIEND SELECTED TO ESCORT SUDANESE DIGNITARY BECAUSE HE IS ARAB AND WAS TO SERVE AS IRANIAN ATTACHE FOR TALKS WITH KHOMEINI. FRIEND LEARNED INFO IN ITEM B BELOW FROM ONE OF ISLAMIC SERVING AT KHOMEINI'S RESIDENCE. SUBJECT LEARNED ITEM B DURING TELEPHONE CALL FROM FRIEND IN IRAN AND IN TEHRAN TO SUBJECT ON 16 SEPTEMBER. SUBJECT COULD NOT ELABORATE ON EITHER OF PIECES OF INFORMATION. HE BELIEVES INFO IS RELIABLE. HE WAS NOT ABLE TO ASK ANY QUESTIONS ON THIS INFORMATION BECAUSE THEY WERE USING TELEPHONES.

3. ITEM A, ALAMIR STATED THAT IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN WAS TO BE REPLACED WITHIN NEXT TWO OR THREE DA

PAGE 2 ATHENS 6083 S E C R E T
KCIRCA 21 OR 22 SEPTEMBER) AND THAT REPLACEMENT WOULD BE
EITHER IBRAHIM YAZDI (FOREIGN MINISTER) OR AHMED BANI SADR
(ISLAMIC PARTY THEORETICIAN). SUBJECT DID NOT KNOW HOW
ALAMIR LEARNED THIS INFORMATION.

ITEM B, ANOTHER HOLY CITY OF QOM, ISLAMIC GUARDS ARE B
TRAINED IN GUERRILLA TACTICS TO BE USED IN SUPPORT OF ANTI
REGIME ACTIONS IN AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF ISLAMI
GUARDS TRAINED AT M ARE ALREADY IN AFGANISTAN SUPPORTING
THE AFGHAN ISLAMIC FORCES ENGAGED IN OPPOSITION FIGHTING.
INGRESS ROUTE TO AFGHANISTAN USED BY IRANIAN ISLAMIC GUARD
IS VIA BALUCHISTAN. PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN'S RECENT VIS
TO BALUCHISTAN WAS FOR FACILITATING PURPOSES ON PROBLEMS
IN MOVEMENT OF ISLAMIC GUARDS ACROSS THE BORDER INTO AFGH

3. FILE: 2 962640. RVW 20 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1

S E C R E T

21 SEP 79 2/2

S E C R E T 212[illegible]Z SEP 79 STAFF

SITE PARIS 1590

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, FR/WASHINGTON.

UNIMELI AJAXA FCORRES

REF: DIRECTOR [illegible]7075

1. JAMAL AL-AMIR TOLD PARIS C/O AND SDSLIPPERY/1 ON 20 SEPTEMBER THAT GENERAL TARIRI ALI HAD ARRIVED PARIS 19 SEPTEMBER AT REQUEST OF AL-AMIR'S COORDINATING GROUP, WHICH NOW CALLS ITSELF THE NATIONAL UNION KETIBEH E MELLI), TO DIRECT MILITARY PLANNING FOR THE GROUP. AL AMIR DESCRIBED GENERAL JAFARI AS THE MOST POPULAR WITH TROOPS AND GENERAL ALI AS THE MOST PROFESSIONALLY RESPECTED OF THE HOLD-LINE IRANIAN GENERALS. AL AMIR DESCRIBED ALI AS HAVING BEEN CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF UNDER MOSSKDEGH, LATER AMBASSADOR IN MADRID, AND AS HOLDER OF MATHEMATICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEGREES FROM UNIVERSITIES IN EUROPE AND U.S.

2. IT WOULD BE USEFUL OPERATIONALLY IF PARIS STATION IF SDSLIPPERY/1 COULD VERIFY INFO PARA 1 ABOVE AND DEFINE ALI'S RELATIONSHIP TO BAKHTIAR AND AL-AMIR WHO PRESENTS SELF AS GENERAL COORDINATING FIGURE WHOSE CREDENTIALS DERIVE FROM EARLY DAYS OF OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH, BAKHTIAR AS FIGURE-HEAD, AND JAFARI AND SHARIAT-MADARI AS MEN WHOSE POPULARITY WAS BUILT BY AL-AMIR AND OTHERS IN THE OLD OPPOSITION.

3. AL-AMIR HAS NOW MET PARIS C/O, UNDER POLITICAL SECTION COVER IN TRUE NAME, TWICE AT MEETINGS BROKERED BY SDSLIPPERY/1. IN SECOND MEETING, AL-AMIR REFERRED TO POLITICAL SECTION CONTACT WITH KHOMEINI DURING NEAUPHLE LE CHATEAU EXILE AND IDENTIFIED U.S. WARREN ZIMMERMANN ERRONEOUSLY AS REACTION COS. PARIS C/O CLAIMED MR. ZIMMERMANN AS HIS BOSS, AND CLARIFIED THAT HE NOT COS, WHILE DENYING KNOWLEDGE OF ZIMMERMANN CONTACT WITH KHOMEINI. WE HAVE, AS YET, NO CONTROL OVER WHAT SDSLIPPERY/1 MAY SAY TO PRINCIPALS (SUCH AS AL-AMIR AND C/O) WHOM HE WISHES TO BRING TOGETHER IN ORDER TO BUILD THEM UP TO EACH OTHER. SDSLIPPERY/1 SHOULD NOT, OF COURSE, BE BRIEFED ON OUR CONTACTS WITH AL-AMIR (WHICH HAVE BEEN UNSOLICITED AND MAY NOT



. PARI 12824 S E C R E T
(NUEA) BUT CAN NO WHO DEBRIEFS HIM AFTER TRIP SHOULD BE AL
Y INDICATION THAT SDSLIPPERY// HAS BECOME AWARE OF TH
TRY TO DISCOVER WHAT AL-AMIR MAY HAVE SAI ABOUT THEM.

4. FI : 220 962615; 201-962067. R W 21SEP99 DRV

R E T

SET
94



PO S E C R E T /WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON
UNC AN/FRANCE
PJ ONTACT AND ACTIVITIES OF IRANIAN OPPOSITION
OVEME IN FRANCE (DOI: LATE SEPTEMBER 1979)

OU NON-IRANIAN SEISITE BUSINESSMAN ABROAD WHOSE
RELIA ILI HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE SPOKE TO
A MEMBER OF THE IRANIAN OPPOSITION MOVEMENT.

RY: THE PARIS COORDINATING GROUP OF IRANIAN
OP NISTS UNDER THE NOMINAL GUIDANCE OF FORMER IRANIAN
PR ISTER BAKTIAR HAS NAMED ITSELF ITTIHAD-E-MELLI
(UNION). THEY PUBLISH A FARSI PUBLICATION CALLED
IN PARIS ON A WEEKLY BASIS. THEY HAVE ASKED FORMER
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL TARIRI ALI TO BE THEIR
TARY PLANNER, AND HAVE THE SUPPORT OF SEVERAL
AYATOLLAHS IN IRAN. THEY MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH
MPLOYEES OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION
BEEN ABLE TO SPORADICALLY INTERRUPT SPEECHES BY
THEY PLAN TO CONTINUE SABOTAGE OF POLITICAL AND
US BROADCASTS ON AN OCCASIONAL BASIS. THE NATIONAL
UPPORTS THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SELF-
INATION, AND WITH THE EXCEPTION OF BAKTIAR, FAVORS
MY STATUS FOR IRANIAN MINORITY NATIONALITIES. THE
AL UNION HOPES CURRENT IRANIAN REGIME MINISTER MEHDI
GAN WILL RESIGN AND RETURN AT A LATER DATE AS THEIR
IDATE TO HEAD AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT ONCE KHOMEINI IS
VED. THEY HAD ONE CONTACT WITH A SOVIET OFFICIAL IN PARIS,
THEIR ATTEMPT TO GET TUDEH PARTY SUPPORT WAS TO NO AVAIL.
SUMMARY.

1. THE PARIS COORDINATING GROUP OF IRANIAN OPPOSITIONISTS
MINALLY HEADED BY FORMER IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER SHAPOUR
A K H T I A R AND COMPOSED OF MEMBERS OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL
FRONT, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT, MUJAHEDAN AND FEDAYEEN
E-KHALQ, HAS NAMED ITSELF THE ITTIHAD-E-MELLI (NATIONAL
UNION). THEY SPONSOR A WEEKLY FARSI LANGUAGE PUBLICATION
ENTITLED "NAMEH," WHOSE MANAGING EDITOR IS A. A L B I G E S.
ONE OF "NAMEH'S" PRINCIPAL ORGANIZERS, IRANIAN JOURNALIST
AND FORMER TELEVISION PRODUCER JAWAD A L - A M I R, IS CURRENTLY
IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A WORLDWIDE LIST OF POTENTIAL
IRANIAN SUBSCRIBERS.

TRYING TO LINE UP SUPPORT FOR ITS EFFORTS. THE
ION HA ASKED GENERAL TARIRI A L I, WHO SERVED AS
AFF OF THE IRANIAN ARMY UNDER THE REGIME OF
S S A D E C H, TO BE THEIR CHIEF MILITARY
LI CAME TO PARIS ON 19 SEPTEMBER IN RESPONSE TO
ST. NATIONAL UNION LEADERS CONSIDER GENERAL ALI,
ATHEMATICIAN AND HOLDS, AMONG OTHERS, A DEGREE FROM
UNIVERSITY, THE RETIRED GENERAL WHO COMMANDS THE
OSSIONAL RESPECT IN THE ARMY; WHEREAS THEY REGARD
ANIAN CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL FEREIDUN D J A M AS THE
LAR OF THE RETIRED GENERALS. (FIELD COMMENT:
RDB-315/15877-79, 11 SEPTEMBER 1979, FROM AN OFFICIAL
SERVICE, WHICH STATES THAT FORMER IRANIAN PRIME
BAKHTIAR AND ARREACHED GENERAL JAM FOR HIS SUPPORT,
RAL JAM DECIDED TO REMAIN ON THE SIDELINES FOR THE
NG.)

THE NATIONAL UNION IS IN REGULAR COMMUNICATION WITH
ENLISTED THE SUPPORT OF AYATOLLAHS SAYED KAZEM
I A T - M A D A R I, HASSAN TABATABAI Q O M I, AND
LAH SEYED ABDOREZA S H I R A Z I. THE NATIONAL UNION IS
CE WITH AYATOLLAH M O T A H A R I AND IS OPTIMISTIC
GAINING HIS SUPPORT. AYATOLLAH B E H B A H A N I ALSO
AINS CONTACT WITH THEM, BUT THEY CONSIDER HIM AN
RTUNIST WHO WILL BACK THE POLITICAL ELEMENT WHICH SEEMS TO
TO BE WINNING AT THE MOMENT. RUHANI IS CURRENTLY AN UNRE-
ADHERENT OF KHOMEINI. (SOURCE COMMENT: RUHANI IS
VATELY OPPOSED TO KHOMEINI BUT CURRENTLY RELIES ON HIS
SITION AS AN OVERT SUPPORTER AS A BASE FROM WHICH TO ATTACK
E BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT, PRIMARILY FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIM
A Z D I. RUHANI PRESUMBALY BLAMES THE GOVERNMENT FOR FAILING
O SUPPORT THE POSITION OF RUHANI'S YOUNGER BROTHER, H E
ESIDES IN PARIS, AS PREEMINENT MULLAH OF THE SHIITE COMMUNITY
IN EUROPE.)

A. THE NATIONAL UNION HAS CONTINUING CONTACT WITH A GROUP
OF EMPLOYEES OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION (NIRT)
WHO, ON 10 SEPTEMBER, CAUSED THE INTERRUPTION OF A KHOMEINI
SPEECH BEING RELAYED TO ONE OF THE IRANIAN PROVINCES AT 2100
HOURS, FOR THE THIRD TIME IN A TWO-WEEK PERIOD. THE NATIONAL
UNION ESTIMATES THAT NINETY PERCENT OF THE EMPLOYEES OF THE
NIRT ARE OPPOSED TO THE KHOMEINI REGIME, AND ANTICIPATES NO
DIFFICULTY IN IMPLEMENTING A PLAN FOR THE OCCASIONAL SABOTAGE

S FOR RELAYING F POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS BROAD-
OF THIS IS A TECHNIQUE WHICH WAS EMPLOYED BY THE
WHICH, PUT KHOMEINI IN POWER. THE NATIONAL UNION
BOTH KHOMEINI AND THE GENERAL POPULACE WILL VIEW
PTIONS AS A SIGN THAT THE OLD REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS
AGAINST KHOMEINI AS THEY WERE AGAINST THE SHAH.

POLICYWISE, THE NATIONAL UNION HAS NO CONTACTS WITH
TINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), BUT ITS POLICY
PORT THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SELF-
TION. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF BAKHTIAR, THE NATIONAL
FO'S THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY VERGING ON SEPERATION FOR
IAN MINORITY NATIONALITIES. BAKHTIAR FAVORS
ION OF THE MINORITIES.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, THE NATIONAL UNION HOPES THAT
PRIME MINISTER YEZDI / A Z A R G A N WILL RESIGN
ER A SUITABLE INTERLUDE, BE ABLE TO INFILTRATE FROM IRA
ME THE NATIONAL UNION CANDIDATE FOR INSTALLATION AS
AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO PREPARE ELECTIONS AFTER THE
OF THE KHOMEINI REGIME. THE NATIONAL UNION BELIEVES
F BAZARGAN RESIGNS, KHOMEINI WILL REPLACE EITHER
N MINISTER YAZDI OR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS ADVISOR ABDOL HASSAN
I S A D R.

7. THE NATIONAL UNION HAS HAD ONE CONTACT WITH A SENIOR
ET DIPLOMAT IN PARIS. THE NATIONAL UNION REPRESENTATIVE
D THE SOVIET TO PREVAIL UPON THE TUDEH COMMUNIST PARTY
JOIN THE COORDINATING GROUP OR, AT LEAST, TO COME OUT
INLY IN OPPOSITION TO KHOMEINI. THE SOVIET OFFICIAL
MURRED, CLAIMING THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD NO CONTROL
ER THE ACTIVITIES AND POLICIES OF THE TUDEH.

8. ACQ: FRANCE, PARIS (21 SEPTEMBER 1979). FIELD
OK CPA-4725.

9. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT PARIS. SENT TO TEHRAN.
REPORT CLASS S/E C R E T /WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINA-
TION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.
RVW 10OCT99 DRV DSCI BY FEDDEPPL REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS
CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.
PT
#2899



Ø2151ØZ OCT 79 UNTEL 30Oct79

12898 ZNY XXXXX

FOR INFO TEHRAN, ATHENS, LONDON.

AJA SDSLIPPERY INTEL ZRWAHOO

ZRWAHOO FOR TEHRAN COMMENTS: NO OPACT. SOURCE
TIMMEN AND SDSLIPPERY/1 DIRECTLY. (SAME CIRCUM-
STANCES AS IN PARIS 123730). NO LIAISON. NO INDEX.
NO FILE. OBJECTIVE: S+A-E. CL BY Ø97277. FIELD
NO: OFA-4726.
Ø2151ØZ



30OCT79

E C R E T 302252Z OCT 79 STAFF

TIE DIRECTOR 328724.

O: AO/DOR, PARIS TAPO TEHRAN.

INTEL AJA SNOWFALL INTEL FIGI

REFS: A. OFA-4726 (PARIS 12898 ZRWAHOO)
B. LONDON [illegible]
C. PARIS 12[illegible]

1. AS WE ARE FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ANY FORM OF OUTSIDE
INTERFERENCE/SUBSTANTIATION FROM ALEADING IRANIAN OPPOSITION FIGURE
REFERRED TO IN REF A, WE ARE IN CONTACT, WHETHER OUTSIDE CONCURRENCE IN REF B
SHOULD PRECIPITATE/RESOLVE THAT MEETING.

2. NO FILE. NFW DO OCT 99 DRV DSP. ALL SECRET.

E C R E T



22 SEP 79

S E C R E T 2115[illegible]Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS12610

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO ATHENS, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA INTEL.

REF: A. ATHENS [illegible]
B. PARIS [illegible]

1. ULTIMATE SOURCE OF ITEM A PARA 2 REF TOLD PARIS STATION C/O AND SDSLIPPERY/1 ON 20 AUGUST THAT, IN SOURCE OPINION, BAZARGAN WOULD BE THE BEST MAN TO HEAD AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO REESTABLISH PUBLIC ORDER AND PREPARE ELECTIONS AFTER KHOMEINI FALLS OR IS REMOVED FROM POWER. SOURCE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME TO PERSUADE BAZARGAN TO RESIGN FROM PRIME MINISTRY AND AWAIT FAVORABLE (TO THE OPPOSITION) EVENTS. C/O ASKED SOURCE WHO KHOMEINI WOULD PUT IN BAZARGAN'S PLACE. WERE THE LATTER TO RESIGN, AND SOURCE REPLIED PROBABLY YAZDI, POSSIBLY BANI SADR. SOURCE COMMENTED THAT YAZDI WANTED TO PLAY THE AMERICAN GAME, AND BANI SADR MIGHT PROMOTE HIS THEORY OF MONOTHEIST ECONOMICS WHICH, IN A NUTSHELL, IMPLIES DISPOSSESSION OF THE WEALTHY.

2. SOURCE AN SDSLIPPERY/1 CLAIM, PROBABLY CORRECTLY, THAT SOURCE IS IN TOUCH WITH A STEADY STREAM OF IRANIANS COMING AND GOING FROM IRAN AND FROM WESTERN COUNTRIES, SO IT USELESS TO SPECULATE WHETHER ONE, OR WHICH ONE, OF THEM MAY HAVE PREDICTED BAZARGAN FALL IN TWO OR THREE DAY TIME FRAME. HOWEVER, SOURCE DID SAY THAT MOST RECENT SIGNIFICANT ARRIVAL FROM IRAN, AT BEHES OF NATIONAL UNION, WAS GENERAL TARIRI ALI, PER REF B.

3. FILE: 201962037. RVW 21 SEP 99 DRV DOC1.

S E C R E T
BT
#2610



5 OCT 79

S E C R E T 041734Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 12809

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL ITE AJAJA SDSLIPPERY

REF: A. PARIS 12594
B. PARIS 12432
C. PARIS 12373
D. PARIS EMBTEL 026015 OF 17 AUG 79
E. PARIS 97163
F. PARIS 95826
G. PARIS 95824

1. REQUEST FULL TRACES AND ASSIGNMENT 201 AND CRYPT FOR AMIR (ALT: DJAWAD ALAMIR) (AKA DJAWAD ALAMIR DAWALLOU) PDOB IRAN, TEHRAN 5 APRIL 35; CIT. IRAN; OCC. BUSINESS, COMMUNICATIONS ENTREPRENEUR; RES. FRANCE, PARIS, 3 BOULEVARD HENRI IV, SIXTEENTH ARRONDISSEMENT, TEL. 329 66 52; FATHER'S NAME MAHMUD AL-AMIR QAJAR OF EMTESHAM-OL-SALTANEH. MOTHER'S NAME MA'SUMA LNU, OF ASHTAR-OL-ZAMAN. SUBJECT ATTENDED INSTITUT DUPUICH IN BRUSSELS, INSTITUT D'ETUDES POLITIQUES IN PARIS; FACULTY OF LETTERS, UNIVERSITY OF PARIS (SORBONNE). SUBJECT SPEAKS FRENCH AND ENGLISH AT LEVEL 4, CLAIMS EQUAL FLUENCY IN FARSI, SPANISH AND GERMAN. SUBJECT IS MARRIED AND HAS FOUR CHILDREN.

2. SUBJECT EMPLOYMENT HISTORY, DATES NOT SUPPLIED: POLITICAL EDITOR, ETTELA'AT NEWSPAPER; CHIEF EDITOR, JOURNAL DE TEHERAN; PUBLISHER, JAME JAHAN-NEMA, IN HAFTEH, THIS WEEK IN TEHERAN; REPRESENTATIVE, ORTF (IRAN); CORRESPONDENT, LE MONDE (PARIS), NEWSWEEK (NEW YORK); ADVISOR ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS POLITICAL COMMENTATOR, PRODUCER, NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO-TELEVISION (NIRT). CURRENTLY: PRESIDENT, TELEPRESS INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY.

3. INFO PARAS 1 AND 2 SUPPLIED BY SUBJECT TO SDSLIPPERY/1 WHO FURNISHED COPY OF PARIS C/O. SDSLIPPERY/1. AT C/O REQUEST, OBTAINED FOLLOWING FROM SDULTIMATE:

PAGE 2 PARIS 13009 S E C R E T

A. SUBJECT [illegible] TELEVISION PROGRA[illegible] PRODUCER. [illegible] WAS
PARIS DAILY LE MONDE CORRESPONDENT IN TE[illegible] FOR TEN YEARS.

B. SUBJECT ENJOYED A VERY FAVOR[illegible] RELATIONSHIP WITH
THE SHAH.

C. SUBJECT'S FATHER, OR POSSIBL[illegible] GRANDFATHER, WAS AN
IRANIAN SENA[illegible]OR.

D. SUBJECT HAS FOUR CHILDREN, T[illegible] OF WHOM ARE IN SCHO
IN CONUS, EL[illegible]EST OF [illegible]HOM IS A MALE BORN [illegible]A 54.

5. SUB[illegible]JECT IS NOW AN INFLUENTIAL M[illegible]ER OF A COORDINATIN
GROUP FOR TE[illegible] IRANIA[illegible] OPPOSITION IN EXILE [illegible]WHICH HE CALLS THE
NATIONAL UNI[illegible]N. HE [illegible]AS TWICE LUNCHED WI[illegible] PARIS STATION C/O
ERNEST N. TI[illegible]KEN AS [illegible]HE GUEST OF SDSLIPPERY1. SUBJECT KNOWS
TIMKEN IN HI[illegible] COVER [illegible]APACITY, BUT MAY AS[illegible]UME THAT HE IS
RTACTION CON[illegible]ECTED. SUBJECT HAS TOLD TI[illegible]KE THAT PARIS
EMBASSY POLI[illegible]ICAL CO[illegible]NSELOR WARREN ZIMME[illegible]MAN WAS IN CONTACT
WITH AYATOLL[illegible]H KHOMEINI DURING HIS EXILE [illegible]N BEAUPUILLE IN CHATEA
AND THAT ZIM[illegible]ERMANN WAS THE RTACTION CHI[illegible]N PARIS. (TIMKEN
HAS ASSURED [illegible]UBJECT THAT ZIMMERMANN IS N[illegible] RTACTION.) SUBJECT
CLAIMS MANY [illegible]ISTINGUISHED AMERICANS, FOR MO[illegible] AMONG THEM
AMBASSADOR R[illegible]CHARD HELMS, AS CLOSE FRIENDS OF LONG STANDING.
SUBJECT CLAI[illegible]S TO HAVE BEEN AN OUTSPOKEN OPPONENT OF THE SHAH
FOR MANY YEA[illegible]S PRIOR TO 1978. UNPOLO/1 [illegible]AS TOLD TIMKEN THAT
SUBJECT CLAI[illegible]S TO HAVE BEEN JAILED UNDER TH[illegible] SHAH'S REGIME FOR
OPPOSITION A[illegible]IVITY, WHEREAS HE WAS ACTU[illegible]LLY CONDEMNED TO
EIGHT YEARS [illegible]NCARCERA[illegible]TION FOR RAPING HIS OW[illegible] NIECE, BUT
RELEASED AFT[illegible]ER TWO YEARS THANKS TO HIS F[illegible]MILY'S I[illegible]FLUENCE AT
COURT. SUBJECT'S OWN VERSION OF THIS ST[illegible]RY IS RELATED IN
REF C, PARA [illegible]. UNPOLO/1 ATTRIBUTES HER [illegible]TORY TO [illegible]NCONTESTABLY
RELIABLE IRA[illegible]IAN LAWYERS OF HER ACQUAINT[illegible]NCE.

5. FILE: 201-[illegible]62067. RVW 2 OCT 9[illegible] DAW D9C.

S E C R E T
BT
#3009


DISPATCH
Chief, Near East Division
Chief, European Division
COS Tehran
Chief of Station, Paris
INITIAL IDEL WAJA RTWINNER
Forwarding copies of Iranian
WARNING NOTICE - INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
1. Attached are two copies
RTWINNER of the National Union's
appears in Paris daily in Paris
are unable to read the publication
understand from IDEN who have us these
bulletin is a compendium of the most
events and an supplied by travelers,
and letters from Iran.
2. We recommend that
for information of possible Political
analysts, or operational interest to Tehran,
other stations.
3. We recommend that RTWINNER
for potential value of an outlet for
of perspectives, and retain it as
use in support of grey or black
The publication was discussed with
visit to Paris.
ERNEST N.
Attachment: as stated,
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1 - Addressee, w/att h/w; iden
1 - C/NEUR, w/o att; iden
1 - COS, Tehran, w/att h/w; iden
DISSEMINATION SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OPRA-7147
CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T
DATE
NOS FILE
201

2 Nov 79 11 38z

S E C R E T 020040Z NOV 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 544703.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL INTEL AJAJA SDSLIPPERY

REF: PARIS 13009

1. SUBJECT REF ENCRYPTED SDLEADER/1, ASSIGNED 201-963116. TRACES CONTAINED DIRECTOR 508655, 6 SEP 79.

2. FILE: 201-963116. RVW 01NOV99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
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

C S E T 311922Z J[illegible] 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR 488088.

PRIORITY PARIS 13[illegible] TEHRAN, [illegible] UI

WINTEL HYBAT AJAJA

REF: PARIS 11[illegible]

1. [illegible] SLIM INCRYPTED IDEN A, ASSIGN[illegible] 201-[illegible]
HAS BEEN ISSUED [illegible] VICE PDA FOR OPERATION[illegible] USS[illegible] IS TO
BE PARTIAL ACTIVITY UNTIL SUCH TIME AS HIS [illegible] A PID ARE
RECEIVED. MAHDI ARHANI HAS BEEN ENCRYPTED IDEN[illegible]

2. REF CABLE CONTINUES TO BE INTERESTING AND W[illegible]
THAT PARA 7 PROPOSAL MEETS OUR FOLLOW-THROUG[illegible] MUCH
PARIS BEFORE THIS CAN AND MUST DEVELOP[illegible] IN TO INTE[illegible]
WE BEGIN INCREASE STEADILY TOWARD ACCEPTANCE[illegible] ASSETS
IN IRAN. AT SAME TIME, BELIEVE WE MUST SOME[illegible] NOT[illegible] CAUTION
CONCERNING OUR DEALINGS WITH SLIM. WE[illegible] D, [illegible] IN
LESS THAN FAVORABLY KNOWN TO OFFICERS[illegible] SERVICE
WHILE NOT RECOMMENDING THAT WE NOT WORK WITH SLIM, [illegible] INTERE
BEIRUT STATION OFFICER RECOMMENDED THAT WE [illegible] VERY [illegible]
AND THAT IT UNLIKELY SLIM WAS IN CONTACT WITH [illegible] AND
PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE RENEWED HIS CONTACT[illegible]
SERVICE. IN SHORT, SLIM COMES ACROSS AS A [illegible]
CERTAIN WORLD WHO COULD, WHEN PROFITABLE, [illegible] CONTACT
CONTACT FOR SLIM'S OWN ADVANTAGE. [illegible] IN ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH US IS TO INCREASE HIS PROFIT
AMONG HIS LEBANESE CONTACTS AND INCREASE [illegible] ABILITY AND
ABILITY TO BROKER POLITICAL ACTION AMONG THE LEBANESE [illegible]
IRANIAN COMMUNITY IN LEBANON AND EUROPE.

3. ACCORDINGLY, IN AGREEING TO PARA 7 PROPOSAL, BELIEVE PRUDENCE WOULD DICTATE THAT WE PROCEED MOST CAUTIOUSLY AND REF PROPOSAL CALLS FOR, CAREFULLY METTING SLIM'S SOURCE ASSETS INFORMATION AS WE TRACK TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF REPORTING ON IN IRAN. BELIEVE WE SHOULD ALSO BE PLANNING TO SEVERELY CONTACT WITH THESE ASSETS, METTING SLIM OUT OF THE CA





E C R E T 18Ø922Z SEP 79 STAFF

TE PARIS 12432 SECTION 1 OF 2

: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN

INTEL RYBAT AJAJA SDSLIPPERY

EFS A. DIRECTOR 485999
B. PARIS 11078
C. PARIS 11096
D. PARIS 12269
E. PARIS 12374
F. PARIS 12373
G. PARIS 11096
H. PARIS 11078

1. SDSLIPPERY/1 RETURNED FROM BEIRUT 31 AUGUST; MET C/O 4 SEPTEMBER; LUNCHED NESSIM KHURI, JOURNALIST WITH PARI RABIC PAPER AL-MUSTAQBAL, AND HIS FRIEND KENISE MOURAD OF NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR ON 5 SEPTEMBER; MET JAWADH AL-AMIR AND SDULTIMATE/1 ON 6 SEPTEMBER; SERVED LUNCH TO C/O AND JAWADH AL-AMIR ON 8 SEPTEMBER; MET C/O ON 11 SEPTEMBER.

2. AT 4 SEPTEMBER MEETING, SDSLIPPERY/1 ASKED FOR WASHINGTON REACTION TO HIS PAPER DESCRIBED PARA 7 REF C. TOLD SDSLIPPERY/1 THAT WASHINGTON HAD FOUND HIS ANALYSIS GENERALLY SOUND, SO FAR AS THE LIMITED INFORMATION AVAILABL TO US PERMITTED EVALUATION; THAT C/O WAS AUTHORIZED TO CONT DISCUSSIONS WITH SDSLIPPERY/1 WITH A VIEW TO DETERMINING WHETHER, WITHIN THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY OUR POLICY OF ES ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF O NATIONS AND SEVERE BUDGETARY RESTRICTIONS, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH ANTENNAE (AS HE, SDSLIPPERY/1 CALLS THEM) IN THE KEY AREAS OF QOM, NAJJAF KVICE TEHRAN, ER ONE LY LISTED REF G) AND BEIRUT, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE CURRENT, POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN IRA IRAQ, AND ADJACENT AREAS WHERE SHI'A COMMUNITIES HAVE POLI ACCESS AND INFLUENCE; AND THAT WE MIGHT BEGIN BY SPONSORIN AN SDSLIPPERY/1 VISIT TO IRAN TO ASSESS AND DEBRIEF SDULTI



PAGE 2 PARIS 12432 S E C R E T

MATE/1 BROTHER AT QOM, AND SUBJECT REF H. SDSLIPPERY/1 UNSMILINGLY ACCEPTED THIS, THEN ASKED WHETHER C/O COULD OFFER SOME ASSISTANCE TO SDULTIMATE/1 WHO MIGHT BE THE KEY TO OBTAINING HIS BROTHER'S COOPERATION AND WOULD BE USEFUL AS SPOTTER, ELICITOR AND SOURCE OF INTRODUCTION TO KNOWLEDGEABLE IRANIANS RESIDING IN OR PASSING THROUGH PARIS. C/O REPLIED THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO MAKE HIS FIRST FINANCIAL COMMITMENT TO SOMEONE MORE DEMONSTRABLY ABLE AND WILLING TO REPORT USEFUL POLITICAL INFORMATION, ALTHOUGH SDULTIMATE/1 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT POTENTIAL WAS NOT TO BE DISCOUNTED. C/O DECLINED TO MEET SDULTIMATE/1 AGAIN DIRECTLY FOR TIME BEING. SDSLIPPERY/1 REPORTED THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO MEET MOURAD AND AL-AMIR, RECOMMENDED THAT HE SET UP C/O MEETINGS WITH THEM. SDSLIPPERY/1 SAID MOURAD, PAUL BALTA OF L'EXPRESS, AND ROULEAU OF LE MONDE, WERE THE ONLY FRENCH JOURNALISTS WITHIN OPPOSITION MAKING ARTICLES ON IRAN - AND THAT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT MET BALTA, HE THOUGHT MOURAD MIGHT BE SORTEST TARGET FROM POINT OF VIEW OF EXTRACTING OR (IN HIS CASE) PLANTING INFO. C/O REPLIED THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE SDSLIPPERY/1 DEAL WITH MOURAD WITHOUT INVOLVING C/O. POSTPONED RESPONSE RE AL-AMIR, LATER ADVISING SDSLIPPERY/1 THAT HE DID WISH MEET AL-AMIR.

3. SDSLIPPERY/1 ASSESSMENT OF MOURAD REPORTED IN PARA 2 REF D. HE RECOMMENDS THAT SHE, BALTA AND ROULEAU (WHOM HE KNOWN FOR YEARS) BE CULTIVATED AS SECONDARY SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SDSLIPPERY/1, OF COURSE, WOULD LIKE TO DO THIS WITH OUR MONEY (SEE BELOW) AND COLLECT, FOR HIS OWN PURPOSES, A BY-PRODUCT IN TERMS OF THEIR AVAILABILITY TO HIM AS CONDUIT FOR INFO HE MAY WISH TO PLANT.

4. REFS E AND F COVER SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF DISCUSSIO WITH AL-AMIR. CONSIDERABLE TIME WAS WASTED DISCUSSING IMAM MUSA AL-SADR BECAUSE MEETING TOOK PLACE DAY AFTER ALITALIA HIJACKING BY SHI'A GROUP. AL-AMIR CLAIMED THAT HIS ORGANIZATION HAD LOCATED MUSA SADR'S MANSERVANT WHO HAD IDENTIFIED MUSTAFA SHAMRAN AS THE LAST MAN TO SEE SADR BEFORE HE WENT TO LIBYA. SDSLIPPERY/1 EXPRESSED CONVICTION SADR DEAD. BOTH AGREED THAT SADR HAD BEEN SAVAK AGENT OF INFLUENCE. AL-AMIR IMPLIED IT MORE LIKELY THAT PALESTINIANS HAD PROBABLY DONE SADR IN AT BEHEST OF KHOMEINY THAN THAT LIBYANS HAD KILLED OR

GE 5 PARIS 12432 S E C R E T [illegible] QUESTIONS, AL-AMIR SAID
PRISONED HIM. IN RESPONSE DIRECT QUESTIONS, AL-AMIR SAID
E SADR QUESTION WAS OF NO POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE IN IRAN
DAY, AND SDSLIPPERY/1 SAID THAT SADR WAS IMPORTANT TO THE
BANESE SHI'A PRIMARILY BECAUSE HE HAD DISAPPEARED. (SDSLIP-
RY/1 HAS BEEN A LONGTIME OPPONENT OF SADR.) AL-AMIR PREDICTED
AT KHOMEINY REGIME WOULD CONTRIVE TO EXPLOIT TRIAL OF HI-
CKERS TO LAUNCH CANARD THAT SAVAK HAD KILLED SADR, BECAUSE
OMINNY HAS FOUND OUT THAT THE OPPOSITION NOW KNOW THAT SHAM-
N WAS SOMEHOW INVOLVED IN SADR DISAPPEARANCE.

5. DURING PAST TWO WEEKS, SDSLIPPERY/1 HAS OFFERED
ROKER SOCIAL CONTACT FOR C/O WITH LEBANESE AMBASSADOR TO
NESCO, WITH RAYMOND EDDE, AND WITH A FRENCH NEWSMAN WHO
DSLIPPERY/1 SAYS IS BEING COURTED BY PLO. C/O HAS DEFERRED
HESE INTRODUCTIONS AS NOT OF CURRENT INTEREST.

6. AT 11 SEPTEMBER MEETING, SDSLIPPERY/1 REINTRODUCED
HE SUBJECT OF MONEY BY EXPLAINING THAT SDULTIMATE/1 WAS
AVING TROUBLE COVERING THE 25,000 TO 30,000 FRANC (5,813 TO
,977 DOLLARS) MONTHLY PRINTING COSTS FOR AN ISLAMIC REVIEW
E EDITS IN FRENCH. C/O FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THIS CHALLENGE
ED SDSLIPPERY/1 TO ENQUIRE AS TO WHAT SORT OF BUDGET C/O
XPECTED TO BE GIVEN TO COVER COSTS OF SOURCES IN PARIS, BEIRUT
AJAF, AND QOM IN THE LIGHT OF TODAY'S COST OF LIVING,
ECLINING VALUE OF DOLLAR, ETC. IN COURSE OF THIS EXPOSITION,
SDSLIPPERY/1 LET IT BE KNOWN THAT HE PAYS 6,000 FRANCS (1,395
OLLARS) MONTHLY FOR HIS OFFICE IN PARIS (PROBABLY TRUE) EXCLUD
ING UTILITIES, PHONE, TELETYPE, XEROX, AND SECRETARY; AND THAT
HE SPENDS ABOUT $0,000 FRANCS MONTHLY (INCLUDING THE RENT) ON
PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL ENTERTAINMENT AND OTHER LIVING
EXPENSES WHEN HE IS IN PARIS. SDSLIPPERY/1 COOPERATED IN
PREPARATION OF PROJ I, WHICH WE ARE POUCHING, BUT C/O OMITTED
THE FINANCIAL QUESTION IN ORDER NOT TO CONFUSE THE ISSUE.
THIS, THE NEXT MOVE WILL BE TO HAVE A FRANK TALK WITH SDSLIP-
PERY/1 ABOUT HOW HE FINANCES THAT WHICH HE IS ALREADY DOING AS
PREREQUISITE FOR DETERMINING HOW MUCH, HOW, AND UNDER WHAT
COVER WE CAN PAY HIM FOR SERVICES TO US. THEN, WE WILL HAVE T
MAKE HIM AN OFFER. BELIEVE IT SHOULD CONSIST OF THE FOLLOWING
ELEMENTS:

A. PAYMENT FOR SERVICES ALREADY RENDERED TO INCLUDE

[illegible] PARIS 12432 S E C R E T [illegible] RECEIVED FROM SOULTIMATE/1
[illegible] PARIS 12432 S E C R E T
ODUCTIONS TO AND ENFORMATION RECEIVED FROM SOULTIMATE/1
AL-AMIR, ASSESSMENT OF MOURAD, FUTURE USE OF HIS OFFICE AS A
B. PAYMENT FOR PAST AND FUTURE USE OF SDSLIPPERY OPERATION, SUBJECT TO
HOUSE, IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE. THE SITE IS WELL LOCATED AND
M NATION WITHOUT NOTICE. IF WE BUY IN, WE CAN CONTROL THE
OOD SECURITY FEATURES. AUDIO POSSIBILITIES, AND VARIOUS POINTS IN
E AND DEFENSIVE BETWEEN BEIRUT AND TRADITIONAL
C. COST OF TRAVEL ENTERTAINMENT, FOR TRIP CITED
PER DIEM AND OPERATIONAL EXPENSES
PRESENTED BY MIDDLE EASTERN TRAVELERS, FOR TRIP
2 ABOVE.
D. ANNUAL RETAINER (SINCE HE IS LAWYER) TO HELP DEFRAY
S OF CULTIVATION OF CONTACTS OF INTEREST TO HIMSELF AND
WHOM WE MAY OR MAY NOT DERIVE BENEFIT FROM TIME TO TIME.
E. REIMBURSEMENT OF ACTUAL OPERATIONAL EXPENSES
OVED BY C/O IN ADVANCE FOR AGREED ACTIVITIES LEADING TO
QUISITION OF SIGNIFICANT, SECRET INFORMATION OR SOURCES BY
PARAS D AND E SHOULD BE CONTINGENT UPON SUCCESSFUL COMPLE-
N OF SUBPARA C TRIP. FINAL MOA SHOULD, OF COURSE,
VIDE FOR FUTURE OPERATIONAL TRAVEL. THIS, IN TURN, SHOULD BE
OTIATED AFTER SDSWIRL WHICH SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED AFTER
P TO IRAN.

7. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZATION TO ESTABLISH TRIAL
OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SDSLIPPERY/1 BY PAYING HIM 1,000
DOLLARS FOR SERVICES (INCLUDING USE OF HIS OFFICE) RENDERED
AND COMMITTING OURSELVES TO PAY 1,500 DOLLARS MONTHLY, OCTOBER
THROUGH DECEMBER, TO ASSIST SDSLIPPERY/1 WITH COSTS OF HIS
PARIS OFFICE AND ENTERTAINMENT; BEIRUT/TEHRAN/BEIRUT ECONOMY
AIR FARE AND NON-ACCOUNTABLE OPERATIONAL EXPENSES UP TO 1,000
DOLLARS IN LIEU PER DIEM, GIFTS AND ENTERTAINMENT OF CONTACTS
FOR PARA 1. C TRIP; AND ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL EXPENSES IN
PARIS DURING TRIAL PERIOD IF APPROVED IN ADVANCE OR EXPENDI-
TURE BY STATION. PAYMENTS WILL BE MADE IN CASH, ACCOUNTED FO
Y C/O IN REVOLVING ACCOUNT, RECEIPTED FOR BY SDSLIPPERY/1 WILL INITIALLY DECLIN
N PSEUDO. WE ASSUME THAT SDSLIPPERY/1 WILL INITIALLY DECLIN
OFFER AS INADEQUATE AND FAILURE TO APPRECIATE HIS STATURE.
HIS WILL PROVIDE OPENING FOR C/O TO INSIST ON THE FINANCIAL



ACE 5 PARIS 12432 S E C R E T
I[illegible] DISCLOSURES NECESSARY TO INITIATE INVESTIGATION OF SDSLIPPERY/
[illegible] OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME, AND ESTIMATE WHAT CONTROL WE CAN
[illegible] AND AT WHAT PRICE, IF WE DECIDE WE REQUIRE HIS SERVICES.

8. SDSLIPPERY/1 IS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO BEIRUT ON
22 SEPTEMBER. WILL VISIT IRAN ON WAY BACK TO PARIS CIRCA
[illegible] OCTOBER. WIDE RANGE OF IRAN REQUIREMENTS IS AVAILABLE
AT STATION, BUT WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FROM
HEADQUARTERS AND TEHRAN AS TO REQUIREMENTS WHICH WILL ENABLE
US CONFIDENTLY TO EVALUATE SDSLIPPERY/1 ACCESS AND RELIABILITY.

9. FILE: 201-962067. RVW 17SEP98 DRV D9C1.

S E C R E T

BT
#2432

S E C R E T 190751Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54247

TO: PARIS INFO DIRECTOR

WANINTEL RYBAT AJAJA SDSLIPPERY

REF: PARIS 12432

1. DO NOT BELIEVE WE ARE SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH
ESSENTIALLY LEBANESE SHIITE BACKGROUND OF THE SDSLIPPERY/1
ASE TO BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THE KIND OF TAILORED REQUIREMENTS
EQUESTED REF. THEREFORE DEFER TO HQS.

2. STATION HOLDING DO NOT INCLUDE IDENTITIES OF EITHER
LTIMATE/1 OR HIS BROTHER. REQUEST PARIS PROVIDE.

3. NO FILE. RVW 19 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T





26 SEP 79

S E C R E T 260342Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 521028.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN, BEIRUT.

FROM: CNE/IRAN INFO CNE/SLJ

SUBJECT: WNINTEL AJAJA SDSLIPPER INTEL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 518662
B. DIRECTOR 458600

1. AS PROMISED REF A, FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS ARE FOR USE WITH SDSLIPPERY/1 (S/1) TO COLLECT FROM HIS LEBANESE SHI'ITE CONTACTS IN EUROPE AND, IF A TRIP FOR S/1 TO BEIRUT SHOULD EVENTUATE, FOR USE IN TALKING TO CONTACTS IN LEBANON. PARIS SHOULD ALSO SEE RFF B WHICH LEVIES STILL VALID REQUIREMENTS ON SHI'ITE TARGET IN MIDDLE EAST.

2. REQUIREMENTS ARE:

A. THERE IS A VIRTUAL DEARTH OF INFO ON THE "AMAL", THE SHI'ITE PARAMILITARY GROUP IN LEBANON. STRENGTH, LEADERSHIP, ARMS INVENTORY, WHAT SUPPORT FROM IRAN? AMAL SECTY/GEN WAS IN IRAN IN MID-APRIL AND AGAIN IN EARLY JULY PER PRESS REPORTS AND MET WITH IRANIAN LEADERS. PURPOSE/RESULTS THESE MEETINGS? WHAT DOES S/1 KNOW ABOUT HUSAYNI'S BACKGROUND AND RELATIONSHIP WITH IRANIAN LEADERS. S/1'S INFO IN PARIS 11096 THAT THE SHI'ITE FORCE IN LEBANON IS PAID FOR BY THE SYRIANS; TRAINED, COMMANDED AND LARGELY STAFFED BY PALESTINIANS IS THE FIRST WE HAVE HAD ON EITHER SYRIAN OR PAL INVOLVEMENT. A SUBSTANTIVE EXPANSION OF THIS WOULD BE VERY DISSEMINABLE INFO.

B. ALSO PER PRESS, KHOMEINI'S GRANDSON (HUSAYN MUSTAFA KHOMEINI) ARRIVED BEIRUT 2 SEPT. WAS S/1 IN BEIRUT AT THE TIME. WHAT DOES HE KNOW OF THE PURPOSE OF THIS VISIT? THE HIGHER ISLAMIC SHI'ITE COUNCIL AND THE AMAL MOVEMENT WERE TO ORGANIZE A SPECIAL PROGRAM FOR HIS VISIT.

C. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE HIGHER ISLAMIC SHI'ITE

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 - 201-528

COUNCIL (WHICH OVERSEES SHI'ITE AFFAIRS IN LEBANON), CAN S/1 PROVIDE BACKGROUND ON EACH OF ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR SYMPATHIES/ALIGNMENTS, DEGREE OF INFLUENCE AMONG THE SHI'ITES EACH HAS. WHO IS THE MOST INFLUENTIAL. S/1 REPORTED IN PARIS 10911 THAT SHIA CLERGY NO LONGER EXERT MUCH INFLUENCE OVER SHIAS AND THAT COMMUNITY WAS IN PROCESS OF TRYING TO DEVELOP NEW LEADERSHIP. AN EXPANSION OF THIS WOULD BE OF GREAT INTEREST. WHY HAVE CLERGY LOST INFLUENCE, WHICH IS IN SUCH CONTRAST TO SITUATION IN IRAN? ANY SUCCESS IN DEVELOPING NEW LEADERSHIP?

D. ALSO OF INTEREST TO US IS HIS CONTACT WITH SALAH BITAR, WHO IS CO-FOUNDER OF BA'TH PARTY (WITH MICHEL AFLAQ) AND AN OLD LINE SYRIAN OPPOSITION LEADER. DOES HE KNOW WHETHER BITAR IS STILL POLITICALLY ACTIVE. CAN HE ELICIT BITAR'S COMMENTS ON HOW BITAR SEES THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SYRIA AND ASSESS THE VIABILITY OF THE ASAD REGIME THERE IN VIEW OF THE ESCALATING SECTARIAN CLASHES?

3. WE SOMEWHAT CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBILITY THAT S/1 MAY BE IN TOUCH WITH ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. S/1 HAS SAID THAT HE WAS SYMPATHETIC WITH CAUSE OF ISRAELI-BACKED MAJOR SAAD H A D D A D, WHO NOW IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF MUCH OF SOUTH LEBANON AND HE HAS ADMITTED CONTACTS WITH ISRAELI EMBASSY OFFICIALS.

4. FILE: 201-0962067. RVW 25SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

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IT PARIS 13023 SECTION 1 OF 2

O: (DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

NIT AJAJA SDSLIPPERY

REF: . DIRECTOR 518662
. WASHINGTON 521028
. PARIS 12452
. DIRECTOR 486658
. DIRECTOR 495999
. DIRECTOR 455576

REFS A AND B DID NOT ARRIVE PARIS PRIOR TO SDSLIPPERY/1
DE AR E ANTICIPATED REF C, WHICH AFFORDS US CONVENIENT INTER-
VA T REVIEW ASSESSMENT DATA AND REVISE OPS PLAN. BELIEVE
HQ I CORRECT TO LABEL SDSLIPPERY/1 PROPOSAL AS OFFER TO
HI E AS PRINCIPAL AGENT. WE HAVE NOT YET MA COUN-
TE H POSAL TO HIM WHICH WOULD ALTER PRINCIPAL AGENT ROLE TO
TH SPOTTER AND ELICITOR, AND FIX FAIR RATE O PAY.
BE FO E DO SO, WE SHOULD CLARIFY PARAMETERS OF SDSLIPPERY/1
RO ETTLE ON FAIR COMPENSATION, AND, ABOVE AL DECIDE
WH WE TRUST HIM SUFFICIENTLY TO ENTER INTO CLANDESTINE
RE NSHIP EVEN ON TRIAL BASIS. REF A EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDES
FO MOTION ON DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP AND
WH E ARE IN NO HURRY, WE CANNOT REMAIN ON DEAD CENTER
IN DE ITELY WITHOUT RECOGNIZING THAT WE ARE FORFEITING
ES SHMENT OF CONTROL WE NEED TO PLACE RELATIONSHIP ON
MO URE BASE.

REF A REFERS TO SDSLIPPERY/1 "HISTORY" AND "BACKGROUND
I ER WHICH INFERS THAT HIS BACKGROUND IS SINISTER. REVIEW
O D, E, AND F (ALL THE RELEVANT INFORMATION ON SDSLIPPERY
B UND AVAILABLE TO US) REVEALS:

A. THAT, IN JUNE 63, PESECULAR/1 SAID SDSLIPPERY/1
S TTING THE LEBANESE SHI'A LEADERS TO BE PRO-SEAH, AND
T WAS A SECOND RATE BRITISH AGENT. THE LATTER ALLEGA-
T BEARS TO HAVE BEEN UNSUBSTANTIATED BY PE CULAR/1 AND

WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE FITNESS RATING WITHOUT ENDORSEMENT BY EM
PRO-SHAH INCITEMENT. IN THE POLITICAL CLIMATE OF 63, CANNOT B
REGARDED AS DEROGATORY. WHAT WAS PESECULAR/1'S ACCESS, RELIA
BILITY, AND MOTIVATION IN REPORTING THE INFO?

B. PETEAK, IN JANUARY 63, SAID THAT SDSLIPPERY/1 WAS
PAID AGENT OF HIS OWN NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE. WE CANNOT
REGARD THIS AS DEROGATORY BUT WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEAD-
QUARTERS EVALUATION OF PETEAK ACCESS, RELIABILITY, AND MOTIV
TION IN REPORTING THE INFO. THE SAME WOULD APPLY TO PESCOFF
REPORTS THAT, IN THE EARLY SIXTIES, SDSLIPPERY/1 WORKED FOR
OWN GOVERNMENT'S POLICE AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. THE
THREE ALLEGATIONS, TAKEN TOGETHER, GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF A
MAN WIDELY SUSPECTED OF REPORTING TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES B
NOT KNOWN TO DO SO - HENCE THE CONFUSION ABOUT WHICH SERVICE
IT WAS. IN ANY CASE, IT WAS HIS OWN COUNTRY'S SERVICE. IF A

C. PESCOFF/1, HOWEVER, ALSO ALLEGED THAT LEBANESE G
ARCHIVES SHOWED SDSLIPPERY/1 WAS WORKING FOR SA'UDI ARABIA (N
SERVICE, NOT EVEN THE EMBASSY IN BEIRUT, SPECIFIED); AS
COOPERATING WITH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY; AND AS HAVING A FRIEN
WHO WAS A BRITISH OFFICIAL. CERTAINLY THERE IS NO NEED TO
PLACE A DEROGATORY INTERPRETATION ON ANY OF THESE ALLEGATION
AND, AGAIN, WE WONDER NOT ONLY ABOUT THE EVALUATION OF THE SU
BUT WHETHER THE ENTRIES THEMSELVES MIGHT HAVE BEEN PUT IN T
C-2 ARCHIVES WITH THE INTENTION OF COVERING THEIR OWN AGENT
IE, INDEED, SDSLIPPERY/1 WAS ONE.

D. FINALLY, AND AGAIN IN SIXTIES, SDSLIPPERY/1 IS
ALLEGED TO HAVE HAD A CONTACT, LASAR SIVULJ, WHO WAS A YUGO
SLAV FIRST SECRETARY. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW WHET
SIVULJ WAS INTELLIGENCE CONNECTED, A COMMUNIST, AND THE
FREQUENCY AND NATURE OF CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO.

IN OBTAINING PRQ I FROM SDSLIPPERY/1 C/O ASKED HIM WHETHER H
HAD EVER ENJOYED CONTACT WITH PERSONNEL OF ANY INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE. THEN PRODDED HIM CONCERNING THE ISRAELI EMBASSY C
HE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED, AND CONTACTS WITH ANY SAVAK OFFICERS.
SDSLIPPERY/1 FIRMLY ASSERTED THAT HE HAD HAD NO INTELLIGEN
CONTACTS, ALTHOUGH AMONG HIS MANY ARAB OFFICIAL FRIENDS TH

MIGHT HAVE BEEN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS LURKING UNDECLARED TO
HIM. WE HAVE, THUS, DEFINED AN AREA TO BE EXPLORED BY
SGSWIRL. SDSLIPPERY/1 HAS TOLD US THAT HE IS ABLE TO PRACTICE
LAW AND MAINTAIN A STUDIO INPARIS WITHOUT FRENCH PARTICIPA-
TION THANKS TO THE INTERVENTION OF EDGAR FAURE. WE HAVE TASKED
UNGUSY/1, A PROTEGE OF FAURE, TO GET US A RUNDOWN ON
WHO SDSLIPPERY/1 IS, HOW HE SUPPORTS HIMSELF, AND WHAT HIS
POLITICAL CONNECTIONS ARE IN FRANCE AND THE ARAB WORLD. MEAN-
WHILE, COULD HEADQUARTERS BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT SUCH REF E
COMMENTS AS THAT SDSLIPPERY/1 WAS WELL AND LESS THAN FAVORABL
KNOWN TO OFFICERS WHO HAVE SERVED IN BEIRUT; AND THAT HE IS
LIKELY TO BE IN CONTACT WITH GNGRAPE, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD NOT
HAVE REVEALED HIS REACTION CONTACT TO THEM. SUCH REMARKS IMPL
THAT THERE ARE FACTS ABOUT SDSLIPPERY/1 WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN MA
KNOWN TO US AND WHICH MIGHT FACILITATE FIELD INVESTIGATION OF
THIS POTENTIAL ASSET. TO KNOW SDSLIPPERY/1 IS TO MISTRUST HIM
BUT ONE MUST ASK ONESELF WHAT ONE REALLY KNOWS. HIS PERSONALIT
IS REMINISCENT OF A ONCE GREAT AGENT, OPPOSE, WHO WAS UNIVERSAL
SUSPECTED OF WORKING FOR THE ISRAELIS AND FOR MOST OF THE
WESTERN POWERS, INCLUDING US, AND WHO FINALLY DIED FOR IT.

3. ALTHOUGH SDSLIPPERY/1 HAS PROPOSED HIMSELF IN THE
PRINCIPAL AGENT ROLE, HIS COMPORTMENT TO DATE HAS INDICATED NO
RELUCTANCE TO INTRODUCE US DIRECTLY TO DESIGNATED
INFORMANTS, AS IN THE CASES OF AL-AMIR, SDULTIMATE, AND SEVERAL
OTHERS WHOM C/O HAS DECLINED TO MEET. DO NOT BELIEVE IT WILL
BE DIFFICULT TO EXTEND THIS PATTERN BUT WE CANNOT TRANSFER IT
TO COM AND NAJAF UNLESS WE FIRST SEND SDSLIPPERY/1 TO PICK UP
EXISTING CONTACTS (THOSE WHOM HE WOULD HAVE MET ON REF C TRIP
WERE DESIGNATED IN PARA 2 REF C) AND MAKE SOME OTHERS. ONCE TH
SPOTTING IS DONE, GIVEN WHAT WE ASSUME TO BE THE RELATIVE
OPERATIONAL INACCESSIBILITY OF THESE AREAS, IT WOULD SEEM THAT
SDSLIPPERY/1 WILL HAVE TO DRAW THOSE HE HAS SPOTTED ELSEWHERE
TO BE MET, ASSESSED, AND DEVELOPED BY US. IF WE HAVE SECURITY
RESERVATIONS ABOUT SDSLIPPERY/1, WE ASSUME THAT CANDIDATES WIL
NO BE DRAWN TO SOME PLACE WHERE WE HAVE LESS AT STAKE AND MORE
CONTROL OF THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT THAN WE BELIEVE TO BE THE
CASE IN TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, OR BEIRUT. THIS WILL REQUIRE A
PRETEXT AND, UNDOUBTEDLY, FUNDS. WELCOME HEADQUARTERS VIEWS.
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4. WE ARE CONSCIOUS THAT, IN DISPLAYING C/O'S OWN SENSI
TIVITY TO SDSLIPPERY/1'S ARAB IN PARIS VIEW OF LIFE AND ITS
COSTS, AND TO THE IMAGE HE PROJECTS AS A SLIGHTLY SLEAZY
PROMOTER, WE MAY HAVE OBSCURED SOME OF HIS MORE PROMISING
OPERATIONAL GIFTS AND UNDERPLAYED WHAT STATURE HE HAS, IN OUR
PREOCCUPATION WITH SECURITY AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS. SDSLIPPERY/
IS A JURIST OF SOME STATURE IN HIS WORLD. HE HAS A HOST OF
POTENTIALLY USEFUL CONTACTS, AND ENOUGH BRASS TO MEET ANYONE
WE ASK HIM TO MEET. THE OBSERVATION THAT HE DOES NOT INSPIRE
CONFIDENCE IN EVERYONE HE MEETS MAY WORK IN OUR FAVOR, SINCE
HE HIMSELF MUST BE CONSCIOUS OF THIS, AND IT MAY ACCOUNT FOR
HIS READINESS TO INJECT HIS CASE-OFFICER INTO RELATIONSHIPS
WITH INFORMANTS. HE IS MORE AVARICIOUS THAN MANY OF HIS
COUNTRYMEN, BUT NOT EXCEPTIONALLY SO - AND HAS PROVEN HIMSELF
WILLING TO RISK A LITTLE MONEY TO MAKE SOME MORE. HE IS
HIGHLY INTELLIGENT, A SKILLFUL ELICITOR AND SHREWD ASSESSOR
OF HIS FELLOW MAN. HE REPORTS, WHEN REMINDED OF OUR
WESTERN PREOCCUPATION WITH FACTS, ACCURATELY, IN DETAIL, AND
IN WRITING WHEN THIS IS REQUIRED. AT THIS MID-POINT IN OUR
FIELD INVESTIGATION, HE SEEMS DISCREET AND LOYAL. WHILE HE IS
CONCERNED WITH SELF AGGRANDISSEMENT IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE, HE
SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY MOTIVATED BY THE DESIRE TO SUR
THE INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON WHICH IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH OUR
INTERESTS. AT THIS POINT IN TIME, THEREFORE, OUR WORKING
HYPOTHESIS IS THAT SDSLIPPERY/1 CAN BE CONTROLLED AND THAT
IS PROBABLY WORTH A SERIOUS INVESTMENT OF TIME AND MONEY TO DO
SO, OR TO DETERMINE THAT OUR HYPOTHESIS IS WRONG.

5. OUR FIGURE OF US $1,000 IN REF C WAS PREDICATED ON TH
CONCEPT THAT IT WOULD BE OFFERED AS PART OF A TRIAL PERIOD AND
OFFER WHICH WOULD INCLUDE, AT LEAST, SOME TEMPORARY SALARY BY MAIG
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES. THE INTENT WAS TO SAVE MONEY AT LEAST $400 ON OPRA
A PACKAGE DEAL. SDSLIPPERY/1 HAS SPENT AT LEAST [illegible] IN THE PROCESS
TIONAL ENTERTAINMENT OF AL-AMIR AND SDULTIMATE/1. SDSLIPPERY/1 IS A
OF BRINGING THEM TOGETHER WITH THE C/O. SDSLIPPERY/1 LAWYER MAKES
SUCCESSFUL ATTORNEY AND, IN FRANCE, EVEN A TYRO LEGITIMATE BILLING
US $50 PER HOUR. AT THIS RATE, SDSLIPPERY/1 WOULD BE ABOUT US
TO US, HAD WE RETAINED HIM PROFESSIONALLY, WOULD DO NOT
$2,000 FOR TIME SPENT IN OPERATIONAL MEETINGS. AT LEGAL RATES, THOUG
SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD PAY SDSLIPPERY/1 AT LEGAL RATES.

PAGE 5 PA IS 13023 S E C R E T
A GLANCE AT THE LIFE STYLE OF THE PLO'S IBRAHIM SUSS WOULD
SUFFICE TO ESTABLISH THE ROUGH EQUIVALENCE OF AFFLUENCE
BETWEEN PRACTITIONERS OF THE LAW AND THOSE OF FARMER PROFESS
SIONS. WE WOULD PREFER TO CONTINUE AS LONG AS WE CAN WITHOUT
COMING TO FINANCIAL TERMS, AND THEN TERMINATE THE RELATIONSHIP
AMICABLY, RATHER THAN MAKE SO UNFAIR A GESTURE AS SUGGESTED
IN REF A PARA 3. SDSLIPPERY/1'S DIGNITY MAY REST ON SHAKY
FOUNDATIONS IN OUR OPINION, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT TO HIM AND WE
SHOULD NOT ASSAIL IT WITHOUT REGARD FOR THE POSSIBILITY THAT
HE MIGHT HAVE A VINDICTIVE REACTION. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS
RECONSIDER WHAT WE MIGHT OFFER SDSLIPPERY/1 WHICH MIGHT
INDUCE HIM TO SUBJECT HIMSELF TO OUR CONTROL T THE
EXTENT OF DISCUSSING HIS SOURCES OF INCOME FRA KLY WITH US,
SUBMITTING TO SGSWIRL THEN FUNCTIONING AS SPO TER AND SOURCE
OF OPERATIONAL INFORMATION, WITH POSSIBILITY T AT WE WILL ALS
USE HIM AS SOCIAL BRIDGE TO TARGETS, NOT NECESSARILY IRANIAN,
IN PARI AND AS CONDUIT TO FEED MATERIAL IN SUPPORT OF RTWINN
PERSPECTIVES ON NEAR EAST TO LOCAL JOURNALISTS. I BELIEVE THE
FIGURE WE FINALLY ARRIVE AT SHOULD BE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION
THAT IT IS AS REASONABLE FOR A MAN TO ASK FOR A FAIR WAGE FO
ESPIONAGE AND COVERT ACTION SERVICES AS IT IS FOR ANY OTHER
TYPE OF SERVICE, MAKING ALLOWANCE FOR THE FACT THAT SPIES DO
NOT PAY TAXES ON COVERT INCOME. LEVEL AND TYPE OF PAYMENTS
SHOULD NOT REFLECT OUR RESERVATIONS ABOUT SECURITY. THE SINE
QUA NON OF CONTINUING THE RELATIONSHIP AT ALL

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TE PARIS 11033

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

INTEL RYBAT AJAJA RUNNER SDULTIMATE

REF: PARIS 11099

1. SDULTIMATE/1 HAS CONTACTED PARIS C/O TO REPORT THAT
ATOLLAH SADIQ AL-RUHANI'S PUBLIC THREAT TO INSTIGATE SHI'A
EVOLT IN BAHRAIN WAS MADE IN RESPONSE TO CALL FROM RUHANI'S
OLLOWERS IN BAHRAIN FOR SUPPORT IN THEIR STRUGGLE TO OBTAIN
HAT THEY REGARD AS THEIR RIGHTS FROM AMIR OF BAHRAIN.
SDULTIMATE/1 SAID THAT POPULATION OF BAHRAIN IS EIGHTY-FIVE
ERCENT SHI'A AND THAT VAST MAJORITY OF SHI'A ARE FOLLOWERS
F RUHANI.) SDULTIMATE/1 REPORTED THAT BOTH PRIME MINISTER
AZARGAN AND AYATOLLAH KEOMEINI HAD URGED RUHANI TO SOFTEN
S ATTACKS ON BAHRAINI AUTHORITIES. RUHANI WILL REFLECT
OR A WEEK OR SO AND, MEANWHILE, HAS ASKED SDULTIMATE/1 TO
HECK THE EXTERNAL REACTION TO RUHANI'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST
AHRAIN. SDULTIMATE/1 ASKED C/O FOR NVBLAZON REACTION AND
FFERED TO COUNSEL RUHANI IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHATEVER GUIDANCE
VBLAZON GIVES.

2. C/O TOLD SDULTIMATE/1 THAT REQUEST OF THIS NATURE
OULD HAVE TO BE REFERRED TO HIGHER AUTHORITY BUT THAT, PENDING
/O COULD CONFIDENTLY ASSURE SDULTIMATE/1 THAT A REVOLT IN
AHRAIN AT THIS TIME MIGHT HAVE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF A
AGNITUDE DIFFICULT TO PREDICT OR CONTROL AND, CONSEQUENTLY,
OULD NOT BE LIKELY TO FAVOR THE INTERESTS OF NVBLAZON OR OF
NY OF BAHRAIN'S NEIGHBORS. C/O OPINED THAT WHAT THE AREA
EEMED TO NEED MOST WAS A PERIOD OF STABILITY IN WHICH TO
IGEST RECENT CHANGES. C/O PROMISED TO FURNISH OFFICIAL
VBLAZON RESPONSE TO SDULTIMATE/1 THIS WEEK. REQUEST HEAD-
UARTERS GUIDANCE.

3. C/O SUGGESTED TO SDULTIMATE/1 THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFI-
CULT IN ANY CASE FOR RUHANI TO CONTINUE HIS CAMPAIGN AT THE
RESENT LEVEL IN THE FACE OF KEOMEINI AND IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
OPPOSITION WITHOUT RISKING POLITICAL ISOLATION AT BEST.



AG 2] PARIS 13133 S E C R E T
DULTIMATE/1 REPLIE THAT AYATOLLAH OF RUHANI'S STATURE
OULD NOT BE ISOLATED FROM HIS RELIGIOUS FOLLOWING WHICH
ONSTITUTES HIS POLITICAL BASE.

4. IN DISCUSS ON F THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAN, A
F THE EXTERNAL OPPOSITION, SDULTIMATE/1 SAID THAT ALTHOUGH
RECEIVING APPEAL ALMOST DAILY FROM IRANIANS IN DIASPORA
ECLARE HIMSELF IN OPPOSITION TO KHOMEINI, HE FELT THE TIME
AS NOT YET RIGHT. SDULTIMATE/1 OPINED THAT IN ANOTHER FIV
X MONTHS THE SITUATION IN IRAN MIGHT BECOME SUFFICIENTLY
EA OTIC, BECAUSE OF KHOMEINI REGIME'S INABILITY TO WORK
FE ECTIVELY AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT, INFLATION, AND NATIONAL
RAGMENTATION, TO PERMIT ORGANIZATION OF EFFECTIVE OPPOSITI
N SDULTIMATE/1 OPINION, THE LACK OF VIABLE POLITICAL INSTI
TIONS IN IRAN DICTATES THAT NO OPPOSITION MOVEMENT CAN SUCC
WITHOUT RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. FOR THE SAME REASON, NO NON-
OUS RELIGIOUS LEADER WILL BE ABLE TO ENSURE THE INSTALL
ON OF A SOUND GOVERNMENT WITHOUT THE COOPERATION OF IRAN
ESTERN TRAINED INTELLIGENTSIA AND GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT FR
THE WESTERN INDUSTRIAL POWERS, ESPECIALLY THE UNITED STATES
SDULTIMATE/1 MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO P
A OLE UNDER NUBLA'S GUIDANCE IN SUCH AN EFFORT TO RESTOR
STABILITY IN IRAN, AND IMPLIED THAT UNDER NO OTHER CIRCUM-
STANCES WOULD HE TAKE ON KHOMEINI. SDULTIMATE/1
EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS FULLY EMPOWERED TO SPEAK FOR RUHANI
IN THE MATTER OF BAHRAIN AND IMPLIED THAT RUHANI SHARED THE
FOREGOING ANALYSIS OF HOW TO PLAY THE POLITICAL SITUATION
IRAN.

5. FILED BY 26 961724. RVW 900T99 DRV DDC1.
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19 OCT 79 [illegible] 02

S E C R E T 122341Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 535287.

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WNINIEL AJAJA SDSLIPPERY SDULTIMATE

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54496
B. PARIS 13023
C. PARIS 12959
D. PARIS 12898
E. PARIS 12833
F. TEHRAN 54353
G. DIRECTOR 518662
H. PARIS 12612
I. PARIS 12594
J. DIRECTOR 517075
K. PARIS 12432
L. DIRECTOR 528655

1. EOS APPRECIATES REF B SUMMARY OF PARIS THOUGHTS AND CONCERNS OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN SDSLIPPERY/1 (S/1) AND SDULTIMATE/1 (U/1) CASES. AS REF A NOTES, THERE CONTINUES TO BE A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST OVER INABILITY OF BAKHTIAR MOVEMENT TO GENERATE ANY DEGREE OF ENTHUSIASM AND ACTIVITY. NONETHELESS, THE MOVEMENT REMAINS A VALID INTELLIGENCE TARGET AND ONE, WE BELIEVE, ON WHICH BOTH S/1 AND U/1 MAY BE ABLE COLLECT VALUABLE FI. ANALYSTS HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN SCOPE OF S/1 REPORTING, DESPITE ERRORS, AND WHILE MUCH OF INFORMATION TO DATE REMAINS UNSUBSTANTIATED, THEY CONSIDER FIS REPORTING POTENTIALLY USEFUL. THEREFORE, BELIEVE PARIS CORRECT IN ITS ASSESSMENT THAT S/1 COULD CONTRIBUTE AGAINST WIDE VARIETY OF TARGETS.

2. HAVING SAID THIS, WISE REASSERT THAT WE ARE STILL VERY UNCERTAIN AS TO RELIABILITY, VERACITY, AND MOTIVATIONS OF BOTH S/1 AND U/1 AND THAT WE BELIEVE THAT WHILE CONTACT WITH BOTH OF THESE SOURCES IS WORTHWHILE AND MAY EVEN BE PROMISING, CONTACT SHOULD BE MAINTAINED WITH LEAST POSSIBLE COMMITMENT ON OUR PART. OUR CONCERNS ABOUT EXTENT OF REACTION COMMITMENTS TO S/1 OR U/1

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85

ARE REFLECTED IN SPECIFIC REPORTING PROBLEMS OUTLINED BELOW. UNTIL PROVEN OTHERWISE, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT S/1 AND U/1 WOULD NOT ANY COMMITMENT OR FORMALIZED RELATIONSHIP WITH REACTION TO FURTHER IRAN'S OWN INTERESTS WITH RESULTING COMPLICATIONS BEYOND ANY ADVANTAGE WHICH WOULD ACCRUE TO US.

3. WE BELIEVE THAT S/1 AND U/1 VIEW THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH REACTION AS ONE IN WHICH THEY HAVE "PRODUCT" TO SELL, NAMELY, THEIR PARTICULAR FACTION OF ANTI-KHOMEINI MOVEMENT AND THAT THEY DESIRE AMERICAN BACKING, FOR WHICH THEY VIEW REACTION AS SOURCE OR INSTRUMENT OF THAT BACKING. WHILE THESE CASES NOT UNIQUE IN THIS REGARD, THEY HAVE PRODUCED SOME INFORMATION WHICH WOULD SEEM INDICATE THEIR ACCESS NOT RELIABLE. OF PARTICULAR CONCERN IS S/1'S RELATIONSHIP WITH JAVAD ALAMIR D A V A L U, WHO HAS EXTENSIVE CHECKERED BACKGROUND, IS SUBJECT REF C, AND WHOSE REPORTS ON BAKHTIAR'S BEHALF HAVE, ACCORDING TO SHEPPER/1, BEEN DISAVOWED BY BAKHTIAR HIMSELF (DIRECTOR 528726). MOREOVER, NEITHER BAKHTIAR NOR ANY OF THOSE IN HIS IMMEDIATE ENTOURAGE KNEW OF FEDEHADI-E MILLI NOR TABIRI ALI.

4. RECENT REPORTS HAVE ALSO SURFACED SEVERAL QUESTIONS REGARDING ACCURACY S/1-DAVALU REPORTING AS FOLLOWS:

A. AS NOTED REF F, MISIDENTIFICATION OF FEDAYAN-E KHALQ FOR MUJAHEDIN-E-KHALQ IN REF D REPORT.

B. REF D IDENTIFICATION OF AYATOLLAH MOTAHARI AS ONE OF IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS WITH WHOM FEDEHADI-E MELLI IN CURRENT (SEPTEMBER 79) CONTACT. MOTAHARI WAS ASSASSINATED IN APRIL 1979 BY IRANIAN GROUP IN TEHRAN.

C. REF C'S DESCRIPTION OF MUSTAFA CHAMRAN'S POLITICAL OUTLOOK, WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH NFAC ANALYSTS' UNDERSTANDING OF HIS IDEOLOGY. NOR IS ASSERTION HIS PALESTINIAN MARRIAGE CONFIRMED BY OUR RECORDS (TAKEN LARGELY FROM NVCANOPY DOCUMENTARY RECORD) WHICH SHOW HIS BORN IN TEHRAN AND HIS FIRST CONTACT WITH PLO AND LEBANESE CA. 1977.

5. AS TO INFORMATION DEVELOPED DURING MEETINGS WITH U/1,

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WE REMAIN CONCERNED THAT U/1 HAS AXE TO GRIND IN TERMS HIS EFFORTS TO ASSUME POSSIBLE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN ANTI-KHOMEINI MOVEMENT. TO DATE U/1'S PRIMARY VALUE HAS STEMMED FROM FACT THAT HIS BROTHER PLAYS PROMINENT ROLE IN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IN TEHRAN; WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN EXPLORING AND EXPLOITING THAT RELATIONSHIP FOR INTEL COLLECTION. U/1'S ACCESS TO EUROPE-BASED IRANIAN DISSIDENT OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES HAS NOT PROVEN PRODUCTIVE.

6. WE REMAIN WILLING TO REIMBURSE S/1 $1,200 FOR HIS PAST SERVICES AND TO REIMBURSE HIM FOR FUTURE SERVICES. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF CONCERNS NOTED ABOVE, PREFER TO REMUNERATE S/1 ONLY FOR SERVICES ALREADY RENDERED. WHILE FIGURE OF $1,200 DOES NOT FULLY COMPENSATE S/1 AT GOING RATE FOR LAWYERS, HE IN FACT CONTACTED US AND CONTINUES TO HAVE HIS AND U/1'S REASONS FOR MAINTAINING THAT CONTACT. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT REJECTION REF B AND C STATION OPS PROPOSALS WILL PROBABLY PRECLUDE ESTABLISHMENT OUR CONTROL OVER S/1; WE NOT PREPARED MAKE COMMITMENTS DESCRIBED AS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH SUCH CONTROL. ACCORDINGLY, IF STATION BELIEVES $1,200 REIMBURSEMENT FOR PAST SERVICES WOULD IN END BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, BELIEVE BEST COURSE WILL BE THAT SUGGESTED PARA 5 REF A, WHICH IS TO CONTINUE CONTACT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE ON NON-REMUNERATIVE BASIS.

7. SOURCE OF "WELL AND LESS THAN FAVORABLY KNOWN" COMMENT (DIRECTOR 485299) IS NOS OFFICER WHO SERVED IN BEIRUT AND KNEW THAT S/1 WAS IN CONTACT WITH VARIOUS EMBASSY OFFICERS AND HAD RATHER UNSAVORY REPUTATION AS INFLUENCE PEDDLER. THERE NO SPECIFICS AND NOTHING CONCERNING S/1 IN RECENT FOS RECORDS TO CONFIRM OR REFUTE ADMITTEDLY SUBJECTIVE RECOLLECTION.

8. JOSEPH W. ADLESICK, WHO WILL BE TRANSITING PARIS CIRCA 22-OCT 79 ON ANOTHER IRANIAN CASE WILL BE HAPPY DISCUSS S/1, U/1 AND OTHER CASES WITH STATION OFFICERS.

9. WE ARE RESEARCHING ANSWER TO PARA TWO A, REF B QUESTION AND WILL ADVISE.

10. FILE 201-962867; 201-961724. EVW 18OCT99 DRV DEC.1 ALL SECRET.

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CIEP PARIS 13712

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TREAS

PRIORITY AMEMB SDSLIPPERY/1 EMBSY

DTG: PARIS 13[illegible]

1. ON 2 OCTOBER, UNBUSY/1 WAS ASKED TO DETERMINE THE RELATIONSHIP OF SDSLIPPERY TO EDGAR FAURE. UNBUSY/1 WAS TOLD THAT SDSLIPPERY/1 WAS A LEBANESE EX-PARLIAMENTARIAN WHO MAINTAINED A LAW OFFICE IN PARIS WITHOUT BENEFIT OF FRENCH LICENSE AND WHO SAID HE WAS ABLE TO DO SO THANKS TO INTERVENTION OF FAURE. UNBUSY/1 WAS ALSO ASKED TO DETERMINE (WITHIN LIMITS DICTATED BY A HEALTHY REGARD FOR HIS OWN SECURITY) WHAT SDSLIPPERY/1 PRINCIPAL BUSINESS, CLIENTS, CONTACTS, SOURCES OF FUNDS AND REASON FOR ASSISTANCE MIGHT BE.

2. ON 13 OCTOBER UNBUSY/1 REPORTED, AFTER TALKING TO FAURE AND UNDESIGNATED ASSOCIATES OF FAURE, THAT:

A. FAURE ONLY SEES SDSLIPPERY/1 ABOUT ONCE A YEAR, AND IS NOT PARTICULARLY IN THE REASON FOR THEIR RELATIONSHIP, HOWEVER,

B. FAURE ASSOCIATE MICHEL AUDIOT SEES SDSLIPPERY/1 FREQUENTLY;

C. SDSLIPPERY/1 PUTS IT ABOUT THAT HE HAS CLOSE TIES TO THE AMERICANS;

D. SDSLIPPERY/1 SPENDS A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY;

E. SDSLIPPERY/1 IS CLOSE TO MUHAMMAD SHARPI, A TUNISIAN CITIZEN WHO FUNCTIONS AS A CULTURAL ATTACHE OF THE KUWAITI EMBASSY IN PARIS. UNBUSY/1 SAID THAT SHARPI IS A LEBANESE WHO WAS ONCE CONDEMNED TO DEATH IN TUNIS; WHO TRAVELS ON AN IRAQI PASSPORT; AND WHO IS CLOSE TO PLO FIGURES FAROUQ KADDUMI, SALAH KHALAF, AND HANI AL-HASSAN. UNBUSY/1 ALSO SAYS THAT SHARPI WORKS WITH A CAIRO GROUP ACTIVE IN ARENCH FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF. THIS GROUP IS HEADED BY KUWAITI/1 MOST PRINCIPAL ENVOY TO PERSIAN GULF POTENTATES IS NICOLAS LANG (IDEN) FORMER YORK EMPLOYEE

Abu Iyad

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AND DIRECTOR OF THE PUBLICATION AFRO-ASIE. LANG, WHO FORMERLY WAS ACTIVE IN NEGOTIATING FRENCH ARMS SALES TO LIBYA IS NOW TRAVELLING REGULARLY TO TUNISIA ON SOME PROJECT HAVING TO DO WITH THE TUNISIAN ROAD UNIONS IN WHICH HE IS ASSISTED BY SHARPI.

3. ON 17 OCT IN SDSLIPPERY/1'S OFFICE, C/O ASKED SDSLIPPERY/1 IF HE HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF A PERSON NAMED NICOLAS LANG WHO PURPORTED TO LOOK AFTER INTERESTS OF THE FRENCH ESTABLISHMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF. SDSLIPPERY/1 SAID NO, PICKED UP THE PHONE AND IMMEDIATELY POSED THE QUESTION TO SOMEONE WHOM HE LATER IDENTIFIED AS NICOLAS LANG. SDSLIPPERY/1 SAID THAT LANG HAD ASSURED HIM THERE NO SUCH PERSON WHO REPRESENTS THE ELYSEE OR THE QUAI D'ORSAY AND SAID HE WOULD CHECK THE FOREIGN COMMERCE MINISTRY. SDSLIPPERY/1 SAID THAT LANG WAS A MAN WHO DID REPRESENT THE FRENCH ESTABLISHMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, WHO WAS ASSOCIATED WITH UNCLE/1 AND THE BANQUE VOIRIN, AND WHO PROBABLY HAD CONNECTED WITH THE S.D.E.C.E.

4. PARIS HAS NO TRACES ON SHARPI AND SHARPI NOT LISTED IN FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY DIPLOMATIC LIST AS OFFICIAL OF KUWAITI EMBASSY.

5. FILE: [illegible]; [illegible]; [illegible]. [illegible] 1POCDPG DEV DPC1.
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MT
#3712

S E C R E T 271171Z OCT 79 STATE

CITE PARIS 13711

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WINDEPI AJAJA SISLIPPERY MONEY

REF: PARIS 13712

IDEN IS NEWSPAPER (FORM -LY MAGAZINE/14) WHO ARRIVED IN MID-1978 BUT HIS ASSIGNABILITY OF SOURCES OF INFORMATION PRACTICES IN PARIS AND LONG TRAVELS TO MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA.
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FM PARIS 12969

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, DIRECTOR.

INTEL RYBAT AJAJA RTWINNER

1. PARIS STATION OFFICER TIMKEN (IDEN A FOR TEHRAN) FUNCTIONALLY INTEGRATED AS (IDEN B FOR TEHRAN) HAS BEGUN ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF IDEN C AS POTENTIAL CONDUIT FOR WELL-HELL TREATMENT OF NEWS ON IRAN, NAM, AND OTHER FAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN TOPICS. PARIS STATION ASSET IDEN D FOR HEADQUARTERS) TOLD A FRIEND WHO IS CULTURAL EDITOR OF IDEN C'S MAGAZINE THAT PERSON COVERING THIRD WORLD FOR THIS MAGAZINE SHOULD MEET ASSET'S FRIEND TIMKEN WHO COVERED SAME BEAT AND WAS A KNOWLEDGEABLE MAVERICK TYPE WHO CONSTANTLY DEPLORING THAT PROFESSIONAL ETHICS PRECLUDED HIM FROM WRITING FOR PRESS WHICH, AT LEAST IN FRANCE, WAS REPUTEDLY UNINFORMED ABOUT THIRD WORLD. OUR TENTATIVE PLAN IS TO INDUCE IDEN C TO CULTIVATE TIMKEN AS POTENTIAL SOURCE. TIMKEN HAS HAD ONLY ONE ENCOUNTER WITH IDEN C, A DRINK AT HER PLACE WHICH WAS INTERRUPTED AFTER HALF-HOUR BY ARRIVAL OF AFP CAMERAMAN WHO SENT TV FOOTAGE IN IRAN DURING REVOLUTION. (HIS SISTER IS CULTURAL ADVISOR TO FRENCH SERVICE OF RADIO PEKING.) TIMKEN WILL LUNCH IDEN C ON 14 SEPTEMBER, AND SHE WILL DEPART FOR TEHRAN O/A 15 SEPTEMBER.

2. ACCORDING TO SDSLIPPERY/1, IDEN C BEGAN COVERING IRANIAN OPPOSITION TO SHAH SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE THE REVOLUTION AND REMAINS ONE OF THREE FRENCH JOURNALISTS WHO WRITE OPINION MAKING ARTICLES ON IRAN. HE ASSESSES IDEN C, WHOM HE HAS MET ONLY ONCE HIMSELF, AS PROFESSIONALLY OBJECTIVE AND POLITICALLY NOT NEARLY SO FAR TO THE LEFT AS THE RAG FOR WHICH SHE WRITES. IDEN C CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN WELL RECEIVED BY EMBASSY PREVIOUSLY IN IRAN, BUT BELIEVES EVERYONE SHE KNEW HAS LEFT. TIMKEN HAS GIVEN HER NAME OF PAO SHELLENBERG AND HAS SAID HE WOULD SEE WHAT HE COULD DO TO FACILITATE CONTACT FOR IDEN C AT EMBASSY. GIVEN IDEN C LEFT WING CREDENTIALS



2. PARIS 12269 S E C R E T. IT SEEMS JUST POSSIBLE THAT, D PRIOR EXPERIENCE IN I[illegible], IT SEEMS JUST POSSIBLE THAT, EN UNDER CURRENT ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES, STATION MIGHT ND CONTACT WITH IDEN CAREFUL. IF SO, ADVISE PARIS MEDIATE PRECEDENCE WITH NAME AND COVER OF OFFICER IF T, IT WOULD FACILITATE OUR DEVELOPMENT OF IDEN C/F EHRAN COULD ENSURE THAT HELLINBERG OR OTHER APPROPRIATE FFICER SEES HER AND CONFIRMS TO HER THAT TIMKEN [illegible] CTLY IDEN B AND DID SUGGEST THAT EMBASSY RECEIVE HER.

3. PARIS STATION HAS NO TRACES IDEN C. REQUEST HEAD UARTERS AND TEHRAN TRACES.

4. FILE DEFER. RVW 11 SEP 99 DRV D9C1~

S E C R E T



12 Sep [illegible] E

S E C R E T 111645Z SEP 79 STAFF

TE PARIS 12270

: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, DIRECTOR.

IF: PARIS 12269

1. IDEN A REF IS ELWIN (TED) ATKINS. IDEN A REF IS OLITICAL SECTION OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR UNITED NATIONS AND ULTI-LATERAL AFFAIRS, AND FOR NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. IDEN C S DENISE M O U R A D (PEN NAME) THIRD WORLD AFFAIRS EDITOR OR LEFTIST PARIS WEEKLY LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR. DOB CIRCA 4- FATHER IS INDIAN NATIONAL, OF SHIA MUSLIM FAITH. MOTHER, A TURK, DIED WHEN MOURAD WAS TWO YEARS OLD. MOURAD HAS RAISED IN FRANCE AND IS FRENCH NATIONAL. SHE SPEAKS RENCH AND ENGLISH.

2. FILEDEFER. RVW 11 SEP 99 DRV D9[illegible].

E C R E T

2270



S E C R E T 121543Z SEP 79 STAFF

C PARIS 12317

T PRIORITY TEHRAN, DIRECTOR.

WN EL RYBAT AJAJA RTWINNER

RE A. PARIS 12269
B. PARIS 12270

1. FURTHER INVESTIGATION REVEALS IDEN C REF B M
TDY ICAL SUBJECT 201-912772 WHO AKA DENIZE FUSSEIN, RI
HEADQUARTERS REVIEW 201 AND ADVISE PARIS AND TEHRAN
PRIORITY ANY INFO PERTINENT TO REF PLAN FOR DEVELOPMENT
OF ASSESSMENT DATA.

2. FILE DEFER. RVW 12 SEP 99. DRV D9C1.

S E C R E T
#2

13 SEP 79 5 5 2

S E C R E T 122105Z SEP 79 STAFF

HCITE DIRECTOR 512138.

TO: IMMEDIATE PARIS, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA RTWINNER UNPOLO

REF: PARIS 12269

1. IDEN A IS UNPOLO/1, FORMER PARIS STATION RECRUITMENT TARGET WHO WAS UNDER PARALLEL CULTIVATION IN 1973 BY STATION CASE OFFICER CLYDE W. TRICHILO (IDEN B) AND BY UNSQUIB/1 AS POTENTIAL FI AGENT ON CHINA AND NE TARGETS. UNPOLO/1 ACCEPTED RECRUITMENT, INCLUDING SALARY, IN NOVEMBER 1973 BUT RENEGED ON MONTH LATER ON BASIS IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT. IN NOTE TO CASE OFFICER SHE STATED: "THE IDEA SEEMED EXCITING, BUT I FINALLY REALIZED IT WAS GOING DEEPLY AGAINST MY FEELINGS....IT WOULD BE A CONSTANT STRUGGLE IN MY MIND." UNPOLO/1 WAS AWARE THAT SHE WAS IN CONTACT WITH RTACTION IN PARIS AND IN ISLAMABAD. OPERATIONAL APPROVAL WAS CANCELLED IN APRIL 1979.

2. ONLY RECENT INFO IN UNPOLO/1 201 IS SEPTEMBER 1978 DOCUMENT EXTRACT REPORTING UNPOLO MEMBERSHIP IN RADICAL OR TROTSKYIST FACTION OF TUDEH PARTY AND HER PARTICIPATION IN ACTIVITIES OF IRANIAN STUDENTS IN PARIS. WE WILL REQUEST FULL TEXT OF DOCUMENT AND ADVISE IF THERE ARE FURTHER DETAILS OF INTEREST TO REPORT. WILL ALSO REVIEW RESTRICTED CI FOLDER ON UNPOLO/1.

3. IN LIGHT ABOVE, STATION MAY WISH REVIEW UNPOLO/1'S OPS BACKGROUND BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER WITH APPROACH TO HER.

4. FILE: 201-912772. RVW 12 SEPT 99. DRV D9C.1. SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#2

3 Sep

S E C R E T 122122Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 512146.

TO: IMMEDIATE PARIS, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA RTWINNER

REF DIRECTOR 512138

1. IDENITITIES ARE:

A. KENIZE M O U R A D AKA KENIZE H U S S E I N (201-912772), BORN CA 1944 IN INDIA. NATURALIZED FRENCH CITIZEN. SHE IS ALLEGED DAUGHTER OF INDIAN MOSLEM MAJARAJA HUSSEIN KOTWARA, AND TURKISH MOTHER. FATHER'S FAMILY MOVED TO PAKISTAN AT TIME OF PARTITION AND TOOK PAKISTANI NATIONALITY. MOTHER LEFT FATHER SOON AFTER MARRIAGE AND MOVED TO PARIS. KENIZE REARED BY CATHOLIC SISTERS FROM EARLY CHILDHOOD AFTER DEATH OF HER MOTHER. AT SOME POINT SHE WAS TAKEN UNDER WING OF SWISS DIPLOMAT WHO AMBASSADOR TO PEKING 1953-54. KENIZE HAS BEEN JOURNALIST FOR "LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR" SINCE 1970. PREVIOUSLY TRAVELLED FOR ONE YEAR IN INDIA TEACHING FRENCH AND WRITING FREE LANCE. PRIOR TO INDIA TRIP WAS STEWARDESS FOR AIR FRANCE FOR TWO YEARS. KENIZE HAS NEPHEW WHO IN LATE 1972 APPOINTED THIRD SECRETARY, PAKISTAN EMBASSY IN PARIS. AT THAT TIME SHE ALSO HAD VERY WIDE ACQUAINTANCE AMONG INDIAN, PAKISTANI, AND BANGLADESH COMMUNITIES AND DIPLOMATS AND APPARENTLY SOME CHINESE CONTACTS AS WELL.

B. CHARLES A. MELTON.

2. FILE: 201-912772. RVW 12 SEPT 99. DRV D9C.1. SECRET.

S E C R E T

1127

15 Sep 79 2 2

S E C R E T 141536Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 12387 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA RTWINNER UNPOLO

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 512138
B. TEHRAN 54198
C. PARIS 12269
D. PARIS 12270
E. PARIS 12374

1. SUBJECT REFS DEPARTS PARIS 14 SEP, ARRIVING TEHRAN 1400 LOCAL SAME DAY. SHE TRAVELLING ON FRENCH PASSPORT WITHOUT VISA AND WILL NOT SAY SHE JOURNALIST ON ENTERING COUNTRY UNLESS ASKED. HER FIRST MOVE WILL BE TO PHONE PRIME MINIST B A Z A R G A N WHO SHE SAYS IS OLD FRIEND. SHE ALSO KNOWS NASIR M I N A C H I (WHOM SHE PROFESSES PRIVATELY TO DETEST AND HOPES HE WILL ASSIST IN ASSURING SHE IS ALLOWED TO GATHER NEWS. SHE PLANS RETURN PARIS CIRCA 5 OCTOBER IF SHE IS NOT EXPELLED SOONER. SHE VOLUNTEERED TO BRIEF PARIS C/O ON IRAN WHEN SHE RETURNS.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE TEHRAN STATION REQUESTING TEA MR. G R A V E S RECEIVE UNPOLO/1 AND EXTEND WHATEVER COURTESIES MAY BE NORMAL IN DIFFICULT TEHRAN EMBASSY SITUATION. YOU MAY TELL MR. GRAVES THAT UNPOLO/1 IS UNDER ASSESSMENT BY PARIS C/O (AS IDENTIFIED REF D) AS POTENTIAL SOURCE OF INTRODUCTION TO LEFTIST JOURNALISTS AND INTELLECTUALS IN PARIS, AND THAT C/O WOULD LIKE TO GAIN CREDIT WITH SUBJECT FOR WHATEVER COURTESIES MR. GRAVES CAN EXTEND. YOU SHOULD ASSURE MR. GRAVES THAT C/O HAS NOT BROKEN COVER WITH UNPOLO/1. YOU MAY ADD THAT UNPOLO/1 ON SHORT ACQUAINTANCE, DOES NOT SEEM HOSTILE TOWARD UNITED STATES OR OUR INTERESTS. THE MAGAZINE FOR WHICH SHE WRITES IS SOCIALIST, BUT NOT COMMUNIST LEANING, AND NOT A KNEE-JERK OPPONENT OF OUR INTERESTS. UNPOLO/1 PLANS TRY TO DO PIECE ON HOW MAN IN STREET IS FARING IN NEW IRAN. SHE IS, OF COURSE, ALSO ANXIOUS TO GAIN INSIGHT INTO STATE OF MINORITIES, MILITARY, AND LEFT.

3. FOR DIRECTOR: FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC AND ASSESSMENT DATA OBTAINED AT LUNCH 13 SEPTEMBER:

A. UNPOLO/1 SAID SEE WAS FRENCH BY VIRTUE OF HAVIN BEEN BORN IN PARIS, AND COULD LEGITIMATELY OBTAIN PAKISTANI OR INDIAN PASSPORT BUT HAS NOT DONE SO IN ORDER NOT TO PREJUDICE HER FRENCH NATIONALITY. SHE SAID HER FATHER REMAINED IN INDIA AND ASSUMED INDIAN NATIONALITY BECAUSE HE OPPOSED PARTITION AND OWNED LAND IN WHAT BECAME INDIA, WHEREAS THE REST OF HIS FAMILY WENT TO PAKISTAN.

B. UNPOLO/1 SAID SHE WAS CLOSE TO MUHAMMED ALI B H U T T O FAMILY AND REGARDS ZIA AS HOMICIDAL MANIAC WHO WILL FURNISH NUCLEAR BOMB TO SOME ARAB COUNTRY AS SOON AS HE GETS HIS HANDS ON ONE. WERE IT NOT FOR BHUTTO CONNECTIO SHE MIGHT HAVE TAKEN UP OPTION FOR DUAL NATIONALITY LAST YE BECAUSE SHE SOUGHT AND ALMOST GOT JOB IN U.N. PRESS OFFICE N NEW YORK WHICH SEE FEELS SHE MIGHT HAVE HAD IF SHE HAD BEEN CONSIDERED PAK INSTEAD OF FRENCH. SHE MUCH WANTED TO LIVE N NEW YORK, AND PLANS VACATION THERE AFTER IRAN TRIP.

C. SUBJECT DESCRIBES LUTFALLAH S U L A Y M A N AS HER "BEST FRIEND". SULAYMAN IS AN OLD AND GOOD FRIEND OF TIMKEN WHO HAS NOT, HOWEVER, RECONTACTED SULAYMAN IN PARIS FOR LACK OF AN ADDRESS OR PHONE NUMBER. SHE SAYS SULAYMAN IS NOW WORKING AT PARIS ARAB LEAGUE OFFICE IN PUBLIC RELATIONS CAPACITY, BUT HE HAS AGED AND IS NOT WELL HEART TROUBLE. SULAYMAN, CO-FOUNDER WITH HENRI C U R I E L OF ORIGINAL (HADITU) EGYPTIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, WAS EXPELLED THEREFROM IN 1949 FOR TROTSKYITE DEVIATIONISM. UNPOLO/1 ASSOCIATION WITH SULAYMAN (NOT A TROTSKYITE, BUT TOO COMMUNIST TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY MODERN COMMUNIST PARTY) MIGHT HAVE LED HER INTO ASSOCIATION WITH OTHERS LABELED TROTSKYITES.

D. SUBJECT "COUSIN" (PERHAPS IDENTICAL TO OR FATHER OR NEPHEW CITED REF A) IS IQBAL AHMAD A K H U N D, PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR TO PARIS WHO, SHE SAYS, IS RESIGNING TO TAKE THE TOP UNITED NATIONS JOB CONCERNED WITH THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBL M

4. WITH REGARD TO IRANIAN AFFAIRS, UNPOLO/1 MADE THE

FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS:

A. BA K H T I A R LEFT IRAN BY HELICOPTER THE DAY KHOMEINY RETURNED. HE IS HOPELESSLY FRENCH, EXCEPT FOR HIS INDULGENCE IN OPIUM, AND WILL NEVER UNDERSTAND THE IRANIAN PEOPLE WELL ENOUGH TO LEAD THEM. HIS POLITICAL REBIRTH IN PARIS IN AUGUST EXCITED NOBODY IN IRAN. HIS NOMINATION OF A DISREPUTABLE FIGURE LIKE JAWADH AL-A M I R AS HIS SPOKESMAN ALIENATED SO MANY EMIGRE IRANIANS THAT BAKHTIAR HAS NOW HAD TO DISOWN AL-A M I R.

B. AL-AMIR IS A FORMER MOVIE AND TELEFILM PRODUCER WH WAS WIDELY BELIEVED, DURING THE SHAH'S REGIME, TO HAVE EXTENSIVE SAVAK CONNECTIONS. AL-AMIR NOW PRETENDS TO HAVE ENDURED IMPRISONMENT FOR OPPOSING THE SHAH BUT, IN FACT, AL-AMIR WAS SENTENCED TO EIGHT YEARS IMPRISONMENT FOR RAPING HIS OWN NIECE, AND WAS RELEASED AFTER SERVING ONLY TWO. HE COMMANDS NO RESPECT. UNPOLO/1 ATTRIBUTED THIS ALLEGATION TO VERY RELIABLE IRANIAN LEGAL SOURCES.

C. THERE ARE CURRENTLY TWO IRANIAN OPPOSITION PERIODICALS PUBLISHED IN PARIS: IRAN LIBRE, PUBLISHED IN FRENCH BY THE MONARCHISTS; AND NAMEH MROUZ (THE DAILY LETTER) PUBLISHED BY AWAD AL-AMIR.

D. KARIM S A J A B I IS IN THE UNITED STATES UNDERGOING MEDICAL TREATMENT. SUBJECT DESCRIBES HIM AS HALF GA-GA AND UNACCEPTABLE TO MANY BECAUSE HE FAVORED A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY UNTIL HE WAS SURE KHOMEINY WOULD WIN.

E. HIDAYAT MATIN-D A F T A R I HAS OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP POTENTIAL, BUT IS HIDING SOMEWHERE - AFRAID FOR HIS LIFE.

F. WITH THE DEATH OF AYATOLLAH T E L E G H A N I, THE IRANIAN LEFT HAS LOST ITS LAST BUFFER WITH THE REGIME. AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-M A D A R I CAN BE EXPECTED TO URGE REASON ON KHOMEINY, BUT IS A CONSERVATIVE AT HEART AND WILL SPEND HIS POLITICAL CAPITAL ONLY ON BEHALF OF HIS CONSTITUENTS IN AZERBAIJAN. THUS, THE LEFT IS EXPOSED AND IN DISARRAY. ONLY THE GUERRILLA GROUP SURVIVE AND THEY CANNOT SEIZE OR HOLD POWER.

BT

#2387

PAGE 4 PARIS 12387 S E C R E T

G. U POLO/1 OBSERVED THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE AN EFFOR
ON THE PART F SOME OF THE LEBANESE SHI'A TO ESTABLISH A
WORKING RELA IONSHIP WITH THE IRANIAN OPPOSITION, WHICH SHE
DID NOT QUIT UNDERSTAND. (THIS UNDOUBTEDLY REFLECTS
IMPRESSION G VEN HER BY SDSLIPPERY/1) TO WHOM SHE WAS INTRO-
DUCED ON 4 SEP BY NESSIM K H U R I OF PARIS ARABIC PAPER A L-
M U S T A Q B A L.) G/O OBSERVED THAT NATURAL INTERESTS O
LEBANESE SHI A WOULD SEEM TO CALL FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH
KHOMEINY REGIME, BUT PERHAPS THIS REFLECTED RESISTANCE TO
PALESTINIAN INFLUENCE ON THE PART OF SOME FACTION OF
LEBANESE SHIITES, PERHAPS ELEMENTS FROM SOUTH (WHICH WOULD
EXCLUDE SDSLIPPERY/1) ALIGNED WITH HADDAD FORCES.

5. WE NOTE THAT UNPOLO/1 COMMENT ON DATE OF BAKHTIA
EXFILTRATION FROM IRAN IS AT VARIANCE WITH WHAT SDSTAY HAS
REPORTED AND WHAT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED. WE ALSO NOTE AL-
AMIR'S EXPLAN TION (PARIS 96324) OF HIS SENTENCE FOR RAPE
AND UNSOPER/1'S FAVORABLE IMPRESSION OF HIM, AS WELL AS
AL-AMIR'S IMP GABLE ASSERTION IN PARA 2 OF SAME MESSAGE
THAT BAKHTIAR HAD NO REAL CONTACTS IN PARIS IN JANUARY 79,
AND AL-AMIR'S CONFIDANT ASSERTION THAT KHOMEINY HAD ENJOYE
PROTECTION OF SAVAK GENERAL TAYMUR BAKHTIAR WHICH MIGHT BE
SLANDER OR IN ICATION THAT AL-AMIR HAD PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO
SAVAK HIMSELF. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO LEARN WHAT MAY BE AVAILABLE
FROM OPERATIO AL AND RESTRICTED CI FOLDERS ON UNPOLO/1 WHICH
BEARS ON ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FOR HER OPERATIONAL EXPLOITA-
TION AS POTENTIAL UNWITTING CONDUIT FOR SELECTED LWSHELL
MATERIAL.

6. FIL : 201-912772; INDEX: LUTFALLAH SULAYMAN (20 -
); IZBAL AHMED AKHUND, PAKISTANI DIPLOMAT RELATED
TO UNPOLO/1; JAWAD AL AMIR (PARAS 4 A. AND 6 SHOULD APPEAR ON
FICHE); NAMEE ROUZ AND IRAN LIBRE, IRANIAN OPPOSITION PUBL -
CATIONS FOUNDED IN PARIS IN AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1979; KARIM
SANJABI; HIJAYAT MATIN-DAFTARI. RVW 14SEP99 DRV D90.1.
S E C R E T
BT
#2387

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

five

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY **IRAN UAR YUGOSLAVIA** REPORT NO.

SUBJECT **POSSIBLE EFFORTS BY PRESIDENT TITO TO RESTORE IRANIAN-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS** DATE OF REPORT **6 AUGUST 1966**

NO. PAGES

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. **EARLY JUNE 1966**

PLACE & DATE ACQ **IRAN, TEHRAN /3 AUGUST 1966/** **NIT -7163**

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: **A LAYMAN WHO IS A TRUSTED CONFIDANT OF MANY IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS. HE IS ALSO CLOSE TO POLITICAL OPPOSITION LEADERS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE NATIONAL FRONT AND THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT OF IRAN. ALTHOUGH HE HAS SELDOM REPORTED ON POLITICAL OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES, HIS INFORMATION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN RELIGIOUS CIRCLES HAS USUALLY BEEN ACCURATE. HE OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION DURING A CONVERSATION WITH AYATOLLAH HAJI MOHAMMAD TAQI QOMI, SHIA SECT REPRESENTATIVE ASSIGNED TO CAIRO. QOMI HAD TALKED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ABBAS ARAM ON 31 JULY 1966.**

1. FOREIGN MINISTER ARAM STATED THAT DURING THE SHAH'S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT TITO IN YUGOSLAVIA IN EARLY JUNE 1966, THE SHAH HAD COMPLAINED TO TITO THAT IT WAS NOT EASY TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH UAR PRESIDENT JAMAL ABD AL-NASIR. TITO ANSWERED THAT HE WAS SURE HE COULD MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO RE-ESTABLISH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND EGYPT. /FIELD COMMENT - NIT-7157 REPORTED THAT THE SHAH HAD TOLD QOMI THAT QUIET NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNDERWAY TO RESTORE IRANIAN-EGYPTIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE SHAH DID NOT SPECIFY, HOWEVER, THE CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE BEING CONDUCTED./ TITO ADVISED THE SHAH TO EXERCISE MODERATION VIS-A-VIS NASIR.

2. ACCORDING TO ARAM, TITO ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE HOPED BOTH IRAN AND PAKISTAN WOULD EVENTUALLY JOIN THE RANKS OF NON-ALIGNED NATIONS.

/END/

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T/WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
COUNTRY: IRAN/EGYPT
DOI : EARLY-MID-DECEMBER 1974
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO ENSURE COOPERATION OF EGYPTIAN CLERGY DURING SHAH OF IRAN'S STATE VISIT TO EGYPT

ACQ : IRAN, TEHRAN (2 JANUARY 1975) FIELD NO. NIT-9430
SOURCE : A LAYMAN WHO IS A TRUSTED CONFIDANT OF MANY IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND FORMER POLITICAL OPPOSITION LEADERS. HIS OCCASIONAL REPORTING ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS HAS USUALLY BEEN ACCURATE, BUT AT TIMES IS BIASED AGAINST THE PRESENT REGIME. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM A SENIOR IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADER.

1. IN MID-DECEMBER 1974, NOTED IRANIAN SHI'A RELIGIOUS LEADER, AYATOLLAH MEHA MUHAMMAD TAQI Q U M I, DEPARTED TEHRAN FOR CAIRO AT THE REQUEST OF EGYPTIAN MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS MUHAMMAD SAMIH A N W A R AND IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER AMIR ABAS H O V E Y D A TO ASSIST IN WINNING THE COOPERATION OF EGYPTIAN CLERICAL LEADERS IN CONNECTION WITH THE UPCOMING STATE VISIT TO EGYPT BY THE SHAH AND EMPRESS F OF IRAN.

2. IN EARLY DECEMBER 1974, QUMI RECEIVED A PERSONAL LETTER FROM MINISTER OF STATE ANWAR. IN THIS LETTER ANWAR

REQUESTED THAT QUMI VISIT CAIRO BEGINNING IN MID-DECEMBER 1974 IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE 8-12 JANUARY 1975 VISIT TO EGYPT BY THE SHAH AND EMPRESS. QUMI WAS ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN ALL OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE AT WHICH MEMBERS OF THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM CLERGY WOULD BE PRESENT. ANWAR ALSO ASKED QUMI TO ENCOURAGE THE EGYPTIAN CLERGY TO ATTEND ALL THE PLANNED ACTIVITIES SO AS TO LEND THE IMPRESSION THAT EX EGYPTIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAD NO MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE SHAH'S POLICIES.

3. SHORTLY AFTER RECEIVING THE ANWAR LETTER, QUMI WAS CALLED TO AN INTERVIEW WITH IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER HOVEYDA. HOVEYDA REVEALED HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE PARTICULARS OF THE ANWAR LETTER TO QUMI AND REQUESTED THAT QUMI COMPLY WITH ANWAR'S REQUEST. HE ASKED QUMI TO DO EVERYTHING IN HIS POWER TO ENSURE THE FULL COOPERATION OF THE EGYPTIAN CLERGY DURING THE SHAH'S VISIT.

4. QUMI WAS RELUCTANT TO MAKE THE TRIP, BUT HE STATED TO A CLOSE CONFIDANT THAT THE PRESSURE FOR HIM TO COMPLY WAS SIMPLY TOO GREAT TO RESIST. QUMI TOLD THE CONFIDANT THAT HE PLANS TO REMAIN IN CAIRO FOR A FULL TWO MONTHS.

5. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT TEHRAN: SENT TO CAIRO
REPORT CLASS S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

C R E T 031100 MAY 79 STAFF

PARIS 98834

TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR.

EL AJAJA SDFORGIVE UNTROUT

. UNTROUT/1 MET WITH SON OF SD /1 ON 2 APRIL
DURING THE MEETING, SDFORGI PASSED THE FOLLOW-
FORMATION TO UNTROUT/1.

. SOMETIME AROUND THE IRANIA (15+22 ARCH,
TROUT/1), SDFORGIVE/1 WAS ARR DETAINED FOR
IMATELY HALF AN HOUR BY THE K DED BY SADEGH
K H A L E, A MULLAH. (COMM OUT/1 WAS NOT
KHALKHALE'S FIRST NAME, BUT WAS A PROMINENT
) SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE KO TO SDFORGIVE/1'S
EARCHED IT AND TOOK SOME PAPE SPORTS BELONGING
RGIVE/1 AND HIS DAUGHTER, AN /1 HIMSELF. THE
O TOOK THE EQUIVALENT OF USD NGING TO SDFOR-
AND USD 7,000 BELONGING TO TH NCE THE INCIDENT,
HIGH-LEVEL MEMBERS OF THE RE SIDE OF THE
GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING SDTHOR N-LAW, HAVE
ED TO SDFORGIVE/1 AND INDICA ITEMS TAKEN
RETURNED. KHALKHALE WAS STRI LEADERSHIP OF
TEH, BUT WAS GIVEN ANOTHER PO UT/1 DOES NOT
SDFORGIVE/1 DID NOT MENTION ENT TO HIM PRIOR
EPARTURE FROM TEHRAN, BUT SPE T SDFORGIVE/1
Y HUMILIATED BY THE INCIDENT OT WANT TO TALK
HE ADDED THAT SDFORGIVE/1 RIVATE PERSON
LWAYS OPERATED MORE OR LESS SCENES AND
EREFORE, NOT WANT PUBLIC EXPO E ARREST.

TO DATE, SDFORGIVE/1'S PASSP BEEN RETURNED.
1 IS DETERMINED TO LEAVE IRA DO SO CLAND-
IF THE PASSPORT IS NOT RETUR UT/1 STATED
GIVE/1 WOULD OBVIOUSLY NEED S PTAINING

S C R E T 3114252 AUG 79 STAFF

C PARIS 12014

TO TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR.

WN ATL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

RE TEHRAN 54063

DURING 30 AUGUST MEETING WITH UNTROUT/1, MARIN
BE UP-SDFORGIVE/1. ACCORDING TO UNTROUT/1, SDFORG
IS THE TEHRAN REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR. THIS POSIT
IS BY AHMAD AZARI-QOMI. FYI: SDFORGIVE/1'S TRUE
IS ITY.

UNTROUT/1 REITERATED HIS PREVIOUS COMMENTS ON
RE SHIP, OR LACK THEREOF, BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND
SD /1. UNTROUT/1 SAID THAT KHOMEINI WOULD NEVER
OF POSITION OF REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR TO SDFORG
ON CHANCE THAT KHOMEINI WOULD OFFER THE JOB TO
SD /1. UNTROUT/1 STATED THAT SDFORGIVE/1 WOULD TUR
DO JOB OFFER.

UNTROUT/1 TOLD MARINOS IN APRIL 1979 THAT
HE ED SDFORGIVE/1'S PHONE HAD BEEN TAPPED. HE BASE
AS ON THE FACT THAT SDFORGIVE/1'S TELEPHONE SERV
HA INTERRUPTED REPEATEDLY PRIOR TO THE TIME HE WAS
AR AND DETAINED BY SADEGH KHALKHALI'S KOMITEH ME
IN ARCH 1979 (SEE PARIS 9883[illegible], BEING RELAYED TO
TE ON THE DAY THAT SDFORGIVE/1 WAS DETAINED, HIS
PH OUT OF ORDER FOR THE ENTIRE DAY. IN ADDITION,
SD /1'S SON (WHO WAS IN TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH HI
FA WHILE HE WAS IN PARIS) TOLD UNTROUT/1 THAT HE DID
NO HIS FATHER AT HIS HOME. RATHER, HE CALLED A
RE IN TEHRAN WHO PASSED MESSAGES TO BOTH PARTIES.
UN ASSUMED THAT THE TAPPING WAS DONE BY PRO-KHOME
EL WHILE ABOVE IS CERTAINLY NOT HARD EVIDENCE
TH GIVE/1'S PHONE IS TAPPED, UNTROUT/1 IS FIRMLY
CO THAT THIS IS THE CASE.

FILE: 201-0079932. RVW 31 AUG 99 DRV D9C.1.

S E T

#20



C R E T 3114262 AUG 79 STAFF

PARIS 12015

TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR

EL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

PARIS 12014

DENTITY IS: MOHAMAD TAQI

R A T

S E C R E T 3122202 AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 305277.

TO TEHRAN INFO PARIS.

WNANIEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFO GIVE

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54063
B. PARIS 11916

1. SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT SDFO GIVE/1 (S/1) WILL BE WILLING TO HAVE ANY SUBSTANTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH SDFORWARD/1 (F/1). HE WAS MOST RELUCTANT TO DO SO EVEN IN PRESENCE OF UNTROUT/1 (T/1) AND, GIVEN EVENTS OF PAST SIX MONTHS, WILL PROBABLY DO LITTLE MORE THAN RECEIVE F/1. WE CONCUR WITH TEHRAN'S COMMENTS THAT S/1 IS STILL OF HIGH OPS INTEREST, BUT GIVEN DIFFICULTIES OF MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH HIM, WE LESS SURE WE ABLE MAKE ARGUMENT FOR MAJOR EFFORT AGAINST THIS TARGET.

2. AS ADDRESSEES AWARE, PREVIOUS CONTACT WITH S/1 WAS THROUGH T/1 WHO WOULD, MONTHLY, TDY FROM PARIS TO TEHRAN TO MAKE MEETINGS, BE DEBRIEFED BY STATION OFFICER AND RETURN TO PARIS. SUCH TRIPS WERE OBVIOUSLY BURDEN FOR AGING T/1 AND HIS BEING STUCK IN TEHRAN IN AFTERMATH OF FEBRUARY REVOLUTION FURTHER COMPLICATED PROBLEM. FOR ALL OF THAT, WE MUST REALISTICALLY CONCLUDE THAT T/1 REMAINS ONLY VIABLE ROUTE TO S/1 IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE, AND DO NOT BELIEVE T/1 VIABLE ALTERNATIVE. WOULD LIKE SUGGEST, PENDING TEHRAN'S CONCURRENCE, PARIS DETERMINE T/1'S WILLINGNESS FOR TRAVEL TEHRAN TO AGAIN SEE S/1. NO COMMITMENT TO SUCH TRAVEL SHOULD BE MADE IF RESULTS SUCH APPROACH T/1 POSITIVE AND TEHRAN CONTINUES VIEW S/1 HIGH PRIORITY TARGET. WE WILL CONSIDER PROPOSAL HAVE T/1 RETURN TEHRAN FOR MEETING WITH AND DEBRIEFING OF S/1. T/1 WOULD, OF COURSE, ATTEMPT DETERMINE S/1'S RECEPTIVITY SUCH MEETING PRIOR T/1'S DEPARTURE FROM PARIS.

3. HQS DID NOT RECEIVE RET A VIDEN. PLEASE RETRANSMIT.

4. FILE: 201 [illegible]3243 055; 201-0079932. RVW 31AUG99 DRV D9C[illegible]

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

5/SEP/79 TRAVEL

R E T 05Ø959Z SEP 79 STAFF

PARIS 12067

TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR

TE AJAJA UNIROUT SDFORGIVE

REF: A. DIRECTOR 506277
B. TEHRAN 541Ø2

1. ALTHOUGH PARIS WILL DETERMINE UNROUT/1'S WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL TO TEHRAN TO MEET WITH SDFORGIVE/1, WE ARE NOT ENGENDERING HE WOULD BE AMENABLE TO SUCH TRIP. IN ADDITION TO POINTS MADE IN REF A, UNIROUT/1 MAY BE A BIT RELUCTANT CONTACT SDFORGIVE/1 SINCE HE HAS HEARD NOTHING RECENTLY FROM SDFORGIVE/1. UNTROUT/1 TOOK POSITION THAT IF SDFORGIVE/1 DESIRED CONTACT WITH HIM, HE WOULD HAVE INITIATED CONTACT.

2. PARIS HAS RECEIVED NO FOLLOW-UP REPORTING ON SECURITY INCIDENT IN TEHRAN IN WHICH DOCUMENTS WERE LEFT IN EMBASSY COMMISSARY. DID REPORT ON THIS INCIDENT CONFIRM STATEMENT IN TEHRAN 22668 THAT "THERE IS NO WAY UNIROUT/1'S IDENTITY WOULD BE DISCERNED FROM COMPROMISED NOTES"? IF THIS WAS FINAL CONCLUSION REGARDING THIS INCIDENT, THERE SHOULD BE NO SECURITY PROBLEMS RELATED TO UNTROUT/1 TRAVEL TO TEHRAN.

3. BEFORE BRINGING UP SUBJECT OF FUTURE TRAVEL TO TEHRAN WITH UNTROUT/1, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION OF LOCATION AND POSITION OF SDFORGIVE/1. IT IS UNTROUT/1'S UNDERSTANDING THAT SDFORGIVE/1 IS IN TEHRAN, NOT MAHSAD. UNTROUT/1 TOLD PARINOS ON 30 AUGUST THAT THERE ARE TWO AYATOLLAHS WHOSE SURNAMES ARE SIMILAR OR IDENTICAL TO THAT OF SDFORGIVE/1. HE STATED THAT ONE OF THESE MEN WAS IN MAHSAD. BELIEVE THAT IDENTITY, NOT SDFORGIVE/1, IS IN MASHAD. KIMKEN OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION ON IDENTITY FROM SDSLIPPERY/1). UNLESS SDFORGIVE/1 IS IN A POSITION TO FURNISH SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION, SEE NO MERIT IN UNTROUT/1 TRAVEL TO TEHRAN.

A. FILE: 201-Ø07699Ø2. RVW 4 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1.

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

5/SEP/79 TRAVEL

E C R E T 05111ØZ SEP 79 STAFF

ITE PARIS 12068

O C TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR

WNINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

REF: PARIS 12067

IDENTITY IS: HASSAN G O M I, COUSIN OF MAHDI RUHANI THE IMAM OF THE SHI'A COMMUNITY IN EUROPE. RVW 4 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1.

S E C R E T

1 SEP 7

S E C R E T 1015352 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 12208

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

UNINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 509525
B. TEHRAN 54126

1. MARINOS MET WITH UNTROUT/1 ON 10 SEPTEMBER AND SECURED HIS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO RETURN TO TEHRAN FOR MEETINGS WITH SDFORGIVE/1. PRIOR TO MAKING FINAL DECISION, HOWEVER, UNTROUT/1 WOULD APPRECIATE ASSURANCE THAT REACTION WOULD BE WILLING AND ABLE TO FACILITATE HIS EXIT FROM IRAN IF HE SHOULD HAVE DIFFICULTIES IN LEAVING.

2. UNTROUT/1 LEARNED 10 SEPTEMBER THAT MINISTRY OF CULTURE HAS CONTINUED TO DEPOSIT HIS BASE SALARY INTO HIS TEHRAN BANK ACCOUNT IN SPITE FACT HE HAS DONE ABSOLUTELY NO WORK SINCE THE REVOLUTION. MINISTRY HAS DEPOSITED ABOUT US 000 IN UNTROUT/1'S ACCOUNT IN THE LAST FIVE MONTHS. BECAUSE THIS, UNTROUT/1 WILL HAVE TO OBTAIN MINISTRY APPROVAL TO LEAVE TEHRAN. AS ADDEES RECALL, THIS WAS MAJOR PROBLEM ENCOUNTERED DURING UNTROUT/1'S LAST TDY TO TEHRAN AND RETARDED HIS RETURN TO PARIS. AS MINISTRY PAYING UNTROUT/1, HE THINKS THERE POSSIBILITY THEY MAY ASK HIM STAY IN TEHRAN AND WORK AND REFUSE ISSUANCE REQUISITE PAPERS. IN THIS EVENT, UNTROUT/1 WOULD NEED ASSISTANCE IN EXITING THE COUNTRY. THIS OBVIOUSLY IS WORST CASE SITUATION, BUT BELIEVE UNTROUT/1'S COMMENTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

3. UNTROUT/1 HAS ALSO AGAIN ASKED FOR REACTION ASSISTANCE IN REMOVING MONEY FROM IRAN. ASSUMING HE TRAVELS TO IRAN, REQUEST TEHRAN CONCURRENCE AND HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL TO MAKE ACCOMMODATION CONVERSION OF RIALS EQUIVALENT USD 00 TO FRENCH FRANCS FOR UNTROUT/1. CONVERSION COULD BE HANDLED IN SAME MANNER AS PREVIOUS TRANSACTION, I.E., UNTROUT/1 WOULD PASS RIALS TO TEHRAN CASE OFFICER WHO WOULD

IN AMOUNT (ACCORDING TO EXCHANGE RATE AT THE TIME) TO PARIS
WOULD IN TURN PASS CASH TO UNTROUT/1 FOR DEPOSIT IN HIS
PARIS ACCOUNT. 4. IF, FOR SOME REASON, UNTROUT/1 UNABLE TRAVEL
TEHRAN, WOULD STILL APPRECIATE TEHRAN ASSISTANCE IN MAKING
ACCOMMODATION CONVERSION. UNTROUT/1 MENTIONED HE COULD SEND
PERSONAL CHECK TO SOMEONE IN TOUCH WITH TEHRAN STATION, SUCH
AS SDFORWARD/1, WHO WOULD THEN PASS CASH TO TEHRAN CASE
OFFICER

4. BELIEVE POSITIVE RESPONSES TO PARA 2 AND 3 ABOVE WILL ENSURE POSITIVE DECISION ON UNTROUT/1'S PART TO TRAVEL TEHRAN. ONE REMAINING PROBLEM IS SDFORGIVE/1'S WILLINGNESS MEET WITH UNTROUT/1. UNTROUT/1 IS WILLING TELEPHONE SDFORGIVE/1 DIRECTLY FROM PARIS TO OBTAIN READING ON HIS FEELINGS ABOUT SUCH MEETINGS. UNTROUT/1 IS CONFIDENT CONVERSATION CAN BE SUFFICIENTLY DOUBLE-TALKED SO AS NOT POSE SECURITY PROBLEM. SECOND OPTION IS HAVE UNTROUT/1 ATTEMPT CONTACT SON OF SDFORGIVE/1 IN PARIS WHO WOULD IN TURN CONTACT SDFORGIVE/1 ON BEHALF OF UNTROUT/1. ALTHOUGH THIS OPTION WOULD USE LESS CONTROL OVER CONTACT, BELIEVE IT DOES HAVE SOME MERIT, GIVEN THE MORE SECURE MEANS OF CONTACT BETWEEN SDFORGIVE/1 AND HIS SON THAN BETWEEN SDFORGIVE/1 AND UNTROUT/1. SDFORGIVE/1'S SON IS NO LONGER IN PARIS HOWEVER, UNTROUT/1 WILL INITIATE DIRECT CONTACT WITH SDFORGIVE/1. APPRECIATE HEARS COMMENTS ON PREFERRED METHOD OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN UNTROUT/1 AND SDFORGIVE/1.

5. NEXT CONTACT WITH UNTROUT/1 IS 0930 HOURS LOCAL SEPTEMBER. WOULD APPRECIATE RESPONSES TO ABOVE ITEMS FOR COB 13 SEPTEMBER.

6. FILE: 201-0079932. RVW 10 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1.

SECRET

12 SEP 79

S E C [illegible] 1121182 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 511343.

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

REFS: A. PARIS 12408
B. DIRECTOR 509825
C. TEHRAN 54190

1. UNTROUT/1 (T/1) SHOULD NOT UNDERTAKE TRIP TO TEHRAN ON BEHALF UNLESS HE ABLE CONFIRM SOME WAY THAT MEETING WITH SDFORGIVE/1 (SDF/1) IS POSSIBLE. DEFER TO PARIS AS TO MEANS BY WHICH HE CONFIRMS SUCH MEETING.

2. REGRET WE ARE UNABLE COMMIT RESOURCES TO FACILITATING EXIT FROM IRAN IN EVENT HE HAS TROUBLE LEAVING. PRESUME T/1 IN MIND EXFILTRATION OF ONE SORT OR ANOTHER. BELIEVE TEHRAN WILL AGREE THIS IS TOO GREAT AN OBLIGATION TO UNDERTAKE FOR T/1 SERVICES AT THIS POINT.

3. HQS CAN APPROVE ACCOMMODATION CONVERSION OF RIALS EQUIVALENT TO $7,000 TO FRENCH FRANCS IF T/1 HANDLING TRAVEL TEHRAN. OTHERWISE, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE WOULD PREFER AVOID SUCH CONVERSIONS. WE WOULD OF COURSE PAY T/1'S TRAVEL EXPENSES AND A 50 DOLLAR PER DAY BONUS.

4. FI[illegible] 201-279932. RVW 11SEP99 DRV 90C-1 ALL SECRET.

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16 SEP 79

S E C R E T 171534Z SEP 79 STAFF

SITE PARIS 12419

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, LONDON.

WNINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54190 (NOT NEEDED LONDON)
B. DIRECTOR 511343 (NOT NEEDED LONDON)

1. UNTROUT/1 WILL NOT MAKE TRIP TO TEHRAN TO CONTACT SDFORGIVE/1 UNLESS EXTRACTION WOULD BE APLS TO ASSIST HIM IN THE EVENT HE IS FORCED TO REMAIN IN TEHRAN. UNTROUT/1 FEELS THE CHANCES OF BEING FORCED TO REMAIN ARE VERY SLIM, AND IS UNWILLING TO TAKE THE RISK AT THIS POINT. IF HE COULD LEAVE TEHRAN UNDER HIS TRUE IDENTITY, HE WOULD NEED FALSE IDENTITY DOCUMENTS FOR TRAVEL.

2. QUESTION OF UNTROUT/1 TRAVEL TO TEHRAN MAY BE ACADEMIC POINT AS HE HAS LEARNED FROM SDFORGIVE/1'S SON THAT SDFORGIVE/1 PLANS TO TRAVEL TO EUROPE, POSSIBLY WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. SDFORGIVE/1 WILL INITIALLY GO TO LONDON; HOWEVER, IS NOT SURE IF HE WILL TRAVEL TO PARIS. SDFORGIVE/1'S SON DOES NOT KNOW HOW LONG HIS FATHER WILL BE ABLE TO STAY IN IRAN. UNTROUT/1 CAN TRAVEL TO LONDON FOR MEETINGS WITH SDFORGIVE/1, IF LATTER WILL NOT COME TO PARIS.

3. LONDON: WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS ON MEETINGS BETWEEN UNTROUT/1 AND SDFORGIVE/1 IN LONDON. IS IT NECESSARY TO DECLARE UNTROUT/1 TO BRITISH LIAISON? UNTROUT/1, A BRITISH CITIZEN, IS CURRENTLY A PARIS STATION ACCOMMODATION ASSET. HE WAS AN ASSET OF TEHRAN STATION FROM 1953 UNTIL 1977, WHEN HE MOVED TO PARIS. UNTROUT/1 WORKED FOR BRITISH INTELLIGENCE FROM 1941 UNTIL 1946 (TERMINATION OF THIS RELATIONSHIP WAS VERIFIED BY A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION OF UNTROUT/1). SDFORGIVE/1 IS A PROMINENT CLERIC OF OPS INTEREST TO TEHRAN STATION. DO NOT FORESEE THE NEED FOR UNTROUT/1 TO BE MET BY A LONDON CASE OFFICER, AS HE CAN SIMPLY RETURN TO PARIS FOR DEBRIEFINGS AFTER MEETINGS WITH SDFORGIVE/1.

AG 2 PARIS 12419 S E C R E T

4. HEADQUARTERS: ASSUME WE ARE AUTHORIZED TO PAY UN-
TROUT/1'S EXPENSES AND FIFTY DOLLAR PER DAY BONUS IF HE
TRAVELS TO LONDON TO MEET SDFORGIVE/1. IF SDFORGIVE/1 COME
TO PARIS, WE WOULD LIKE TO PICK UP ANY OPS EXPENSES UNTROUT
MIGHT INCUR DURING MEETINGS WITH SDFORGIVE/1 AS A SUITABL
BONUS AS HE WILL BE PERFORMING DUTIES WHICH GO BEYOND HIS
NORMAL DUTIES OF ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS.

5. PLEASE FORWARD REQUIREMENTS FOR UNTROUT/1 MEETINGS
WITH SDFORGIVE/1.

6. FILE: 201-0079932. RVW 17 SEP 99 DOC.1.
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14 SEP 79

P C R E T 314432 SEP 79 STAFF

TO LONDON 7858

INFO PARIS DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

INTEL ACTION UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

REF: PARIS 2419

1. WE SEE NO NEED TO DECLARE UNTROUT/1 TO LIAISON IF HE COMES
LONDON TO MEET WITH SDFORGIVE/1 AND IS HERE BRIEFEL IN PARIS
2. IF THE LONDON MEETING BECOMES FIRM, PLEASE ADVISE UNTROUT/
FORGIVE 1 RELATIONSHIP, THEIR TRUE NAMES, DATES OF ARRIVALS, AND
WHERE THEY WILL BE STAYING.

3. FILE: 201-079932. RVW 18 SEP 99. DOC.1.
P C R E T
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7858

S E C R E T 181127Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE: TEHRAN 54241

TO : PARIS INFO DIRECTOR, LONDON

WNINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

REF : PARIS 12419

1. FOLLOWING ARE OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS WE HOPE UNTROUT/1 CAN POSE TO SDFORGIVE/1.

A. WHERE IS F/1'S CURRENT RESIDENCE? IF NOT IN QOM, DOES HE VISIT THERE? HOW OFTEN?

B. WHO ARE F/1'S PRINCIPAL CONTACTS IN THE CENIOR CLERGY? THE MILITARY? THE GOVERNMENT? AMONG POLITICIANS NOT IN THE GOVERNMENTS? IN THE ETHNIC MINORITIES?

C. CAN F/1 NOMINATE A FRENCH OR ENGLISH SPEAKER TO SERVE AS INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN F/1 AND TEHRAN STATION?

2. INTEL REQUIREMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. IS THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL A FORMALLY ESTABLISHED BODY WITH A LIST OF ESTABLISHED MEMBERS? IF SO, WHO ARE THEY? IF THE COUNCIL OPERATES ON AN HQS BASIS, HOW IS MEMBERSHIP ON IT DETERMINED?

B. WHICH OF HIS ADVISORS EXERCISE SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE OVER KHOMEINI? ON WHAT ISSUES?

C. WHAT ARE CLERICAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE DRIVE FOR THEOCRATIC STATE BEING MANAGED (PRESUMABLY ON KHOMEINI'S BEHALF) BY AYATOLLAH HOSEIN ALI MOTAZERI? IF THIS ISSUE IS DIVIDING THE CLERGY, WHERE ARE THE LINES BEING DRAWN? IS THERE ANY SIGNIFICANT RESISTANCE TO THE THEOCRACY AMONG THE CLERGY AT QOM?

D. RELATED TO C ABOVE, WHAT FOLLOWING DOES AYATOLLAH KAZEM

SHARIAT-MADARI HAVE AMONG THE CLERGY? IS THIS FOLLOWING GOING UP OR DECLINING?

E. WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY, WILL THE DEATH OF AYATOLLAH TALEGANI HAVE ON KHOMEINI'S ATTITUDS TOWARD AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SECULAR MIDDLE CLASS, THE ETHNIC MINORITIES (ESPECIALLY THE KURDS), AND THE LEFT (INCLUDING THE MUJAHEDIN-H- KHALQ)? WHY DID TALEGANI, IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS BEFORE HIS DEATH, ADOPT A HARDLINESTANCE AGAINST THE LEFT AND AGAINST THE PROPONENTS OF ETHNIC AUTONOMY?

3. IF F/1 IS WILLING AND ABLE TO NAME AN INTERMEDIARY FOR CONTACT WITH TEHRAN, WE HOPE CONTACT ARANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE ON THE SPOT. IF F/1 NOT WILLING TRAVEL PARIS, THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY REQUIRE CONTACT (WITH U/1 IF NOT WITH F/1 HIMSELF) IN LONDON. CAN LONDON ACCOMMODATE THIS?

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CITE PARIS [illegible]64

TO: DIRE[illegible] TEHRAN INFO GENE[illegible]A.

WNINTEL A[illegible] UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

1. [illegible]DULLAE Q O M I, S[illegible]N OF AYATOLLAH [illegible]MAD TAOI Q O [illegible] TOLD UNTROUT/1 ON 15 SEPTEMBER 19[illegible] BAT BROTHER-I[illegible], FNU M O I N Z A D E H, IS CURRE[illegible] IRES IN PARIS A[illegible] S WORKING WITH SH[illegible]POUR BAKHTIAR. [illegible]OOR TO QOMI, M[illegible]ADEH WORKED IN BAKHTIAR'S OFFICE [illegible]LA WAS PRIME [illegible]STER. QOMI ASKED UNTROUT/1 IF HE [illegible]LD TO MEET WI[illegible] BAKHTIAR, BUT UNTROUT/1 DECLINED, [illegible]ING DOOR OPEN [illegible] FUTURE CONTACT.

2. [illegible]F THERE IS INTEREST IN FOLLOWING [illegible]ON T LEAD, WHI[illegible]COULD PROVIDE YET ANOTHER INSIGHT I[illegible]CUR IRANIAN O[illegible]TION GROUPS, STATION WILL BE GLA[illegible]DO SO. OUR [illegible] RESERVATION IS THAT IT MIGHT BE U[illegible]ED A USG "FE[illegible] TO BAKHTIAR DUE TO THE FACT THA[illegible] ABDULLAH [illegible] IS AWARE THAT UNTROUT/1 IS IN CO[illegible]I WI USG. SIN[illegible]EAVE LITTLE CONTROL OVER QOMI, [illegible] WOULD BE [illegible]E TO ENSURE THAT UNTROUT/1 IS PR[illegible]TED SIMPLY AS [illegible]INTERESTED PARTY AND NOT AS ANOTHE[illegible] USG REPRE[illegible]TIVE, LIKE SUNIO[illegible], AND TIMIEN WE[illegible]T (UNDER OF[illegible]AL COVER) WITH JA[illegible]ADH AL-A[illegible]MIN.

3. [illegible]ELCOME ADDRESSES [illegible]OMMENTS, IN ADDI[illegible]N TO PRELIMINA[illegible]RACES ON MOINZADE[illegible].

4. [illegible]ILE: 221-079932. RVW 15 SEP 99 [illegible] DOC

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BT
#2464

21 SEP [illegible]

S E C R E [illegible] 2210172 SEP 79 STAF

CITE DIRECTOR 5179-SP.

TO: PARIS UNIO TEHRAN, GENEVA.

WNINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

REF: PARIS 12464

1. [illegible] AT THIS TIME NO BASIS INTEREST TO FOLL[illegible] [illegible]PRETED AS ANOTHER FEELER TO BAKHTIAR RESULTIN[illegible] [illegible]USION THIS PART AS TO [illegible] IN FACT REPRESENTS [illegible]

2. MOINZADEH IS DJALAL MOINZADEH, FORMER MI[illegible] OFFICER WHO WAS SAVAK CHIEF OF STATION LONDO[illegible] RECENTLY TRAVELED TO U.S. TO SEE OVERT[illegible] [illegible]AGE TO OVPISI) AND SDFEPPERAH (F/I) AND [illegible] SOUGHT THEIR SUPPORT ON BEHALF OF BAKHTIAR. [illegible] [illegible]D BY BAKHTIAR THAT MOINZADEH HAD CALLED [illegible] [illegible] WAS TRAVELING IN BAKHTIAR'S NAME. [illegible] PREMATURE BUT FAILED DISSUADE [illegible]

[illegible] DRAFT: 221-079932. RVW 19SEP99 DEV DOC: ALL-[illegible]

S E C R E T 202336 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE: DIRECTOR 517911

TO : PARIS, LONDON, INFO TEHRAN

WNINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE GNSIGHT

REFS: A LONDON 17825
B TEHRAN 54241
C S 12419

1 ..... MEETING ARE COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENT
EES. WE .....ING ADD TO REF B REQUIREMENTS WHILE
....

2 APPRECIATE LONDON AND PARIS ASSISTANCE THIS CASE
..... IMPORTANT WINDOW INTO RELIGIOUS COMMUNIYY.

3 FILE: 201-079938 ; 201-243505 RVW 19 SEP 99
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S E C R E T



22 SEP

S E C R E T 21172 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 12629

TO: TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR, LONDON,

WNINTEL AJAJA UNT SDFORGIVE

REFS: A. TEHRAN
B. LONDO

1. AS OF 2 SEPTEMBER UNTROUT/1 HAD RECEIVED NO FURTHER WORD ON T OR SDFORGIVE/1 TO EUROPE. AS SOON AS PARTICULARS KN WILL ADVISE.

2. UNTROUT PROVIDED FOLLOWING INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO REF A IREMENTS, WHICH HE WILL DISCUSS WITH SDFORGIVE/1 WHEN ES MATTER. AS UNTROUT/1'S RESPONSES TO INTEL REQUIREME REPRESENT HIS VIEWS, WE ARE REPORTING INFORMATION IN OR MAT.

3. REGARDIN ERATIONAL QUESTIONS ABOUT SDFORGIVE:
A. SDFORGIVE/1'S NT RESIDENCE IS TEHRAN. HE OWNS A FARM BETWEEN TEHRA GOM AND TRAVELS TO THE FARM ABOUT ONCE A WEEK. TO T ST OF UNTROUT/1'S KNOWLEDGE SDFORGIVE/1 DOES N AVEL TO QOM. UNTROUT/1 SA THAT ANY SUCH VISITS WO URELY BE REPORTED IN THE IRANIAN PRES SDFORGIVE//1 DOES RAVEL TO QOM BECAUSE HE WOULD BE EXPECTED TO PAY LL ON ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL RELIGIOUS FIGURES M. AS HE DOES NOT WANT TO VISIT KHOMEINY, HE WOULD ORCED TO VISIT SHARIAT-MADARI, THUS POLITICIZING HIMSE
B. SDFORGIV IN TOUCH WITH ALL THE "MAJ MULLAHS", I.E. MEN WERE ACCEPTED AS RELIGIOUS F URES PRIOR TO THE REVOL AND WHO WERE NOT SIMPLY INS ALLED AS MULLAHS BY KHOM UNTROUT/1 WAS UNAWARE OF ANY CONTACT SDFORGIVE/1 HAS IN PRESENT IRANIAN MILITARY. UNTROUT/1 SAID THAT ALTHOUGH RGIVE KNOWS BAZARGAN, HE DOUBTS IF HE MAINTAINS CO WITH HIM. HE WAS UNABLE TO ADDRESS HIMSELF TO ANY OTH VERNMENT CONTACTS SDFORGIVE/1 HAS. SDFORGIVE/1 IS FAV KNOWN TO SUNNI RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN IRAN. PER UNTRO SUNNI MULLAHS VIEW SDFORGIVE/1 AS THE MOST ACCEPTA OF THE SHI'A CLERGY.

PAGE 2 PARIS 12629 S E C R E T

C. UNTROUT/1 FEELS CERTAINLY GOING UP THE IDEA OF ANOTHER INTERMEDIARY. HE IS NOT SANGUINE THAT SDFORGIVE/1 WILL BE WILLING OR ABLE TO NOMINATE SUCH A PERSON. UNTROUT/1 SUGGESTED THAT SDFORGIVE/1'S SON MIGHT BE WILLING TO SERVE AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN SDFORGIVE/1 AND TEHRAN STATION WHEN THE SON IS IN TEHRAN. UNTROUT/1 WILL MENTION THIS POSSIBILITY TO SDFORGIVE/1 PRIOR TO TAKING ANY ACTION ON SUCH A PROPOSAL.

4. UNTROUT/1 RESPONSES TO INTEL REQUIREMENTS:

A. UNTROUT/1 MAINTAINS THAT NO ONE KNOWS THE MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. WHILE THERE MAY BE CERTAIN MULLAHS WHO ARE PERMANENT MEMBERS, KHOMEINY HAS THE POWER TO CALL A COUNCIL MEETING AT ANY TIME AND THE COUNCIL WOULD SIMPLY BE CONSTITUTED BY THE MULLAHS WHO ARE PRESENT AT THAT PARTICULAR MOMENT. THE COUNCIL HAS LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL POWERS, BUT IT IS KHOMEINY HIMSELF WHO HAS THE LAST WORD IN ALL MATTERS.

B. ALTHOUGH UNTROUT/1 DID NOT HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON THE MEN WHO EXERCISE INFLUENCE OVER KHOMEINY, HE OPINED THAT IT IS KHOMEINY'S FAMILY MEMBERS (HIS SON, SON-IN-LAW AND GRANDSON) WHO HAVE THE MOST INFLUENCE OVER HIM.

C. UNTROUT/1 MAINTAINS THAT ALL THE BONA FIDE MAJOR CLERICAL FIGURES ARE OPPOSED TO A THEOCRACY BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE A CLERIC'S PLACE IS IN THE MOSQUE, NOT PARLIAMENT. THE ONLY PERSON WHO ACTIVELY AND VOCIFEROUSLY OPPOSES THE THEOCRACY IS SHARIAT-MADARI. THE MULLAHS THAT KHOMEINY CREATED AND HAS CALLED AS MULLAHS SUPPORT HIS CALL FOR A THEOCRACY.

D. SHARIAT-MADARI'S SUPPORTERS AMONG THE CLERGY ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. IN QOM: AZARI-PAYEGANI AND NAJAFI.
2. IN MASHAD: HASSAN QOMI AND SHIRAZI
3. IN TEHRAN: KHOUSARI AND SDFORGIVE/1

FOR THE MOST PART, THESE MEN DO NOT WISH TO MEDDLE IN POLITICS. UNTROUT/1 BELIEVES THAT SHARIAT-MADARI'S FOLLOWING IS GROWING.

E. UNTROUT/1 DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT TALEQANI'S DEATH WILL HAVE ANY EFFECT ON KHOMEINI'S POLICIES. HE BELIEVES THAT TALEQANI TOOK A HARD LINE STANCE AGAINST THE LEFT AND PROPONENTS OF ETHNIC AUTONOMY SIMPLY TO SUPPORT KHOMEINI, NOT BECAUSE OF HIS OWN CONVICTIONS. UNTROUT/1 SAID THAT BAZARGAN AND TALEQANI WERE QUITE CLOSE. TALEQANI'S DEATH WILL GIVE KHOMEINY THE OPPORTUNITY TO GET RID BARZARGAN WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT OFFENDING TALEQANI.

4. FILE: 201-[illegible] RMH 28 SEP 99 DRV DSC 1.

S E C R E T

30 Sep 79

P R E T 291055Z SEP 79 STATE

PARIS 12943

TO: PRIORITY TEHRAN, DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

ANI AZL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

REF: A. DIRECTOR 517941
B. TEHRAN 54241

1. UNTROUT/1 ADVISED BACKUP STATION OFFICER MIDDLETON ON 28 SEPTEMBER THAT SDFORGIVE/1 HAD ARRIVED IN PARIS 25 SEPTEMBER. UNTROUT/1 HAD SHORT MEETING WITH SDFORGIVE/1 EVENING 26 SEPTEMBER.

2. SDFORGIVE/1 TOLD UNTROUT/1 THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE TIME FOR TALK HAS PASSED AND THAT IT IS NOW TIME FOR ACTION. HE COULD LIKE UNTROUT/1 TO GET A CLEAR STATEMENT AS TO WHAT U.S. POLICY IS TOWARDS THE KHOMEINI REGIME. IT SEEMS THAT SDFORGIVE/1 IS WILLING TO TAKE ACTIVE ROLE IN MOVEMENT TO REMOVE KHOMEINI BUT NOT INTERESTED IN SIMPLY PROVIDING INFORMATION. THIS PROBABLY NOT A FIRM POSITION.

3. IT IS NOT YET KNOWN HOW LONG SDFORGIVE/1 WILL BE IN PARIS. HE WILL TRAVEL TO EGYPT FROM PARIS AS HE WAS INVITED TO VISIT SADAT BY AN EGYPTIAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL JUST BEFORE THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY CLOSED IN TEHRAN. SDFORGIVE/1 EXPECTS THE EGYPTIANS TO SUGGEST HE HEAD OPPOSITION FROM BASE IN CAIRO. SDFORGIVE/1 PROBABLY NOT WILLING TO MAKE THE SIGNIFICANT SACRIFICES THIS WOULD MEAN FOR HIM AND FAMILY.

4. SDFORGIVE WILL NOT TRAVEL TO LONDON.

5. UNTROUT/1 SAYS FOLLOWING QUOTE SUMS UP SDFORGIVE/1'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN. AS FAR AS HE KNOWS FOR 25 CENTURIES OF HISTORY, IRAN HAS NEVER GONE THROUGH SUCH TIMES. SDFORGIVE/1 HAS A FARM NEAR QOM THAT HE VISITS ONCE A WEEK. HE DOES NOT GO INTO THE CITY AND IS AVOIDING CONTACT WITH THE [illegible] AND CLERGY. WITHIN PAST FEW WEEKS HE TALKED TO [illegible] SHARIAT-MADARA, WHO LIVES IN QOM. SHARIAT-MADARA TRAVELED TO TEHRAN







E F 05[illegible]Z OCT [illegible] STATE

RIS 13054

ECTOR, TEHRAN.

AJAJA, UNTROUT, SDFORGIVE

A. DIRECTOR 526996
B. DIRECTOR 525252
C. TEHRAN 54348
D. PARIS 12843

. UNTROUT/1 VISITED SDFORGIVE/1 AND ATTEMPTED EXPLAIN
THAT RTACTION COULD NOT SUPPORT ANY KIND OF
TION MOVEMENT WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM U.S. POLICY
G LEVELS. SDFORGIVE/1 TOOK THE POSITION THAT IF THIS IS
D THE CASE, HE SAW NO POINT IN CONTINUING THE CONTACT
WITH THIS. UNTROUT/1 TRIED TO SERVICE OUR REQUIREMENTS
SAYING THAT HE HAD INTENDED TRAVEL TEHRAN TO DISCUSS
MATTERS WITH SDFORGIVE/1 AND SUGGESTED THEY BE
USSED NOW. SDFORGIVE/1 SIMPLY REFUSED TO DISCUSS ANYTHING
RTHER. UNTROUT/1 WILL TRY AGAIN USING THE TACTIC THAT T
IRANIAN PEOPLES INTERESTED TO HAVE U.S.G. INFORMED IN ORDER
UND POLICY CAN BE FORMULATED.

2. SDFORGIVE/1 IS CONVINCED THAT RTACTION WAS
SPONSIBLE FOR KHOMEINI COMING TO POWER. AS PROOF HE
LIEVES THE TANK HE HAD TWENTY YEARS AGO IN BEIRUT WITH AN
TACTION OFFICER (SIC) WHO SAID IT NOT PRACTICAL TO ATTEMPT
BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN IRAN. TWO YEARS AGO HE CLAIMS
AT U.S. EMBASSY SET UP A VISIT WITH A RTACTION OFFICE
CAIRO WHO SUGGESTED THAT A POPULAR GOVERNMENT SHOULD
REPLACE THE SHAH. RATHER THAN A VILLAGE PRIEST, KHOMEINI,
COMES TO POWER. HE CONCEDES THAT RTACTION HAD TO HAVE HAD
THIS POSSIBLE. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER COOPERATING
WITH RTACTION IF HE WAS PRESENTED WITH FACTS PROVING
TACTION HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH KHOMEINI COMING TO POWER.
OWEVER, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT EVEN A MESSAGE FROM HEAVEN WOULD
CHANGE SDFORGIVE/1'S MIND ON RTACTION INVOLVEMENT.

PAGE 2 PARIS 13054 S E C R E T

3. SDFORGIVE/1 SIMPLY CANNOT BELIEVE THAT RTACTION CAN
T AND WILL NOT DO SOMETHING ABOUT KHOMEINI WHO SDFORGIVE/1
LIEVES IS TURNING IRANIANS INTO BARBARIANS. HE CITES THE
SE OF GENERAL PAKRAVAN, HEAD OF SAVAK THAT ARRANGED THE
OMEINI TO GO INTO EXILE IN TURKEY.
ROMISE ALLOWING KHOMEINI TO POWER PAKRAVAN WAS ASSURED HIS PHYSICA
EEN KHOMEINI CAME TO POWER. HE WAS ARRESTED FIVE DAYS LATER,
ERSON NOT IN DANGER. BODY
IED IN A REVOLUTIONARY COURT AND EXECUTED. WHEN HIS
AS WASHED FOR BURIAL AS IS THE CUSTOM, IT WAS NOTICED
E WAS NOT CIRCUMCISED AND THEREFORE NOT A MUSLEM AND
THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE BURIED. THEY BURNED HIS BODY BEHIND
A WALL AND DROVE IN LARGE CIRCLES UNTIL IT DISINTEGRATED INTO
NOTHING. THIS KIND OF BARBARISM SDFORGIVE/1 CONTENDS, IS
WHY KHOMEINI HAS TO GO BEFORE IT BECOMES THE NORM.

4. WILL ADVISE IF UNTROUT/1 IS ABLE TO GET SDFORGIVE
TO COMMENT ON REQUIREMENTS. SUSPECT THIS IS A DEAD CASE.

5. NEW SUBJECT: SDJULEP/1 ARRIVED IN PARIS LAST
WEEK. HIS WIFE WILL JOIN HIM IN A FEW DAYS AND STAY FOR A
LEAST TEN DAYS. UNTROUT/1 IS IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH A NU
SDJULEP/1. IT SEEMS THAT SDJULEP IS IN CONTACT WITH A
IRANIANS IN PARIS BUT CLAIMS TO NOT WANT TO BECOME INV
IN POLITICS. UNTROUT/1 WILL CONTINUE TO ASSESS SDJULEP/1
WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF RECOMMENDING HOW BEST TO PUT RTACT
IN TOUCH WITH HIM. HE NOW BELIEVES IT MAY BE POSSIBLE F
HIM TO SET UP THE CONTACT BUT WANTS A LITTLE MORE TIME T
THINK ABOUT IT. WILL ADVISE.

6. FILE: 201-243505. RVW 5 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1.

S E C R E T

#3054

10 OCT 79 1 02Z

S E C R E T 092111Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 529053

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO TEHRAN

SUBJ: NINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

REF: PARIS 13054

1. REF IS UNFORTUNATE, AND WHILE AS NOTED THIS MAY BE INDEED DEAD CASE, WE WOULD APPRECIATE STATION TRYING UNTROUT/1 (S/1) IRY ONCE MORE TACTIC OF POINTING OUT TO SDFORGIVE/1 (F/1 THAT IT NOT IN INTEREST OF THOSE LIKE HIMSELF THAT USG RECEIVES ITS INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY FROM OFFICIAL PGOI SOURCES MAY LOOSEN THINGS A BIT. MOREOVER HQS PREPARED SEND SENIOR STAFFER (AND FARSI SPEAKER) MEET W F/1 IF STATION BELIEVES THIS WOULD SALUTARY. THIS OFFICER MAY BE IN EUROPE ON OTHER BUSINESS CIRCA 20 OCTOBER. PLS ADVISE.

2. FILE 201-24 25; 201-079932. RVW 390 9 DRV D9C.1 ALL

SECRET.

E C R E T

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528

10 OCT 79 15 05Z

E R E T 101700Z OCT 79 STAFF

TE PARIS 13190

C: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

IN EL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

FS A. DIRECTOR 529053
B. DIRECTOR 526995

1. MARINOS MET WITH UNTROUT/1 10 OCTOBER, PRIOR RECEIPT
F . UNTROUT/1 AGAIN VOICED OPINION IT WILL BE NECESSARY
C DISCUSS SOME KIND OF PLAN OF ACTION WITH SDFORGIVE/1
O DER TO MOVE THIS CASE FORWARD. SDFORGIVE/1 IS SIMPLY
OT ILLING TO BE AN "INFORMANT" UNLESS HE CAN BE CONVINCED
AT NVBLAZON WILL TAKE ACTION TO "BETTER THE SITUATION" IN
AN MARINOS POINTED OUT THAT NVBLAZON WOULD NOT CONSPIRE
TH SDFORGIVE/1 TO PLOT A COUP AGAINST KHOMEINI. UNTROUT/1
S WITH US. BUT HE BELIEVES SDFORGIVE/1 WOULD REBUFF
WHO WOULD NOT GO SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT NVBLAZONIS IN
ROCESS OF "STUDYING HOW THE SITUATION COULD BE
RVED".

2. UNLESS ABOVE TACK IS FOLLOWED IN FUTURE DEALINGS
TH SDFORGIVE/1, THIS WILL INDEED BE DEAD CASE. SDFORGIVE/1
S NPLEASANTLY SURPRISED BY NATURE OF REQUIREMENTS DISCUSSED
H HIM; HE TOLD UNTROUT/1 THAT THESE WERE QUESTIONS TO
C ANYONE COULD RESPOND. UNTROUT/1 TRIED IN VAIN TO GET
SDFORGIVE/1 TO DISCUSS REQUIREMENTS, BUT HE ADAMANTLY
FUSED. (IN VIEW OF SDFORGIVE/1'S REFUSAL TO DISCUSS
QUIREMENTS, REF B REQUIREMENTS WERE NOT PASSED TO UNTROUT/1.
Y WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH HIM AT A LATER DATE.)

3. SDFORGIVE/1 HAS NOT COMPLETELY CLOSED DOOR TO FUTURE
NTACTS WITH NVBLAZON. IN FACT, HE TOLD UNTROUT/1 THAT HE
LD BE WILLING TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. AND MEET WITH
PROPRIATE NVBLAZON OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS COURSE OF ACTION.
UNTROUT/1 STRESSED THESE TALKS WOULD NECESSARILY BE "PLANNING
SIONS" AND THAT NO ONE EXPECTS NVBLAZON TO ACT IN THE
EDIATE FUTURE. UNTROUT/1 SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THAT SOME
PE OF PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN AS A FIRST

PAGE 2 PARIS 13190 S E C R E T

THEREFORE GIVEN ABOVE, STATION THINKS THERE IS MERIT IN HAVING
SOMEONE FROM HIGH FARSI-SPEAKING STAFFER FAMILIAR WITH IRAN MEET WITH
SDFORGIVE/1. BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT MEETING WOULD BE
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE UNLESS INTERLOCUTOR WILLING TO AT LEAST
DISCUSS THAT RESULTS THESE TALKS MIGHT LEAD TO A CHANGED
NVBLAZON POLICY TOWARDS IRAN. (FOR THE RECORD, UNTROUT/1
HAS TOLD SDFORGIVE/1 ONLY THAT HE IS IN TOUCH WITH
NVBLAZON, NOT RTACTION.)

4. SDFORGIVE/1 IS LEAVING PARIS IN NEXT TWO DAYS FOR
SWITZERLAND AND GERMANY. UNTROUT/1 IS UNCERTAIN BUT THINKS
SDFORGIVE/1 MAY BE AWAY FROM PARIS AS LONG AS ONE MONTH.
SDFORGIVE/1'S TRIP TO EGYPT IS STILL IN THE PLANNING STAGES
AND HE HAS NOT INDICATED TO UNTROUT/1 WHEN HE WILL RETURN
TO TEHRAN.

5. SDFORGIVE/1 WAS CONTACTED TELEPHONICALLY BY AN
UNIDENTIFIED PERSON FROM THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN PARIS WHO
REQUESTED A MEETING. SDFORGIVE/1 DECLINED, ON THE GROUNDS
THAT THERE ARE NO FARSI SPEAKERS AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN
PARIS. THE SOVIET OFFERED TO HAVE SDFORGIVE/1'S TEHRAN
CONTACT COME TO PARIS TO MEET WITH HIM. SDFORGIVE/1 SAID
HE WOULD THINK ABOUT THE PROPOSAL; HE HAS NOT YET DECIDED
WHETHER HE WILL MEET THE SOVIET. THE PARIS-BASED SOVIET TOLD
SDFORGIVE/1 THEY LOCATED HIM THROUGH HIS SON.

6. UNTROUT/1 OPINED SDFORGIVE/1 MIGHT BE WILLING WORK WITH
SOVIETS IF HE FELT THEY WERE THE ONLY VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO
KHOMEINI. SDFORGIVE/1 THINKS IRAN BEING PUSHED INTO THE
SOVIET ORBIT BY NVBLAZON NON-ACTION. THIS VIEW IS HELD BY
VIRTUALLY ALL IRANIANS WITH WHOM UNTROUT/1 IS IN CONTACT
IN PARIS.

7. SDFORGIVE/1 HAS MET WITH BAKHTIAR DURING HIS
STAY IN PARIS. HE BELIEVES THAT BAKHTIAR IS BEING SUPPORTED
BY THE FRENCH. (WILL DISCUSS THIS POINT IN MORE DETAIL
AT NEXT SESSION WITH UNTROUT/1.)

8. FILE: 201-243505, 201-079932. RVW 10 OCT 99 DRV

SECRET
NOFORN
PAGE 2

S E C R E T 1[illegible]032Z OCT [illegible]

[illegible] DIRECTOR 530842

TO: IMMEDIATE PARIS INFO [illegible]TEHRAN.

UNINTEL AJAJA SDFORGIVE UNTROUT

REFS: A. PARIS 13190
B. DIRECTOR 529053

1. APPRECIATE REF A AND MARINES' EFFORTS THIS CASE. [illegible]WOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL IF PRIOR SDFORGIVE/1 (F/1)'S PRESUMED DEPARTURE UNTROUT/1 (T/1) BROKE TO HIM POSSIBILITY OF MEETING WITH SENIOR NVBLAZON OFFICER CIRCA 24 OCT 79 AND IF F/1 WILLING ALTER HIS SCHEDULE ACCOMMODATE SUCH MEETING.

2. AS ADDRESSEES AWARE, POLICY QUESTIONS RAISED REF A IN AREA WHERE WE HAVE LITTLE LEEWAY, BUT WILL ATTEMPT TO SEE WHAT WE CAN DO TO IMPROVE SITUATION. WILL ADVISE.

FILE: 201-243505, 201-079932. RVW 11 OCT 99 DRV DGC.1.



30 Oct 79 03 40z

S E C R E T 1215322 OCT 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 13283

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN

WNINTEL AJAJA SDFORGIVE UNTROUT

FM: DIRECTOR 530340

1. UNTROUT/1 ADVISED THAT S[illegible]FORGIVE DEPARTED FOR [illegible] 11 OCTOBER. HOWEVER, UNTROUT/1 WILL ATTEMPT TO CONTACT [illegible]FORGIVE/1 AND ASK HIM TO RETURN TO PARIS FOR 22 OCTOBER [illegible] WITH STATION OFFICER. IF SDFORGIVE/1 UNABLE TO RETURN [illegible] UNTROUT/1 WILL ASCERTAIN IF HE WILLING TO MEET [illegible] IN GERMANY.

2. SDFORGIVE/1 TOLD UNTROUT/1 THAT HE COULD BE REACHED [illegible] FNU J A M A R A N I, IRANIAN [illegible] RESIDING IN OBERLINGEN, [illegible] (SIC). ALTHOUGH JAMARANI NOT KNOWN TO UNTROUT/1, [illegible] FAMILIAR WITH JAMARANI FAMILY, WHICH IS PROMINENT [illegible] FAMILY IN IRAN. JAMARANI HIMSELF IS NOT A CLERIC.

3. UNTROUT/1 STRESSED THAT SDFORGIVE/1 IS EXTREMELY [illegible] BOUT ANY DISCUSSIONS TO BE HELD WITH NVBLAZON REPS. [illegible] WITH SDFORGIVE/1 CAN BE ARRANGED, SUGGEST THAT [illegible] BETWEEN UNTROUT/1 AND HOS OFFICER WOULD BE MOST [illegible] FOR FACE-TO-FACE MEETING WITH SDFORGIVE/1.

4. [illegible] WILL ADVISE RESULTS UNTROUT/1 CALL TO SDFORGIVE/1

[illegible] FILE: 201-0243505 RVW 12 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1.

S E C R E T 170854Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54505

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDFORGIVE UNTROUT

1. ADLESICK PLANNING LEAVE TEHRAN 19 OCTOBER, ALTHOUGH DEPARTURE MAY BE DELAYED. REQUEST PARIS PROVIDE CONTACT INSTRUCTION.

2. BELIEVE BEST DECIDE ON WHAT TO DO ABOUT MEETING SDFORGIVE/1 AFTER CONFERRING WITH UNTROUT/1. SINCE ADLESICK MOVING ON TO NEW JOB, NOS MIGHT WISH CONSIDER HAVING SOMEONE ELSE MEET SDFORGIVE/1 WHO WILL BE ABLE TO FOLLOW CASE.

3. NOS: PLS HAVE STATE AMEND TRAVEL ORDER.

4. FILE: 201-0243505. RVW 17 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T



S E C R E T

CITE: DIRECTOR 534834

TO : PRIORITY TEHRAN INFO PARIS

WNINTEL AJAJA SDFORGIVE UNTROUT

REF: TEHRAN 54505

1- AGREE PARA TWO REF AND WE CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVES.

2- STATE TRAVEL ORDERS BEING AMENDED.

3- FILE 201 - 243505: 201-079938. RVW 18OCT90 DRV D9C



S E C R E T 020153Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 487315.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL SDJUIEP

REF: PARIS 11104

1. SDJULEP/1 (SUBJECT REF) BECAME A RECRUITED RTACTION ASSET IN 1956. J/1 WAS TO BE AN FI ASSET FOR EXPLOITATION OF HIS WIDE RANGE OF POLITICAL CONTACTS, AND A CA ASSET FOR THE WRITING, EDITING, AND PLACEMENT OF ARTICLES FAVORABLE TO USG INTERESTS. J/1 WAS, AND APPARENTLY REMAINS, A WRITER OF THE HIGHEST CALIBRE, AND MAY WELL HAVE BEEN THE FINEST EDITOR IN IRAN. J/1 WAS HANDLED BY UNTROUT/1, EDWARD S. VALERIUS, AND JOSEPH V. ADLESICK.

2. IN 1959, J/1 SIGNED A CONTRACT WITH RTACTION FOR $15,000 PER MONTH; HOWEVER, HE SHORTLY THEREAFTER LEFT FOR THE UNITED STATES AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TERMINATED. WHILE J/1 WAS WILLING TO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH RTACTION ON CA PROPAGANDA OPS, HE ALSO WAS MOST RESISTANT TO UNDERTAKE ANY WORK IN THE FI REALM.

3. ALTHOUGH REQUIRING SOME MEASURABLE DEGREE OF HANDHOLDING, J/1 WAS CONSISTENTLY EVALUATED AS POSSESSING SOLID LONG TERM POTENTIAL. NOW MAY WELL BE THE TIME TO CAPITALIZE ON THAT POTENTIAL. WHILE J/1'S VALUE AS AN FI SOURCE IS IN DOUBT (PERHAPS MORE TO HIS RELUCTANCE TO PURSUE CLANDESTINE ACTIVITY THAN ANY OTHER REASON), J/1 REMAINS OF HIGH INTEREST TO RTACTION FOR HIS CA POTENTIAL. TO THIS END, WE ENCOURAGE AND WELCOME PARIS EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH J/1. ALSO, WE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO KNOW WHAT J/1 IS AND WILL BE DOING, WHO HIS CONTACTS ARE, WHAT JOURNALS HE MAY BE EDITING OR PUBLISHING IN, AND HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VARIOUS PERSONALITIES IN IRAN AND THE USG. ADLESICK CURRENTLY AT HQS AND WILLING TO MEET WITH J/1 WHEN/IF NECESSARY. WE APPRECIATE ARIS INTEREST AND EFFORTS.



E O R [illegible] 03403 72, AUG 79 STAFF

LTE DIRECTOR 488745.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN, OSLO.

ENJNFF SDJULEP UNTROUT

REF: PARIS 11230

1. IN REPLY TO REF, FOLLOWING IS EXTRACT FROM 1975 WHO'S WHO IN IRAN.
"BORN 1929; PROFESSION JOURNALIST; EDUCATION: LICENTIATE IN LAW FROM TEHRAN UNIVERSITY; M.A. IN JOURNALISM FROM COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY. GRADUATED IN AN EDUCATIONAL COURSE FROM UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI. STARTED HIS JOURNALISTIC CAREER IN 1948; PARLIAMENTARY REPORTER FOR ETTELA'AT; EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF ETTELA'AT-HAFTEGI; EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE MAGAZINE ROUSHANFEKR; FOUNDER OF THE MAGAZINE "ZAN-E-RUZ;" EDITOR-IN-CHIEF AND TECHNICAL EDITOR OF THE WEEKLY MAGAZINE "ZAN-E-RUZ."

2. HQS LOOKS FORWARD TO UNTROUT/1'S RETURN AND ADDITIONAL INFO RE PLANS OF SDJULEP/1.

3. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-118671. RVW 3AUG99 DRV D9C.1

ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#3554



[illegible] DEVELOPMENTS IN SDJULEP/'1S
[illegible]ACATION IN THE SOUTH
[illegible] NOT EXPECT THAT WE WILL
[illegible] EARLY SEPTEMBER.

2. [illegible]EIVING OVERT TRACES ON SDJULEP/1, INCLU[illegible]IO DATA AND DETAILS OF HIS JOURNALIST CAREER.

3. IF SDJULEP/1 ELECTS TO REMAIN IN OSLO, THERE MAY BE INTEREST IN CONTACTING HIM THERE. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT DISCUSSED THIS WITH UNTROUT/1, IT IS NOT UNLIKELY THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO EFFECT INTRODUCTION OF SDJULEP/1 TO OSLO BASED RTACTION OFFICER.

4. DIRECTOR: PLEASE RELAY REF TO OSLO.

5. FILE: 201-118671. RVW 2 AUG 99 DRV D9C1.
S E C R E T
BT
#1230

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

20 Oct 79 09 36z

S E C R E T 191813Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 486739.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN, OSLO.

WNINTEL AJAJA UNFROUI SIJULEP

REF: PARIS 13199

1. NO EOS TRACES ON PARI S A K A N D A R Y.

2. WHILE DEFERRING TEHRAN, DO NOT BELIEVE SHE REPRESENTS FI OR CA TARGET WITH SUFFICIENT ACCESS OR POTENTIAL WARRANT OUR EFFORTS. APPRECIATE REF.

3. FILE: 41-128-27. RVW 19OCT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#9042

PJT

☆U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978-258-344



S E C R E T 071577Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 490[illegible]

TO: PRIORITY FRANTECH INFO TEHRAN, DUTECH, ACUTECH

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA SDLURE ACQUATIC

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 446752
B. FRANTECH 5[illegible]91
C. DIRECTOR 42[illegible]74

1. PLANNING FOR SDLURE/1 OPERATION (WHICH UNDERWENT SIGNIFICANT REVIEW PER REF A) NOW IN FINAL STAGES AND IS SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 79. GUY W. RUTHERFORD (P) WILL TRAVEL TO TEHRAN [illegible] AUGUST 79. RUTHERFORD NOW EQUIPPED WITH FULLY BACKSTOPPED [illegible] IDENTITY AND TRAVELLING ON ALIAS U.S. REGULAR PASSPORT [illegible].

2. REQUEST FRANTECH PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO RUTHERFORD IN PROCURING MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS OF SAFEKEEPING HIS TRANSATLANTIC AIR TICKETS AND TENTATIVE PERSONAL DOCUMENTATION WHILE HE TRAVELLING TO IRAN. TENTATIVE PLAN FOR RUTHERFORD TO STOPOVER FRANKFURT AND CONTACT IZNOVA PER PARA 5 REF B AND PARA 5 REF C INSTRUCTIONS. PLS ADVISE SOONEST IF THIS ARRANGEMENT ACCEPTABLE.

3. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE [illegible] NEED FOR ANY OTHER FORM OF ASSISTANCE TO RUTHERFORD WHO WILL TDY FRANKFURT ONLY FOR AS LONG AS TAKES TO EFFECT TURNOVER OF TICKETS (AND RETRIEVE THEM ON HIS RETURN FROM IRAN).

4. WILL ADVISE RUTHERFORD [illegible] AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. FILE: 201-959289. RVW 07[illegible]99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T



S E C R E T 2?Z AUG 79 ST

?ITE DIRECTO[illegible] 2.

TC: PRIORITY [illegible] INFO [illegible]

[illegible]NIFTEL RYBAT A[illegible]LURE AQU[illegible]TI

REF: DIRECTOR 4[illegible]

IDEN: WILL[illegible]FOSTER.
VW 27UG79 DRV DO[illegible]L SECRET.
E C R E T
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142



S E C R E T 1?0205Z AUG 79 STAF[illegible]

ITE DIRECTOR 492219.

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN INFO IMMEDIATE FRANTECH, ROUTINE
RTECE, ATBTECF, ATHENS, NEW DELHI.

[illegible]NTEL RYBAT AJAJA LPGAMIN TICES [illegible]LURE

REF: A. FRANTECH 39042 (NOT SENT/NEEDED BONN, GERMANY,
ATHENS, NEW DELHI)
B. TEHRAN 53781 (NOT SENT/NEEDED BONN, GERMANY,
ATHENS, NEW DELHI)

1. RUTHERFORD PRESENTLY EOS AFGHANISTAN FOR FINAL BRIEFING
TRAVEL TO IRAN. ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS (BUT NOTE DATES ARE
TENTATIVE AND SUBJECT TO AVAILABILITY OF AIRLINE SEATS, LEAD
TIME REQUIRED TO ACQUIRE VISAS IN EUROPE, ETC.):

9-12 AUG KABUL D.C. (FINAL BRIEFING)
12-13 AUG FRANKFURT (DROP OFF TRANSATLANTIC AIR T
AND MISC ITEMS)
13-15 AUG ATHENS (ACQUIRE INDIA/IRAN BUSINESSMAN'S
15-18 AUG DELHI (FOR CORPORATE COVER WORK PURPOSES
19 AUG-1 SEPT TEHRAN

2. RUTHERFORD TRAVELLING ON ALIAS (GREEN) FROM U.S. WHILE
[illegible]E INTENDS MAKING RESERVATIONS FOR 2 WEEKS AT TEHRAN
[illegible]NTINENTAL. CE WILL ALSO CALL SDLURE/1 AND ADVISE HIM OF
[illegible]ETA. RUTHERFORD HAS VISITED TEHRAN 2-3 TIMES AND
[illegible]QUENTLY FAMILIAR WITH CITY TO MAKE CAR PICK-UPS/PERSO
[illegible]S PROVIDE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS TO EOS (INFO AZNOWA).
[illegible]RD WILL INITIATE CONTACT NEITHER WITH STATION NOR
[illegible] SUITABLE PERIOD OF TIME HAS PASSED TO ALLOW HIM TO
[illegible]OVER WORK MEETINGS AND OTHERWISE ASSUME ALL
[illegible] TRAVELLING BUSINESSMAN. IN ANY CASE EXPECT TETS
[illegible] LONGER THAN 2-3 DAYS. WHO WILL MEET RUTHERFORD?

[illegible]ON [illegible]R PARA 3 REF B REASONING.

143



492219 S E C R E T
ZNOVA: A. ANTICIPATE RUTHERFORD TRAVEL TO
G. HE PLANS MAKE OWN ACCOMMODATION PLANS ON ARRIVA
NUMBER/TIMES NOT YET KNOWN AND WILL CONTACT ZNOVA
NGEMENTS.

PLS RELAT TEHRAN CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS TO RUTHERFOR

NEW DELHI, ATHENS, BONN, GERMANY; GUY M. RUTHERFO
SCAFFER AND PRESENTLY ON CONTRACT TO REACTION WILL
ING IN ALIAS (VDRN) TO YOUR RESPECTIVE AREAS PER PARA
STATION CONTACT OR SUPPORT IS REQUESTED OR ANTICIPAT
INVOLVED IN SENSITIVE IRANIAN CASE. NO OPERATIONAL
LANNED EXCEPT IN TEHRAN. RVW 29AUG99 DRV DOC.V



E C R E 100025Z AUG 7
TE DIRECTOR 492243
IMMEDIATE TEHRAN INFO
TECH, ATHENS, ATHENS, N
EL RYBAT AJAJA LP AMIN
DIRECTOR 492219
DRN: WILLIAM A. FOSTER
0399 DRV DOC.1 A L SEC
E T

11 AUG 79

S E C R E T 102251Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 493012.

TO: IMMEDIATE GERMANY INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, FRANTECH, DIRTECH, ATHTECH, ROUTINE BONN, ATHENS, NEW DELHI.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA LPGAMIN TECHS SDLURE

REFS: A. GERMANY 83634
B. DIRECTOR 492243

1. APPRECIATE REF. RUTHERFORD ALREADY HAS COMPLETE ALIAS DOCUMENTATION. NAME SEEMS COMMON ENOUGH, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY SDLURE/1, WSO TARGET IN THIS CASE, HAS ALREADY MET RUTHERFORD IN REF B ALIAS.

2. FILE: 201-959289. RVW 10AUG99 DRV DOC.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
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EMS. 78 A. 12

R E T 131029Z AUG 79 STAFF

FRANTECH 39093 (WIADUCK ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, GE

INTEL RYBAT AJAJA SDLURE TECHS

EF: DIRECTOR 492219

1. RUTHERFORD ARRIVED FRANKFURT TELEPHONE TEHRAN PROSPECT AFTERNOON

2. FILE: DEFER. RVW 13 AUG 99. D

S E C R E T



S E C R E T 31[illegible]Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR [illegible]26025.

TO: TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT LPGAMIN SDLURE

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54054
B. TEHRAN 54083
C. TEHRAN 54082

1. PE REF B. LPKNIGHT INFORMED US MORNING 27 AUGUST RUTHERFORD'S REQUEST FOR HOTEL CREDIT TRANSFER. WE APPROVED TEIS ON THE SPOT IN ORDER THAT LPKNIGHT COULD ASK INTERCONTINENTAL NY MAIN OFFICE TO EFFECT TRANSFER EXPEDITIOUSLY. TRANSFER SHOULD CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN MADE BY NOW. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE HOTEL WILL INFORM RUTHERFORD OF THE TRANSFER WHEN RECEIVED. PLS REMIND RUTHERFORD THAT IF HE HAS FURTHER NEED FOR FUNDS, REQUESTS THROUGH LPKNIGHT WILL BE HANDLED EXPEDITIOUSLY AND SHOULD TAKE A COUPLE OF DAYS AT THE MOST.

2. LOOK FORWARD TO DEVELOPMENTS.

3. FILE: 221-[illegible]. RVW 31AUG99 DRV DOC.1 ALL S

S E C R E T
BT
#3161

S C R E T 040807Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54117

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT LPGAMIN SDLURE

1. FOLLOWING IS RUTHERFORD'S REPORT OF SECOND MEETING HELD WITH SDLURE/1 ON 3 SEPTEMBER. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH RUTHERFORD WAITED FOR SUBJECT ONE HOUR AT LATTER'S RESIDENCE ON 2 SEPTEMBER, SDLURE/1 (L/1) TELEPHONED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE IT AND SUGGESTED CHANGING TO NEXT DAY.)

2. L/1 HAS BEEN MAINTAINING A BUSY SCHEDULE SINCE HIS RETURN TO IRAN LAST FEBRUARY. BETWEEN ATTENDING DAILY SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS, MEETINGS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND PUBLISHING HIS PAPER, HE IS NORMALLY WORKING UNTIL AFTER MIDNIGHT ON A REGULAR BASIS. HE BROKE AWAY FROM A MEETING ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION TO MEET WITH RUTHERFORD FOR TWO HOURS ON 3 SEP AND PLANNED TO RETURN TO PARLIAMENT IN THE AFTERNOON TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION.

3. SUBJECT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO REVISIT PARIS SINCE HIS RETURN IRAN. TWO OF HIS CHILDREN CONTINUE TO STUDY IN PARIS. ASKED ABOUT HIS APARTMENT THERE, HE INDICATED THAT HE STILL RETAINS IT BUT HOPES TO TERMINATE IT BECAUSE OF THE FINANCIAL BURDEN. HE AND THE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY IN TEHRAN ARE LIVING WITH THREE MARRIED SISTERS WHO OCCUPY THE THREE APARTMENTS AT CHANAS STREET LOCATION.

4. IN DISCUSSING THE CENTER OF POWER IN THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVT OF IRAN, SUBJECT STATED THAT POWER RESIDES IN THE HANDS OF COUNCIL, THE REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR AND IN THE KOMITEHS. ACCORDING TO HIS EXPLANATION, THE KOMITEHS ARE PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH LOCAL MATTERS BUT, NONTHELESS, ARE CAPABLE OF PROPOSING SPECIFIC STEPS OR ACTION BY THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF POWER. ALTHOUGH INCLUDING THE PRESENT CABINET AS A HOLDER POWER, SUBJECT NOTED ONCE AGAIN THAT IT TAKES ACTION ON RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT MATTERS SUCH AS THOSE CONCERNING EDUCATION, HEALTH, ETC.

5. SUBJECT WAS EITHER UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO NAME A LIKELY SUCCESSOR TO BAZARGAN WHENEVER HE STEPS ASIDE.HIS RESPONSE WAS THAT " WE SHALL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE."

6. COMMENTING ON HIS OWN ESTIMATE ON THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE REVOLUTION, SUBJECT STATED THAT HE IS SATISFIED BY SOME OF THE PROGRESS MADE TO DATE BUT THAT HE IS FRUSTRATED AND DISCOURAGED BY THE STUMBLING BLOCKS WITHIN THE GOVT ITSELF. NOT SURPRISING, HE EXHIBITED OPTIMISM CONCERNING THE FUTURE.

7. WHILE MENTIONING FORMIN IBRAHIM YAZDI, SUBJECT NOTED THAT HE IS NO LONGER A MEMBER OF THE REV/ COUNCIL SINCE JOINING THE CABINET. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT YAZDI ENJOYS THE CONFIDENCE OF KHOMEINI BUT IS NOT INCLINED TO REGARD HIM AS A POWERFUL INDIVIDUAL.

8. IN DISCUSSING THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE BANKS, SUBJ STRESSED THAT THEY WERE DESPARATELY IN NEED OF REFORM MEASURES. FOR EXAMPLE, POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS IN THE BANKING FIELD MANIPULATED THE BANK FUNDS AND ARRANGED 'SWEETHEART" LOANS. FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS, KHOMEINI WANTED TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE BANKING SYSTEM AND THUS APPROVED THE NATIONALIZATION STEP. SUBJ STATED THAT WHEREAS WEALTHY IRANIAN BUSINESSMEN ARE OPPOSED TO NATIONAL-IZATION, THE SMALL BUSINESSMEN FAVOR IT AS THEY WILL BE ABLE TO.... RECEIVE LOANS MORE EASILY THAN HITHERTO.

9. ALTHOUGH CONCEDING THAT THE KURDESTAN PROBLEM OCCUPA.... THE ATTENTION OF THE PRESENT GOVT, SUBJ STATED THAT A MORE URGENT PROBLEM IS TO SET THE ECONOMY MOVING. HE MAINTAINED THAT THE OIL REVENUES ARE ONLY SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE REQUIRMENT OF THE DEFENSE PROGRAM AND TO ENABLE THE GOVT TO PAY ITS BIL.... ADDITIONAL FUNDS ARE GOING TO HAVE TO BE DEVELOPED TO STIMULATE THE FIELDS OF AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY. ATTACKING THE DEVELOP-MENT POLICIES OF THE FORMER REGIME, HE NOTED HOW A SURPLUS ... NUMBER OF AUTOMATIVE FIRMS WERE ESTABLISHED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE LIGHT INDUSTRY AND FARMING.

10. RUTHERFORD COMMENT: ON THE BASIS OF TWO SESSIONS TO DATE INCLINED TO BELIEVE WE CAN INTRODUCE SUBJ A USG OFFICIAL ALTHOUGH CALLED ATTENTION IN PASSING AT THE 3SPT MEETING THAT THE SHAH WAS "THE INSTRUMENT OF THE USG POLICY IN THE AREA" AND THAT US FIRMS WILL BE WELCOME IN IRAN AS LONG AS THEY DO NOT .....BLE IN THE COUNTRY'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, BELIEVE WE CAN GET AROUND THIS

11. FILE: 201-959282 RVW 4SEP99 DRV D9C. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 040807Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54118

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT LPGAMIN SDLURE

REFS: A, TEHRAN 54117
B, TEHRAN 54084
C, TEHRAN 5408?

1, RUTHERFORD'S NEXT MEETING WITH SDLURE/1(L/1) SCHEDULED FOR EVENING 5 SEP. STATION WILL SEE HIM JUST BEFORE IT TO PASS ON LAST MINUTE INSTRUCTIONS.

2, WE THINK THAT, IF RUTHERFORD IS GOING TO SURFACE AN EXTRACURRICULAR INTEREST IN L/1 DURING THIS VISIT, IT WILL HAVE TO BE DONE AT 5 SEP SESSION. REASONS ARE THAT COVER AGENDA WILL HAVE BEEN PRETTY WELL COMPLETED, AND THAT, IF THERE TO BE A RECRUITMENT WITH OR WITHOUT TURNOVER, HE WILL HAVE TO START ARRANGING THE MECHANICS OF THE NEW RELATIONSHIP. RUTHER-FORD SAID AT OUR 3SEP MEETING HE THINKS THERE 80 PERCENT LIKELIHOOD L/1 WOULD ACCEPT AN OSTENSIBLE PRIVATE COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP, WITH TURNOVER TO STATION OFFICER OSTENSIBLY MOON-LIGHTING AS COMMO CHANNEL BETWEEN RUTHERFPRD AND L/1.

3, THIS ESTIMATE MAY WELL BE ACCURATE, BUT IS BASED ON L/1'S ACCESSIBILITY AND ON GENERAL TONE OF MEETING, NOT .... DEMONSTRATED L/1 WILLINGNESS TO SHARE PROTECTED INFORMATION ON EXPRESSION OF INTEREST, EVEN IMPLYED, IN EXTRACURRICULAR RELATIONSHIP. OUR OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT RUTHERFORD HAS NOW SPEND ENOUGH TIME WITH L/1 SO THAT L/1 WOULD NOT GREATE ... OVER A COMMERCIAL PITCH , EVEN IF HE REJECTED IT. WE DO NOT THINK THE ASSESSMENT HAS PROCEEDED FAR ENOUGH TO PERMIT AN ESTIMATE OF THE PROBABILITY THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT. THERE IS AT PRESENT EVEN LESS BASIS TO PREDICT HIS REACTION TO ::AN... AT FULL RECRUITMENT.

4, GIVEN THE UNCERTAINTIES WHICH ATTEND THIS .... THINK IT MAY BE USEFUL TO LAY OUT THE OPTION AS W..... ..... THE PROS AND CONS OF EACH:

A, FULL RECRUITMENT WITH TURNOVER TO STATION. ADVANTAGE IS OBVIOUS: WE COULD LEVY REQUIRMENTS WITH REASONABLE EXPECTA-TION THAT L/1 WOULD DO WHAT HE CAN TO SATISFY THEM. THIS APPROACH ALSO HAS THE HIGHEST FLAP POTENTIAL. L/1 COULD YELL ...., AND FEED RUTHERFORD TO THE REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR. A MORE SUBTLE BUT STILL REAL DANGER IS THAT L/1 WOULD COVER HIS .ETS BY ASKING KHOMEINI AND/OR BAZARGAN TO ENDORSE A RELATION-SHIP WHICH HE WOULD DESCRIBE AS SOME KIND OF UNOFFICIAL LIAISON. THIS WOULD SIGNAL TO THEM THAT WE ARE NOT COTENT WITH THE SDPLOD/1 CHANNEL, AND SEEK MULTIPLE LINES INTO THE PGOI; IT

WOULD ALSO GIVE THE LIE TO OUR DENIAL TO SDPLOD/1 AND COMPANY OF A RESIDENT RTACTION PRESENCE IN TEHRAN.

B, RUTHERFORD'S HYBRID AN APPROACH WHICH SOLICITS L/1'S COOPERATION AS PERSONAL ADVISOR TO RUTHERFORD AND ENDS WITH INSERTION OF STATION OFFICER AS OBSTENSIBLE COMMO CHANNEL HAS ADVANTAGE THAT, IF SUCCESSFUL, WE WIND UP WITHSTATION OFFICER IN DIRECT CONTACT, WHILE HAVING PRESERVED SOME DEGREE OF DENIABILITY. RUTHERFORD, MEANWHILE, HAS BEEN ABLE TO PROCEED BY DEGREES UNTIL L/1 AGREES TO THE RELATIVELY INNOCUOUS ADVISORY FUNCTION, THE QUESTION OF NVBLAZON INVOLVEMENT NEVER COMES UP. POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES ARE: (1) L/1 MAY AGREE TO THE ADVISORY FUNCTION, IN RETURN FOR SPECIFIED COMPENSATION, BUT BALK AT DEALING WITH INTERMEDIARY, WE THEN GET LITTEL IF ANY QUID FOR OUR QUO. (2) AT THE MENTION OF EMBASSY CUTOUT, L/1 LOSES WHATEVER INNOCENCE HE MAY HAVE HAD ABOUT RUTHERFORD'S REAL PURPOSES. THERE IS LESS FLAP POTENTIAL IN THIS PHASED APPROACH THAN IN PARA 4 SCENARIO, BUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT .... WILL SEEK APPROVAL FOR THE SDPLOD/1 REALATIONSHIP THUS REMAIN ABOUT THE SAME.

C, OBSTENSIBLE COMMERCIAL RECRUITMENT. IF RUTHERFORD MAINTAINS THE OBSTENSIBLE COMMERCIAL MOTIVATION OF HIS OFFER RELYING ON PERSONAL CONTACT AND OPEN MAIL FOR COMMUNICATION RECRUITMENT RISK IS MINIMIZED. SO IS PRODUCT: THE RANGE OF PERMISSIBLE QUESTIONS IS LIMITED, AND COMMUNICATIONS ARE UNSATISFACTORY.

D, POSTPONEMENT UNTIL L/1 VISITS PARIS, RUTHERFORD'S ..... RISK DECLINES TO ABOUT ZERO, AND L/1 MIGHT WELL BE .... CEPTIVE TO A PITCH MADE ON A NEUTRAL GROUND. DISADVANTAGES ARE THAT TIMING OF L/1 TRIP TO PARIS IS INDETERMINATE, AND THAT ..... NO GURANTEE TEHRAN CASE OFFICER WOULD BE AVAILABLE WHEN ..... DECIDES TO GO (RUTHERFORD ADVISES THAT RELATIONSHIP MORE ..... TO PROSPER IF CONDUCTED IN FRENCH, BELIEVES COS IS ONLY TEHRAN OFFICER WITH ADEQUATE PROFICIENCY IN THAT LANGUAGE.)

5, AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE WE WOULD RATHER SEE A RECRUITMENT PITCH BY NOC OFFICER MADE ON NEUTRAL GROUND, AND WILL ACCORDINGLY INSTRUCT RUTHERFORD TO PROBE FURTHER RE POSSIBLE TIMING OF AN L/1 VISIT TO PARIS. IF THIS IS COMPLETELY INDETERMINATE, WE WILL HAVE TO DECIDE AMONG OTHER OPTIONS, OR ELECT TO WAIT FOR ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY. OF THE FIRST THREE OPTIONS, THE SECOND SEEMS MOST SUCCESSFULLY TO BALANCE THE RISKS VERSOS POTENTIAL BENEFITS,

REVEALING INTELLIGENCE INTERESTS ON A PHASED BASIS AND PRESERVING SOME DENIABILITY. HQS WILL PRESUMABLY WANT TO DEVOTE PARTICULAR ATTENSION TO THE SDPLOD/1 LIAISON IN TAKING ITS RISK/BENEFIT CALCULATION, AS THIS IS AN EQUITY WHOSE EXISTENCE POSTDATES THE INCEPTION OF THE RUTHERFORD APPROACH TO L/1.

6, IF RECRUITMENT IS TO BE ATTEMPTED PER ANY OF FIRST TO THREE OPTIONS, SUGGEST WE OFFER USD ONE THOUSAND MONTHLY FOR TRIAL PERIOD OF THREE TO SIX MONTHS.

7, REQUEST HQS ADVISE BY ITS COB 4 SEPT HOW IT ..... STATION TO PROCEED.

8, FILE: 201-959089. RVW 4 SEP9 DRV D9C.9. ALL SECRET S E C R E T

S E C R E T 0423512 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 50734

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN

WNINTEL RYRAT LEGAMEN SDLURE

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54113
P. TEHRAN 54107

1. FOLLOWING IS RESPONSE TO REF A SCENARIO PROPOSALS:

2. PLANNING AT THIS POINT CENTERS ON RUTHERFORD'S ASSESS
THAT SDLURE/1 (L/1) MIGHT BE RECEPTIVE TO COMMERCIAL CONSULTA
RECRUITMENT PITCH. CONCUR WITH STATION THAT THIS DESIRABLE B
IT PROTECTS RUTHERFORD IN IRAN AND COULD OPEN WAY TO MORE FORM
PITCH ON NEUTRAL TERRITORY (I.E., PARIS) PD PARA 5 REF A PROP
NOTE IN ANY CASE OUR JUDGMENT (WHICH FACTORS IN SDPLOD/1 DEVEL
MENTS) THAT INTRODUCTION OF "EMBASSY" OFFICER INADVISABLE AT
TIME.

3. ACCORDINGLY, WE ENVISAGE COMBINATION OF OPTIONS C AND
PARA 4 REF A. CONCUR KEY ELEMENT OF THIS WOULD BE FOR RUTHERF
TO PROBE L/1'S INTENTIONS TO TRAVEL TO PARIS IN NEAR FUTU
EXPLORE HIS INTEREST IN ACCEPTING CONSULTANT STATUS; IF HIS PR
PLANS INDETERMINATE, SUGGEST RUTHERFORD INVITE L/1 TO PARIS (P
BY OFFERING TO PAY HIS AIR FARE) FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. MAK
INVITATION IN THIS WAY WOULD BE USEFUL TEST OF L/1'S INTEREST
PURSUING RUTHERFORD RELATIONSHIP AND WOULD ULTIMATELY DISCREET
(CONSPIRATORIAL) CONTACT IN PARIS. BELIEVE PRESENCE OF L/1'S
CHILDREN AND APARTMENT IN PARIS WOULD BE ADDED INCENTIVE AND PR
SUFFICIENT REASON FOR L/1 TO OBTAIN PERMISSION TO TRAVEL THERE.

4. IF, HOWEVER, IT APPEARS L/1 UNABLE TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF IRA
OR FORESEEABLE FUTURE BUT HE MANIFESTLY ATTRACTED BY CONSULTANC
CONCEPT, SUGGEST RUTHERFORD PROVIDE L/1 WITH REQUIREMENTS AND MA
SUBSEQUENT TRIP(S) TO TEHRAN TO BRIEF AND DEBRIEF HIM UNTIL MORE
PERMANENT AND SOPHISTICATED ARRANGEMENT CAN BE DEVISED. BELIEVE
RANGE OF PERMISSABLE QUESTIONS NEED NOT BE LIMITED TO THE INSIGN
ANT OR SUPERFICIAL.

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 52748 S E C R E T

5. CONCUR STATION COMPENSATION PROPOSAL IN PARA 5.

6. WELCOME STATION COMMENTS.

7. WE HAVE JUST BEEN NOTIFIED, VIA PRONTO T, THAT
SCHEDULED DEPARTURE 11 SEPT. BELIEVE THIS TIME FRAME WILL
ACCOMMODATE OUR PLANNING AND ALLOW ADEQUATE TIME FOR ONE OR
FINAL MEETINGS WITH L/1. IF THIS DOES NOT GIVE RUTHERFORD
TIME, ASSUME HE CAN DEVISE APPROPRIATE REASON FOR DELAYING
DEPARTURE FROM TEHRAN.

8. FILE 201-959289. RVW 24 SEPT 99 DRV 90C.1 ALL.

S E C R E T
BT
#1149



R E T 1[illegible]2340Z SEP 79 STAFF

E[illegible]DIRECTOR 512703.

[illegible]RIORITY TEHRAN.

INTEL RYBAT LPCAMIN SDLURE

S: A. TEHRAN 54174
B. TEHRAN 54173
C. TEHRAN 54165
D. TEHRAN 54154

1. NO TRACES OR OTHER IDENTIFIABLE INFO ON SHANDAR.

2. CONCUR PARA 2 REF C PROPOSAL AS EARLIER AGREED. MI
BJECTIVE FOR THIS TRIP IS ATTEMPT AT COMMERCIAL CONSULTANT FI
EF A ASSESSMENT OF SDLURE/1'S PRESENT SITUATION AND FRAME OF
EINFORCE S ASSESSMENT OF VERY MINIMAL BLOWBACK RISK THIS TYPE
APPROACH. GOOD LUCK.

3. FILE: 201-959289. RVW 10[illegible]P99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECR

S E C R E T
B
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

S E C R E T 120720Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRA 54194

TO: DIRECTOR.

INTEL RYBAT LPCAMIN SDLURE

1. PLEASE ADVISE RUTHERFORD COVER COMPANY:

A. COVER COMPANY CABLE OF 31 AUGUST ARRIVED 10 SEPT.

B. $40K ADVANCE REACHED HOTEL 10 SEPT.

C. R UNABLE TO TELEPHONE AS PTT NOT PLACING LONG DISTANCE
DURING TALEGHANI MOURNING PERIOD.

2. FILE: 201-959289. RVW 12 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL
E T



S E 120721Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE 54195

TO: F FRANTECH INRC PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

INTEL LPGAMIN SDLURE

ERFORD DEPARTING TEHRAN 13 SEPT VIA LH 601 AT
AR FRANKFURT A130.

2. TELEPHONE AFTERNOON 13 SEPT AS GEORGE. SUGGEST
AT H ASSE SITE TWO EPT TWO HOURS EARLIER THAN
AGREE TELEPHONE.

3. HQS ADVISE VIA FRANTECH BY 13 SEPT IF AND
FURTHER COULD PROCEED WASH. FYI 13 SEPT SS DRV DSC.

SECRET
SECRET

15 SEP 79 Z

C T 32[illegible]5 Z SEP 79 STAFF

TER TO [illegible]13 54[illegible].

ITE TEHRAN, FRANTECH INFO DIRTECH, ATHTECH.

NTEL VEAT PO IN SDLURE, AQUATIC

S: A. EH AN 4285
B. EH AN 4195
C. EH AT 4194
D. EH AT 4193

AE GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY REF A DEVELOPMENTS AND
TIC TH STRAL PROGRESS CAN BE CONSOLIDATED INTO
DUCTIVE CO E IAL RECRUITMENT IN NEAR FUTURE. WISH EXPRES
R PRECIAT ON TO RUTHERFORD FOR ADVANCING SDLURE/1 (L/1)
SE ALONG TO TH STAGE AND TO STATION FOR ITS SUPPORT AND
ID E OVER PA TWO WEEKS.

TH E. UR PL NING WILL NOW FOCUS ON FUTURE HANDLING OF L/
VE EM O VE UALLY DRAWING HIM TO PARIS PR PARA 4 REF A.
TE AT TH STAGE WE ENVISAGE RUTHERFORD'S CONTINUED
VO HE ERATION AND WE SEE IT AS LIKELY ANOTHER
IS OR DIS D TEHRAN MAY BE IN ORDER TO DEBRIEF AND PAY
1 ETT H UNTIL TIME L/1 FEELS HE ABLE TO TEAK AWAY
DR P IS R P. DETAILED PLANNING AND PROPOSALS WILL FOLLOW
T R E AV PROMPTLY DEBRIEFED RUTHERFORD.

3. FR ANTECH: APPRECIATE YOUR SUPPORT DURING THIS
TA OF OL RE OPERATION. PLS SUGGEST TO RUTHERFORD THAT
LA T ANTICIPATING TO HIS HOME ADDRESS FOR WEEKEND 15 HIS
ER PER OF LINE SCHEDULES PERMIT) AND THEN TDY HQS AREA
7 SEP E FOR DEBRIEFING/PLANNING SESSION. ANTICIPATE
U FOL AGREEMENT WITH THIS TIMETABLE, WE HAVE MADE
FOLLOWING AIR AND HOTEL RESERVATIONS FOR H

I S T: DEPART BOSTON (LOGAN) AT 54 HRS VIA
NORTHWEST-ORIENT FLT 79
ARRIVE DULLES AT 1718 HRS





15 SEP 79 Z

S E [illegible] T 41049Z SEP 79 STAFF

CIT[illegible] TE[illegible] 39582

TO: [illegible]DIATE DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, ATHE[illegible]CH, DIRTECH.

[illegible]NNI [illegible]YBE[illegible] LPGAMIN SDLURE TECHS

REF[illegible] DIRECTOR 513151
[illegible]EHRAN 54195

[illegible]ECRE[illegible] UNABLE TO PASS ALONG REF A INFORMATION TO
[illegible]TH[illegible]D S[illegible]CE REF ARRIVED AFTER EZNOVA LAST CONTAC
[illegible]ITH[illegible] RUTHERFORD DEPARTED FRANKFURT FOR NEW YORK 14 SEP
000[illegible] IA[illegible]E 494.

2[illegible] L: 201-959289. RVW 14 SEP 99, DRV D9C.1.

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95[illegible]

6 OCT 79 09 34Z

S E C R E T 060119Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 528124.

TO: TEHRAN.

ADMIN FINAN

1. TDY TRAVELER GUY W. RUTHERFORD HAS SUBMITTED ACCOUNTING WHICH LISTS $300.00 ADVANCE RECEIVED FROM TEHRAN STATION ON 12 SEPTEMBER. PLEASE CONFIRM TYPE OF CURRENCY ADVANEED AND EXACT AMOUNT.

2. PLEASE ADVISE STATUS OF TEHRAN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER ACCOUNTINGS. RVW 5OCT99 DRV D9C.3 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#3044

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